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Zimbabwe Pacific Cotonou Agreement signed 23 June 
ι 
SN 
The Cotonou Agreement is strikingly 
different in its philosophy from the previ-
ous Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. 
Its expression of partnership is 
eloquent. 
Engagement and mutual responsibility 
are implicit features of the new agree-
ment. The most important objective is 
the fight against poverty, and its principal 
tool is dialogue. Dialogue on develop-
ment policy will allow errors to be cor-
rected and cooperation improved. 
Emphasis is also put on effectiveness, 
to be achieved by simplifying the proce-
dures, speeding up the allocation of 
resources, and by involving a greater 
layer of society in the partnership, 
notably the non-governmental organisa-
tions and the private sector. The gradual 
insertion of the ACP countries into the 
global economy is the objective of a 
strategy aimed at reinforcing regional 
integration. This will enable the ACP 
countries to benefit from globalisation, 
and not be subservient to it. 
On 23 June, a new Partnership 
Agreement was signed in Cotonou, linking 
the 77 ACP countries and the European 
Union. This date represents a major histori-
cal and political event. It is a clear demon-
stration that after the disappointing results 
of Seattle, in a globalised world there is still 
room for a true and deep relationship 
between the North and the South. 
Agreement was reached on how to address 
the major challenges facing ACP countries, 
such as poverty, conflicts and wars, envi-
ronmental threats, risks of economic and 
technological marginalisation. This was 
achieved thanks to a shared political 
willingness to give an ambitious response 
to these problems, building on the acquis of 
25 years of cooperation under the Lomé 
Conventions. 
The new Agreement centres on reducing 
and eventually eradicating poverty, and the 
gradual integration of the ACP countries 
into the world economy. 
We must show the rest of the world that 
we have a shared vision of the future of this 
relationship and that we will deliver. 
Jean-Robert Goulangana, 
ACP Secretary General 
Poul Nielson, 
Commissioner for Development 
and Humanitarian Aid Issue 181  J u n e / J u I y 
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The ACP-EU Courier 
is the main publication of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
and the European Union. The EU provides ACP countries with 
preferential access to EU markets and substantial development 
assistance (some two to three billion Euros a year). The ACP and EU 
cooperate at a political level and engage in a continuous political dia-
logue: in trade, to promote the integration of the ACP countries into the 
World Economy and in development assistance, with the clear objective 
to promote sustainable development and the reduction of poverty. iiàawiT ■■> 
The 21st Century has started well 
for the ACP-EU partnership. 
In February 2000 we concluded an agreement that is a landmark in development cooperation: the new 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, set for another 20 years. 
Building on the success of Lomé, this agreement is the most comprehensive and ambitious partnership 
between developing and developed countries. 
It renews and strengthens our commitment to working together to combat poverty, the principal aim on our 
development agenda, and provides a powerful and effective mechanism for political dialogue. It is also a 
framework for new partnerships for trade and Investment and the gradual Integration of ACP countries into 
the world economy. 
At the centre of the partnership is capacity building to establish real ownership. For the first time, non-state 
actors are brought into the process - NGOs, civil society, the private sector are all involved, because the 
partners believe that to get results on the ground, all those Involved must take part and not just govern-
ments. Alongside the renewed commitment to principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, 
the Agreement also promotes good governance as a fundamental objective and gives priority for both part-
ners to fight against corruption. 
The Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa was concluded in October 1999. It 
is a major achievement that in time provides for the creation of a free trade area between the EU and South 
Africa, which will complement the trading links both parties have with the other ACP countries. We can build 
on this Agreement to help promote trade and Investment in the ACP countries and in southern Africa as a 
whole. And we can learn from it in designing new trading arrangements between the EU and other ACP 
regions. 
Political dialogue at the highest level took place at the first ever General Summit of EU and African Heads 
of State in Cairo, in April, and echoed the concerns dealt with in the Partnership Agreement. The search for 
peace, democracy, regional integration and development were at the centre of debate, and there was a real 
sense of International commitment and communication. 
The Commission Is now looking critically at its development efforts. It began the new Millennium with a 
decision to work on its own organisational and policy reform and in May agreed on a substantial reform of 
its external General Directorates, which organise and manage development cooperation. 
No single donor is able to address the whole spectrum of development: donors and developing countries 
must work together to succeed. The Commission's new development policy spells out six key priority areas 
for our operations: trade, regional integration, support for macroeconomic policies with a particular focus on 
health and education, transport, food security and Institutional capacity building. These are areas where the 
Commission believes it can and should add value whereas In other areas of cooperation we will seek to 
support Initiatives led by the national authorities, in conjunction with other donors and civil society partners. 
In two and a half years as Director General of Development within the European Commission, I have been 
aware of the huge challenges facing our partner countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific - the 
daily insecurity suffered by those who live below the poverty line, the damage inflicted on people and their 
homelands by conflicts, the diseases which continue to threaten millions and the menacing consequences 
of environmental degradation. I have, however, also witnessed immense courage and commitment to 
Improve things for people in both the ACP and European partner countries. 
The task we have set ourselves - the eradication of poverty - may not succeed in this generation but I 
believe we have equipped ourselves with the right tools. We have agreed on the principles and the rules, 
now we have to get on with it. There is a lot to do. The Commission is sharpening up its development policy 
and reforming its Internal structure for development assistance. The European Union, as the World's largest 
aid donor, has the experience and the expertise to make a difference. Acting as a reliable partner to so 
many countries whose future depends on Europe's continued support, the Commission, alongside the 
Member States of the European Union, must help them to make the push for real progress. That progress 
can only be measured by their capacity to build a sound and competitive economy In a free and stable 
society able to combat poverty effectively. It is with economic sovereignty, that political sovereignty will be 
strengthened. 
2  UX^ 
Philip Lowe 
Director-General, DG Development 
until June 2000 Time for change 
by Kenneth Karl 
M 
any people predicted an uncertain 
future for ACP-EU cooperation. 
Some went so far as to call it mori-
bund, obsolete - incapable of sufficiently absorb-
ing the many changes of the dying years of this 
century to have any hope of effective renewal. 
The pessimists were wrong. The European Union 
and the ACP States have just embarked upon a 
new partnership, with a term of 20 years plus a 
five-yearly review clause. At the joint ministerial 
conference in Brussels on 2 and 3 February, the 
71 African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the 
15 Member States of the European Union suc-
ceeded in reaching agreement on the future 
terms of cooperation between them, to replace 
the Lomé Convention that had been in force 
since 1975. 
Driven by the fruitful and wide-ranging debate 
prompted by the Commission's Green Paper, 
negotiations opened in September 1998 and 
ended only a few days before the expiry of the 
fourth Lomé Convention. These discussions -
protracted, contentious and sometimes difficult -
nevertheless took place in a constructive atmos-
phere that accurately reflected the determination 
of both groups of partners to deepen and 
improve relations between them by making the 
necessary - even unavoidable - adjustments. The 
negotiations, and the reshaping of the model of 
North-South partnership regarded as unique in 
the world, were based on a determination to 
safeguard the undeniable achievements of a 
quarter of a century of cooperation, implemented 
through four successive Conventions, and the 
3 contrasting results of those Conventions. 
Despite the many comparative advantages 
offered by the Lomé system, the overall balance-
sheet of ACP-EU cooperation has always been 
patchy, as the Green Paper itself concludes. 
Today, more than half of the ACP group mem-
bers (39 of them) are ranked among the least -
developed countries (LDCs). Although some 
countries in the group have made skilful use of 
the opportunities offered by Lomé, several of 
them have been unable to achieve economic lift-
off. Not all the initial objectives of the Lomé 
Convention have been achieved, and the path 
towards efficient application of some of its provi-
sions has been full of obstacles. It has become 
imperative, therefore, for the states bound by 
this agreement to come up with alternative 
paradigms. 
Between adaptation and innovation 
From Lomé I to Lomé IV - not forgetting the 
two Yaoundé Conventions, preceded by the 
Association system that followed on from the 
Treaty of Rome - the two groups of states have 
constantly looked for ways of improving coopera-
tion between them as each has grown larger and 
been confronted by global geopolitical and eco-
nomic changes. While the end of the Cold War 
that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
brought a new framework and philosophy to 
North-South relations, it inevitably influenced 
relations between the European Union and the 
ACP States. The shift in the Union's priority 
issues towards other zones of political and eco-
nomic involvement (Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean States), and the Union's desire to 
rationalise its external spending, hinted at a 
gradual abandonment of its historical 
partnerships. 
The two groups of states have reaffirmed their 
commitment to maintaining relations between 
them by opting to pursue this cooperation 
despite their awareness of the need for 
necessary adjustments. Furthermore, the 
changes in the global economy, highlighted by 
the acceleration of globalisation in recent years 
and the relative inability of the ACP States to 
take part in world trade or to derive the maxi-
mum possible growth and socio-economic devel-
opment from it, have compelled the partners to 
redefine cooperation priorities. The agreement 
concluded in early February this year in 
Brussels, and signed in Cotonou in June, thus 
forms part of a very different philosophy. It envis-
ages new alignments, the strengthening of sec-
toral strategies and implementing mechanisms 
geared to more efficient cooperation. 
The dossier that follows, while by no means 
comprehensive, is an attempt to analyse the 
major changes underlying the new Agreement -
changes based on five central pillars, which will 
govern cooperation between the EU and ACP 
States at the dawn of the third millennium. 
One of the main innovations in this Agreement 
is the opening up of the partnership to include 
new actors, and more particularly non-state 
actors. The Lomé Convention had traditionally 
been based — in theory and in practice — on 
forms of consultation giving preference to inter-
governmental relations. The emergence of civil 
society during recent years and the need to pro-
mote a genuinely participative form of develop-
ment better suited to the involvement of local 
actors resulted in the negotiators looking beyond 
the simple governmental framework towards 
greater decentralisation of aid. This approach, 
however, requires both sides to accept the chal-
lenges, and to do so on several levels, both 
strategic and active. Gilles Desesquelles con-
tributes a detailed analysis of the problems to 
this dossier. 
The new Agreement also recommends a 
stronger political dimension to the partnership, to 
be achieved by the establishment of a continuing 
and open dialogue between the partners. 
4 Although this theme did make its appearance in 
the last Lomé Convention, new subjects such as 
conflict prevention, management and resolution, 
together with issues associated with good gover-
nance, have been added on this occasion, thus 
boosting the political content of cooperation, as 
Sophie Da Cámara of ECDPM explains. 
Furthermore, concentrating on reducing poverty 
is explicitly a central objective of the new partner-
ship, as envisaged by the general provisions of 
the Agreement and the broad outlines of the 
Union's global development cooperation policy. In 
contrast to the earlier conventions, an integrated 
and coordinated strategic approach to combatting 
From Lomé I to Lomé IV, not 
forgetting the two Yaoundé 
Conventions, the two groups of 
countries have consistently tried to 
improve cooperation between them 
poverty has been defined, and special emphasis 
has been placed on social and human develop-
ment, and also on regional integration and coop-
eration. Guggi Laryea of Eurostep, a network of 
more than 20 European NGOs, introduces us 
here to the various issues. The aim of eradicating 
poverty, and in particular the EU's determination 
to promote the gradual and harmonious integra-
tion of the developing countries into the global 
economy, as stipulated in Title XVII (Article 130 
U) of the Maastricht Treaty, have also brought 
about changes in the trade framework. The sys-
tem of trade preferences granted by the EU to 
the ACP States, with no duty of reciprocity, by 
way of derogation from the rules governing world 
trade, and measures which it was hoped would 
encourage them to diversify their exports and so 
increase their market shares, have had a limited 
impact. New trade agreements aiming at the 
gradual introduction of regional trading partner-
ships compatible with WTO rules are planned fol-
lowing a preparatory period of eight years during 
which the various arrangements will be dis-
cussed. The new trade agreements discussed in 
this dossier by Peter Gakunu, form part of a 
global approach which closely involves support 
activities by the EU for the development of the 
private sector in the ACP States. Furthermore, 
the complex and cumbersome procedures for 
implementing the Lomé Convention, responsible 
for the mass of unused resources, persuaded the 
negotiators to reform the financial cooperation 
arrangements. Guiding principles were estab-
lished, most notably more efficient cooperation 
instruments, and revision of the planning system 
and simplification of implementation procedures, 
as briefly outlined for us by Cecilia Eld-Thorffin. 
The financial resources, which will be better 
managed under the new Agreement, are allocat-
ed as follows: €13.5 billion to the 9th EDF, 
including €10 billion for the long-term arrange-
ment, €1.3 billion for regional cooperation and 
€2.2 billion for the investment facility. The left 
overs from the earlier EDFs, furthermore, are 
assessed at €9.9 billion, to which must be added 
the ElB's own estimated resources of €1.7 bil-
lion. The new Agreement also contains a com-
pendium of reference texts with political and eco-
nomic guidelines defined in the major objectives 
and strategic priorities to be adopted by the ACP-
EU Council of Ministers. In the interests of flexi-
bility - another striking innovation in comparison 
with the earlier Conventions - this compendium 
will be adapted and updated to meet the chang-
ing needs of cooperation. In view of this wide 
range of adjustments, the new Agreement is 
clearly looking to a different future, and the 86 
partners have declared their determination to 
work together to ensure it is implemented more 
efficiently than it has been in the past. 
5 The non-governmental actors 
by Gilles Desesquelles* 
T
he new Convention enshrines the prin-
ciple of participative development, 
extending the partnership concept to 
include a very wide range of actors (civil society, 
the private sector and local authorities). The idea 
is not just to involve these actors in implementing 
projects but to bring them into the political dial-
ogue and make sure they participate in defining 
and evaluating development strategies and pro-
grammes. Decentralised cooperation is thus des-
tined to become an essential aspect of the ACP-
EU partnership. However, for this approach to 
become operationally effective, it is necessary for 
the actors concerned to confront a number of 
challenges. 
An inevitable trend 
Post-independence strategies have made the 
state a controlling influence in development, 
often at the expense of other actors. This devel-
opment approach was also behind cooperation 
policies. Thus, the Lomé Conventions have been 
the preserve of central government. Despite 
recent innovations (such as the decentralised 
cooperation introduced under Lomé IV in 1989) 
ACP-EU cooperation largely kept decentralised 
actors out. During the consultation process 
preparatory to the Green Paper (1996), the need 
to extend ACP-EU cooperation to other types of 
actors was seen as a main political priority. Two 
processes of change made this inevitable: first, 
the ascendancy of a broader range of actors 
(civil society, the private sector and local authori-
ties) anxious to make a larger contribution to 
development, and secondly the emergence of a 
new role for the state with the implementation of 
political reforms and support for the processes of 
liberalisation and decentralisation. In the first 
stage, development cooperation enabled certain 
actors to be involved in the implementation of 
projects and programmes. Today, they want to 
participate in both the formulation and implemen-
tation of development and cooperation policies. 
There are a number of factors that underline the 
need to progress from the mere involvement of 
these actors to their genuine participation in the 
administration of development policies and pro-
grammes. Recent events (the public demonstra-
tions in Seattle and Washington) emphasise the 
part that an active and organised civil society 
expects to play in international cooperation. The 
challenges posed by globalisation, the fight 
against poverty and sustainable development do 
indeed suggest that we should abandon the 
"State versus market" debate and emphasise the 
mobilisation of the various actors, resources and 
capacity and the concept of new public/private 
partnerships. It is now acknowledged that the 
necessary adaptation of the development 
processes requires the involvement of all the 
groups of actors. The EU and other donors are 
currently undertaking a radical review of coopera-
tion policies and approaches to cooperation. The 
political interest of the EU in more participative 
development was also reflected in its negotiating 
mandate for the period after Lomé in the other 
cooperation agreements (MED and ALA), and in 
a whole series of recent initiatives designed to 
introduce new rules governing transparency to 
facilitate public access to information and the 
definition of European policies laid down in the 
Amsterdam treaty. The problems associated with 
the role and involvement of civil society in every 
day life arise not just in the South but also in 
Europe. In this respect, it is worth recalling the 
guidelines set out by the President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi, in his 
address "Shaping the New Europe," given to the 
6 European Parliament on 15 February 2000: 
"The challenge is to radically rethink the way 
we make Europe. To devise a completely new 
form of governance for the world of tomorrow. Let 
me be clear here. The enlarged Europe will cer-
tainly need strong institutions, but they must be 
democratically legitimate institutions that operate 
in a transparent and accountable way and enjoy 
the full confidence of the citizens. People want a 
much more participatory, hands-on democracy. 
They will not support the European project 
unless they are fully involved in setting goals, 
making policy and evaluating progress. And they 
are right. I believe we have to stop thinking in 
terms of hierarchical layers of competence sepa-
rated by the subsidiarity principle and start think-
ing, instead, of a networking arrangement, with 
all levels of governance shaping, proposing, 
implementing and monitoring policy together." 
The message is clear: for Europe to be an 
energetic driving force it needs to be transparent, 
responsible and therefore trusted in its relations 
with the public. The opening up of ACP-EU coop-
eration for the decentralised actors may therefore 
result in major advances. It offers an alternative 
to the top-down approaches that offer little scope 
for local adjustment, creation of responsibility and 
viability. It may improve the processes of (sec-
toral) policy formulation and programme imple-
mentation, while promoting synergistic effects 
between public and private actors. It is also cru-
cially important for the achievement of the aims 
of ACP-EU cooperation (the fight against poverty, 
the advancement of the private sector, support 
for local governance). Following this line of rea-
soning, the broadening of the partnership should 
not be perceived as a threat to the ACP govern-
ments. On the contrary, experience suggests that 
sustainable development cannot be split between 
states and markets, central and local govern-
ments, public actors and society, but requires 
genuine civil interaction. 
. 
New opportunities 
It is precisely this interaction that future ACP-
EU cooperation intends to promote. The first 
point to be made is that the legal provisions of 
the new Agreement represent an important step 
forward. The "participation" of various types of 
actors is defined as one of the four "fundamental 
principles" for implementing the partnership. An 
entire chapter is devoted to the "partnership 
actors" divided into two main categories: the pub-
lic authorities (local, national and regional) and 
the non-state actors (the private sector and the 
economic and social partners, including trade 
union organisations and civil society in all its 
forms, depending on the characteristics of each 
country). This section contains specific commit-
ments to ensure the participation of the decen-
tralised actors in: 
• supplying them with appropriate information 
on the ACP-EU partnership Agreement, 
especially in the ACP states 
• ensuring that civil society is consulted on the 
economic, social and institutional policies and 
reforms that will be the subject of EU support 
• facilitating the participation of the non-
governmental actors in the implementation of the 
programmes and projects 
Djibouti. 
Women actors in the 
partnership. Civil society 
emerges from its shell 
7 Cape Verde, March 
2000. 
Africa-Europe Civil 
Society Forum 
• supplying them with appropriate support to 
boost their capacities 
• encouraging networking and the establish-
ment of links between the ACP and EU actors. 
References to non-state actors are also to be 
found in other sections of the new Agreement, 
covering in particular the complementary nature 
of their role and their potential contribution to the 
aims of cooperation (for example, in the promo-
tion of human rights, the processes of démocra-
tisation and governance, and conflict preven-
tion), and their advisory role in the decision-mak-
ing bodies of ACP-EU cooperation (for example, 
as regards dialogue at the level of the Council of 
Ministers and the Joint Assembly). 
The institutionalisation of Decentralised 
Cooperation (DC) 
The new opportunities mentioned above reflect 
the ascendancy of the Decentralised Coopera-
tion approach. Experiments with this line of 
approach have taken place through the 
Community budget (budget line B7-6430 
Decentralised Cooperation) and, in some coun-
tries, in connection with the EDF These experi-
ments made it possible to clarify the concept and 
operational implications of DC, to inform the vari-
ous actors and improve their awareness, to pro-
mote partnerships between public and private 
actors, to institute pilot programmes, to test new, 
decentralised administrative mechanisms and to 
improve integration of Decentralised Cooperation 
with the political decentralisation processes tak-
ing place in various ACP states. Even though its 
implementation was often complex and slow, ini-
tial results confirm the potential of this innovative 
approach. More sophisticated and diverse 
decentralised cooperation programmes - going 
beyond the traditional microproject approach -
have been launched in a number of countries 
(Benin, Ghana, Uganda, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Guinea 
Conakry and Madagascar). By degrees, there 
are also signs that minds are becoming more 
receptive to this new approach, both among the 
ACP-EU political leaders and among the decen-
tralised actors (who, for their part too, have often 
preferred to work in isolation rather than in 
partnership with other actors). 
Decentralised Cooperation within the frame-
work of the EU is not yet another instrument or 
outlet for financing small grass-root projects, but 
a specific approach to cooperation based on five 
central ideas: 
• active participation and responsibility of all 
groups of actors; 
• greater coordination between various actors 
through dialogue, the quest for synergies, and 
an attempt to establish consistency between the 
various actors' initiatives; 
• delegation of administrative - including finan-
cial - responsibilities to the closest possible hier-
archical level of the actors concerned; 
• the adoption of a process approach with a 
view to ensuring genuine participation and local 
adjustment; 
• the prioritisation of reinforcing capacities and 
institutional development with a view to boosting 
the potential for action and control of local 
initiatives. 
In practice, Decentralised Cooperation pro-
grammes can be conceived as mainly following 
8 two priority axes of intervention: 
• as support for the process 
of decentralisation, aimed at the 
establishment of legitimate and 
effective systems of local 
government; 
• as support for local devel-
opment initiatives and pro-
cesses, making it possible to 
ensure consistency between 
isolated activities (micro-imple-
mentations, NGO activities, 
twinning) within a given spatial 
framework. 
The challenge is to find com-
plementary and synergistic 
effects between these two axes 
which, overall, represent legiti-
macy and credibility. 
The practical challenges 
The moment of truth will 
come when these new princi-
ples relating to the actors are 
put into practice. We must be 
realistic: the implementation of 
a pluralistic partnership concept 
will take time, political courage, 
institutional creativity and on-
the-job learning. Twenty-five 
years of centralised administra-
tion have shaped the attitudes, 
instruments and procedures of 
ACP-EU cooperation. The 
involvement of the decen-
tralised actors in defining and 
implementing policy is, in many 
ways, a cultural revolution. 
Council Regulation 1659/98 
rightly observes that the pur-
pose of DC is to help to "bring 
about a real long-term change 
in the EU's cooperation proce-
dures." Unless the mental barri-
ers can be broken down, 
progress will be slow. In any 
case, it must be said that 
neither the central governments 
nor the Commission 
Delegations have much experi-
ence of dialogue, networking or 
public-private partnerships. It 
will be necessary to establish 
new consultation, planning and 
joint action practices, in line 
with the realities and capabili-
ties of each ACP state, in par-
ticular by encouraging reflection 
on the implications of this 
approach in terms of the radical 
change in the roles and atti-
tudes of the central agencies 
and partners of the north, such 
as the NGO's, and in terms of 
flexible and decentralised 
administrative procedures. It 
will also be important to 
strengthen the capacities of the 
governmental actors to enable 
them to play their new part as 
facilitators. The decentralised 
actors of the ACP states are 
not necessarily ready to embark 
upon this new partnership con-
cept. Some of them still regard 
the state (or local government) 
as more of an enemy than a 
partner. Others are confronted 
by problems of legitimacy, 
organisation or capacity to 
position themselves as credible 
partners for governments and 
the EU, let alone as representa-
tives of the grass-roots actors. 
In this context, it is encouraging 
to note that the ACP actors are 
increasingly organised, espe-
cially at global level. As wit-
nessed by the recent creation 
of an ACP Civil Society Forum, 
an ACP Business Forum and 
an ACP Local Government 
Platform, initiatives supported 
by the Commission's 
Directorate-General for 
Development. The success of 
this new multi-actor partnership 
will to some extent depend on a 
consistent response by the EU, 
at various levels: political con-
sistency (for example, towards 
those ACP states that fail to 
abide by the participative spirit 
of the new agreement); finan-
cial consistency (ensuring that 
resources really are made 
available to decentralised 
actors); instrumental and proce-
dural consistency (adapting 
operating methods and proce-
dures to a genuinely decen-
tralised form of administration); 
and consistency as regards 
capacity (ensuring that adminis-
trators, both in Brussels and, 
especially, in the Delegations, 
have the necessary capability 
to implement a participative 
partnership). 
'Directorate-General for Development, 
Civil society, NGOs and 
Decentralised Cooperation 
9 The political dimension 
of the new ACP-EU partnership 
by Sophie da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes" 
WAR 
OVER! 
ITS TIME FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
PUP/LPA 
T
he political aspect of 
the ACP-EU partner-
ship has gradually 
become more important over 
the last 20 years. The new 
Agreement between the EU 
and the ACP States establishes 
a partnership strengthened 
politically by extensive and 
ongoing political dialogue and 
the involvement of new actors. 
The aim will be to provide a 
framework for discussion of 
questions of mutual or general 
interest, to be considered in 
implementing the objectives of 
the Convention. 
The new areas of political 
dialogue are 
• the problems of peace and 
security and the prevention, 
management and resolution of 
conflicts 
• good governance 
• the campaign against 
corruption 
• immigration issues. 
The dialogue will also 
address issues of greater 
respect for human rights and 
the strengthening of democratic 
principles and the rule of law -
aspects already present in the 
revised Fourth Lomé 
Convention, signed in 1995. 
Tough negotiations before 
the agreement? 
The EU brought to the negoti-
ating table an ambitious agenda 
prompted by the modest record 
of achievement of 30 years of 
development aid and coopera-
tion set out in the Commission's 
Green Paper. The EU's sum-
mary was a harsh one: despite 
many years of privileged coop-
eration and four Lomé 
Conventions, many of the ACP 
States were still suffering seri-
ous structural economic crises, 
crushing foreign debts, and a 
sharp proportional increase in 
internal poverty and external 
dependence. In addition, the 
changes brought by the end of 
the Cold War and by economic 
globalisation prompted a radical 
reassessment by the Union of 
traditional development cooper-
ation arrangements. At the 
same time, geopolitical and 
economic factors have resulted 
in Europe becoming more and 
more obviously disillusioned 
with its ACP partners. Not only 
that, some Member States 
wanted to introduce new factors 
into the negotiations, such as 
making allowance for conflicts. 
The ACP group, alerted by the 
declaration of intent in the 
10 Green Paper, reacted by going on the defensive, 
to safeguarding what they had gained and pre-
serving the unique and privileged relationship 
offered them by Lomé. The mandates of the two 
parties at the outset of negotiations broadly coin-
cided on the principles of a stronger political 
partnership, guided by sustainable development, 
the elimination of poverty, and integration of ACP 
countries into the global economy. This would be 
achieved by an integrated approach to develop-
ment, based on a propitious political environ-
ment (peace, stability, democracy, human rights, 
rule of law and good governance). 
The difficulties arose from the choice of imple-
menting mechanisms and the quest for equi-
librium and reciprocity between the parties. As 
far as essentials were concerned, the ACP 
States' mandate declared their commitment to 
the principles laid down by the existing 
Convention (human rights, democratic principles 
and the rule of law), while the Union wanted to 
make good governance a fourth essential. On 
this point, the main tensions that surfaced during 
the negotiations arose from the difficulty of arriv-
ing at a common definition of governance and 
corruption, the ACP States considering this a 
superfluous point since it was already taken into 
consideration by the first three. 
The final stumbling block as far as governance 
and corruption are concerned was whether or 
not they depended on the coercive mechanism 
of consultation and suspension of the 
Convention in the event of a violation. The ACP 
States argued that the complexity of arriving at 
universal criteria for assessing the level of gov-
ernance or corruption meant that the suspension 
clause, in their view, allowed broad scope for 
arbitrary opinions. The last obstacle to political 
dialogue was the handling of migration between 
the ACP States and the EU. The debate was all 
the more heated because it came up for discus-
sion during the final round of negotiations. The 
question of the repatriation of ACP nationals 
unlawfully resident in Europe was a flashpoint. 
Under the readmission clause, an ACP State 
through which a non-national had made an 
unlawful entry into the Union would have been 
required to allow him re-entry. This was unani-
mously rejected by the ACP States, and it was 
eventually decided that this issue should be 
shelved pending further bilateral negotiations. 
The terms of the Agreement? 
The preamble reasserts the importance of an 
integrated approach, taking due account of the 
political environment within which development 
aid is provided. The parties agree upon an 
unequivocal link between a peaceful, stable 
area, respectful of human rights and favourable 
to the broad establishment of a democratic sys-
tem based on the rule of law and the practice of 
good governance, and the possibility of sustain-
able development. The preamble also stresses 
that each State is responsible for establishing 
this favourable area for development. In addition, 
the Convention now stipulates the contributions 
that non-state actors (especially local authorities 
and civil society as far as political dialogue is 
concerned) might be able to make via a process 
of consultation, if relevant. The chapter on the 
political aspect contains changes regarding the 
content of the political dialogue, the definition 
and sanctioning of essential and fundamental 
elements, the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts, and the migration 
issue.There are a number of interesting innova-
tions. One is a reinforced political dialogue 
intended to improve the implementation of the 
agreement and avoid the need for recourse to 
the non-performance clause, while ensuring the 
deep commitment of the parties by establishing 
common priorities. This dialogue will need to be 
flexible, the precise form it takes depending on 
11 the issue with which it deals. It 
will cover the following main 
areas: the basic objectives of 
the Convention (creating an 
environment favourable to 
development), cooperation 
strategies and sectorial policies, 
subjects of mutual or general 
interest (arms dealing, discrimi-
nation, etc.), and all issues 
related to conflicts. It will 
involve representatives of 
regional and subregional organ-
isations and civil society by 
associating them with the 
dialogue. 
The major change is the 
introduction of good gover-
nance as a fundamental aspect, 
although this idea was already 
present in Lomé IV with its ref-
erence to respect for human 
rights, democratic principles 
and the rule of law. 
The essential and basic ele-
ments, regarded as central 
themes of the political dialogue, 
will be actively encouraged by 
the EU. The idea is to institute 
a system of positive or incen-
tive conditions to supplement 
the coercive mechanism of sus-
pension. ACP States that per-
form well and are anxious to 
embark on the road of demo-
cratic institutional reforms will 
receive extensive (including 
financial) support. Similarly, the 
Union undertakes to take 
account of procedures as well 
as results, allowing for the spe-
cific situation of each State. 
The interesting aim here is to 
strike a balance between the 
granting of aid based on per-
formance criteria and a differen-
tiated approach taking account 
of needs. This collection of 
incentives clearly emphasises 
the central role that the signat-
ories believe must be played in 
the promotion of development 
by basic rights and an effective 
democratic political system. 
There are no sweeping 
changes on the issues of 
democracy and human rights. 
The Convention reaffirms the 
indivisibility, universality and 
interdependence of human 
rights, and the parties under-
take to promote and defend 
basic freedoms. It is explicitly 
stated that democracy is the 
most desirable form of govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the text 
acknowledges that, subject to 
respect for this principle, each 
State has the right to develop 
its own democratic culture. 
The text dealing with good 
governance and the struggle 
against corruption is almost 
entirely new. Agreement on a 
joint definition of good gover-
nance is a notable step in itself. 
This definition, a broad one, 
includes in particular the con-
cepts of responsible, transpar-
ent and equitable administration 
of public resources (human, 
natural, economic and finan-
cial), a transparent decision-
making system, the primacy of 
law, and the strengthening of 
capacities to avoid corruption. 
The emphasis on corruption, 
serious cases of which are sub-
ject to a sanction mechanism, 
is attributable to both sides, the 
ACP States having argued in 
favour of a balanced system 
which also condemns bribery 
(for example, through European 
companies intervening in an 
ACP market). The purpose of 
this paragraph is to send a 
clear signal to European tax-
payers and investors as well as 
to legitimate beneficiaries of 
aid. 
The issue of conflict preven-
tion, management and resolu-
tion is interesting in that its 
presence in this agreement is 
both indispensable and odd. It 
is indispensable because an 
environment of crisis is a major 
obstacle to the effective imple-
mentation of development poli-
cies. It is curious because this 
new incursion of the geopolitical 
field into what was initially a 
commercial and financial agree-
ment is the first of its kind. The 
text creates space for a joint 
campaign in favour of stabilisa-
tion and pacification of conflict 
regions of the ACP zone. The 
essential idea of the 
Convention is to use regional, 
subregional and national capac-
ities to attack the root causes of 
12 conflict. There are also plans to contain existing 
conflicts in order to prevent their spreading. 
Proposed means include the establishment of a 
participatory and equitable political and social 
environment and the introduction of conciliation 
mechanisms and other machinery for the resolu-
tion of conflicts. The origin of tensions is fully 
taken into account, with recommendations for the 
sharing of resources and power, restrictions on 
military spending and arms dealing, etc. It is 
interesting to note that the agreement also 
makes provision for the necessary links to be 
established between emergency measures, reha-
bilitation and cooperation on the ground. 
Immigration, like conflict, is a completely new 
aspect of the partnership. In the absence of a 
consensus, as we have seen, the text confines 
itself to establishing a link between poverty and 
migration and establishing a mutual duty of non-
discrimination. The Convention also establishes 
a link between the concepts of training, educa-
tion and migration, in that the Union undertakes 
to support the provision of greater capacities for 
ACP nationals in their countries of origin or within 
the Union. Finally, the readmission clause will 
affect both parties equally, in the case of an 
unlawful resident repatriated to his country of 
origin, whether it be an ACP or Union State (and 
not to a country through which he has passed). 
Challenges 
There are challenges to be met. As far as the 
political aspect is concerned, there is no denying 
that the new Convention modernises relations 
between the EU and the ACP States, but there 
are still challenges. Three may be mentioned: 
effective implementation, consistent application 
and reinforced partnership. The objectives aimed 
at by the political aspect are mainly a joint attack 
on the root causes of the failure of development. 
It remains to be seen whether the mechanisms 
contemplated will be adequate to achieve the 
stated objectives. This, indeed, is the weakness 
of the text at this stage: operational machinery is 
not yet clearly apparent. To establish processes 
of démocratisation and sustainable participation 
respecting specific local conditions is all very 
well, but how? As yet, for example, there is no 
specific mechanism for dialogue with civil society, 
whose role is still a marginal one. Nor should we 
underestimate the scale of the change of attitude 
necessary if agreements between governments 
are to be replaced by a partnership open to other 
actors. 
The case of conflict prevention, management 
and resolution is an interesting one, but poses a 
practical problem. To judge by the text, the part-
nership should take rapid action to deal with the 
conflict in the Congo at the most appropriate 
level by preventing it from spreading and by 
attacking the arms dealers. Another challenge 
will be consistency. Along the same lines, how is 
the delicate balance to be preserved between the 
application of performance criteria and the main-
tenance of a differentiated approach based on an 
assessment of the needs of the beneficiary coun-
tries? Nor can we lose sight of the impact which 
the internal reform of the Commission will have 
on the policies laid down. Finally, establishing a 
stronger partnership based on dialogue will call 
for a real commitment on the part of the Union, 
alongside its ACP partners and extending to 
international fora, on crucial questions that may 
range from the price of raw materials to the war 
in the Congo, by way of the WTO trade system 
and questions of debt reduction. This unique 
partnership certainly leaves room for improve-
ment, but it does have a vast potential which the 
parties will have to learn to exploit. Everything 
will depend, in future, on the way in which the 
Convention is used. 
"ECDPM programme spokesperson. 
13 Effective poverty eradication 
by Guggi Laryea* 
Slum in 
Namibia 
C
onsistent with current international 
development thinking on the need for 
a poverty focus, the new ACP-EU 
Agreement declares the central objective of ACP-
EU partnership to be the reduction and eventual 
eradication of poverty. Considering the levels of 
poverty in many ACP countries, this declaration 
is a step forward from the previous Lomé 
Conventions. However, there is a need to ensure 
that the new Agreement is not perceived as a 
means of simply paying lip service to current 
fashions in development cooperation. To date the 
strongest and most explicit statements made by 
governments on poverty have been the commit-
ments made at the UN conferences on social 
development and women in 1995. At these con-
ferences, governments - including EU and ACP 
members - committed themselves to eradicating 
poverty. It was also agreed that the process and 
strategies for achieving poverty eradication 
should be defined by developing countries. 
The new ACP-EU Agreement, with its princi-
ples of partnership and ownership, is an ideal 
instrument, with the potential to support these 
initiatives. But in order for this potential to be 
realised, the principles and objectives of the new 
Agreement will have to be backed up by clear 
and specific mechanisms and strategies. In 
addition, certain ambiguities in the Agreement 
regarding the objectives and principles will have 
to be clarified. 
Poverty eradication in practice 
The wording of the objective of the partnership 
seems less bold and forward-looking compared 
to the commitments made at the UN 
Conferences. Its reference to both poverty reduc-
tion and eradication is confusing. In order to 
effectively tackle poverty it is essential that both 
parties concentrate on its eradication as agreed 
at the UN conferences. 
To this end all aspects of ACP-EU cooperation, 
including trade arrangements, should be aimed 
at poverty eradication. The recent statement by 
the European Commissioner for Development, 
Poul Nielson, on the relationship between pover-
ty eradication and other development coopera-
tion aims, helps to emphasise this point. "Issues 
such as trade liberalisation and integration of 
developing countries into the global economy 
remain important features of the European 
Development Policy, but only in as far as they 
directly contribute to the overarching objective of 
raising the standard of living of the poor." 
Beyond policies that are traditionally assoc-
iated with development, coherence should also 
be ensured between all other Community policies 
and poverty eradication, including agricultural 
policies. To help guarantee such coherence, the 
establishment of a special EC office as proposed 
by the European Parliament, charged with moni-
toring coherence between all EC development 
and other policies, should be considered. Finally, 
mechanisms have to be established that enable 
assessments of the Agreement's contribution to 
poverty eradication. The results of these assess-
14 ments should be made public in the annual 
reviews of ACP indicative programmes and in 
reports prepared by the Joint Council of 
Ministers. 
Partnership and ownership 
The definition of strategies to combat poverty 
by developing countries themselves is a funda-
mental prerequisite for sustainable and equitable 
development. The ACP-EU Agreement's princi-
ples of partnership are supposed to encourage 
ownership of the development strategies by the 
countries and populations concerned. Though 
this principle is often cited as a hallmark of ACP-
EU cooperation, the implementation of past 
Lomé Conventions has not truly reflected this 
principle. In theory ACP States are supposed to 
be responsible for defining their own strategies 
and indicative programmes. However, very often, 
ACP programmes have been based on strate-
gies drawn up by the EU. In order to ensure that 
the process for achieving poverty eradication is 
defined by the ACP countries, support and 
capacity building for the ACP offices responsible 
for defining strategies and programmes should 
be provided. 
Civil society participation 
Civil society participation is a pre-condition for 
an effective campaign against poverty. In this 
respect the emphasis placed by the Agreement 
on civil society participation is encouraging. 
However, more specific instruments will have to 
be developed that enable and safeguard civil 
society participation. 
First of all there needs to be a clear under-
standing of the nature and role of civil society. 
Civil society organisations are not elected 
bodies. Their strength is in representing specific 
interest groups within society. Their legitimacy 
lies in the specific mandates that they have. 
To ensure civil society plays an effective role 
in development, mechanisms at national, region-
al and global level, that enable consultation with 
civil society on policy and programming, need to 
be developed. In many ACP countries mecha-
nisms for consultation between governments 
and civil society already exist. These need to be 
built on and improved. 
To enable civil society to be a true actor of the 
partnership, a policy on information disclosure to 
the public by ACP and EU decision-makers on 
proposals made in policy and programming 
would need to be established and implemented. 
Social development 
Eradication of poverty cannot be achieved 
without addressing human and social develop-
ment on which it is dependent. Concrete and 
explicit strategies are going to have to be 
defined that aim for the achievement of universal 
access to basic social services in the ACP. 
Progress made in this area should be 
documented in regular reports. 
Strategies should give particular attention to 
controlling HIV/AIDS and malaria - the most seri-
ous threats to human resources in Africa. This 
should not only involve an increase in resources. 
These diseases should be seen as cross-cutting 
issues to be addressed within all sectors, proj-
ects and programmes. Emphasis should also be 
given to investment in relevant basic education 
of adequate quality in which participation of 
stakeholders in its design is guaranteed. 
In addition the quantity and quality of both 
ACP and EU staff with expertise on social devel-
opment and gender issues will have to be 
increased. 
Finally, the Agreement's specific contribution to 
the social development commitments made at 
the UN Conferences and the subsequent inter-
national development targets also agreed by EU 
and ACP states would have to be outlined. 
Gender equality 
Women constitute the majority of people living 
in poverty in the ACP. Eradication of poverty in 
the ACP will require concrete plans and actions 
that specifically address the problems women 
face. 
15 To establish such plans, gen-
der equality concerns in all 
areas and phases of ACP 
cooperation need to be identi-
fied. This should involve the 
establishment and use of 
gender-disaggregated data. 
To assess progress made in 
addressing the problems faced 
by women, all reviews and 
assessments of programmes 
and projects should include a 
section on the gender impact of 
these programmes and proj-
ects. 
Financial cooperation 
If the international develop-
ment targets of poverty eradica-
tion are to be met, donors will 
have to increase their levels of 
aid in real terms. The EU decid-
ed not to increase the level of 
funding it provides in real terms 
for the new Agreement. It 
argued that by improving the 
rate of disbursement through 
reforms it would be able to 
meet the requirements of the 
ACP. This represents a chal-
lenge that the European 
Commission is yet to prove it 
can meet. To date the lack of 
capacity on the side of both 
parties has hampered the 
speedy disbursement of funds. 
Furthermore, the unfamiliarity of 
ACP and EU staff with new sys-
tems of operation under the 
new Agreement may further 
slow disbursement rates. 
To avoid this scenario, the 
Commission needs to draw up 
a strategy for improving dis-
bursement of funds to the ACP. 
On the basis of this strategy the 
ACP and the EU should agree 
to a timetable with intermediate 
targets for disbursement. 
To generate further 
resources, money pledged by 
EU Member States under the 
EDF should be transferred 
regularly to an interest-bearing 
account and locked for use of 
ACP countries. As a means of 
bringing the EDF under the 
democratic control of the 
European Parliament, this fund 
should be incorporated into the 
overall EC budget. 
Lastly, the criteria on which 
resource allocation is based 
should be transparent and 
related to the objective of 
poverty eradication. 
Cooperation in other fora 
Poverty eradication in the 
ACP is dependent on many fac-
tors that lie outside the ambit of 
the ACP-EU Agreement. An 
enabling environment and sup-
port from the international com-
munity on the objectives of the 
new Agreement are essential to 
their success. To achieve this 
the ACP and the EU need to 
step up their cooperation in 
other fora. 
The debt crisis is the greatest 
obstacle to achieving the inter-
national development targets 
for ACP and other developing 
countries. The EU should work 
with other donors to ensure that 
the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries debt relief package is 
fully funded. In addition the EU 
should push other donors to 
cancel all unpayable debts 
incurred by the ACP. 
Regarding trade arrange-
ments, the ACP and the EU 
need to work together within 
the WTO for the effective appli-
cation of special and differenti-
ated treatment of developing 
countries in all trade and invest-
ment agreements. An effort 
must also be made to reform 
GATT article XXIV to enable 
non-reciprocal trade agree-
ments between structurally and 
economically unequal groups of 
countries. 
Reforms within the EU 
In the Commission's own 
words, increasing levels of 
disbursement to the ACP is 
dependent on, inter alia, 
internal reforms within the 
Commission and a redefinition 
of the Commission and Member 
States' roles. 
The Commission needs to 
address complex administrative 
structures and provide for 
greater decentralisation of deci-
sion-making to delegations . 
abroad. While current efforts to 
reunify the project cycle under 
one external office are appreci-
ated, it should be ensured that 
the Commissioner and 
Directorate-General responsible 
for ACP-EU cooperation have 
the tools and political control to 
effectively co-manage all phas-
es of ACP-EU projects. 
* Policy Advisor, Eurostep 
Eurostep is a network of 21 European 
NGDOs. 
16 What future for trade? 
by Peter Gakunu" 
O
ne of the main driving forces for 
change in ACP-EU cooperation is that 
after more than two decades, ACP 
countries' performance in the EU market has not 
improved substantially, despite preferential 
access granted under the Lomé Convention. 
Sustainable development requires effective 
economic diversification. Despite the financial 
resources provided under previous Conventions, 
and generous preferences, most ACP countries 
remain heavily dependent on the export of a few 
primary commodities which are faced with declin-
ing prices. Under these conditions, globalisation 
poses a serious threat for ACP countries, 
because of the weak nature of their economies, 
and the fact that they are lagging behind in mak-
ing the economic changes to attract foreign direct 
investment and diversify their economies. To 
integrate ACP countries into the world economy 
it will be necesary to adapt the trade regime to 
reflect a changed international environment. 
The Trade Regime of the Lomé Conventions 
was built on two main principles: non-reciprocity 
and non-discrimination. With the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements, the two princi-
ples seemed to be in conflict with the principle of 
most favoured nation treatment, which did not 
allow discrimination between developing coun-
tries. This implies that under the WTO rules the 
EU would not be able to extend preferential treat-
ment on a non-reciprocal basis solely to ACP 
countries. 
Nevertheless, it was understood that because 
of the special relationship with the ACP coun-
tries, the EU was duty-bound to continue the 
non-reciprocal preferences granted to them, at 
least for a transitional period of ten years. While 
recognising the need for special treatment for the 
least developed countries, the solidarity and unity 
of the ACP group had to be maintained, and 
regional integration efforts in the ACP States 
could not be undermined. 
In all negotiations, compromise is a necessity. 
The objectives and principles of the new 
Partnership Agreement reflect this spirit. 
Objectives and principles 
The objectives of the new economic partner-
ship are to foster the smooth and gradual 
integration of ACP States into the world econo-
my, by enhancing their capacity to play a full part 
in international trade and assisting them to partic-
ipate actively in the multilateral trading system. 
The Partnership Agreement aims at assisting the 
ACP States to rise to the challenges of globalisa-
tion, and adapt progressively to new conditions 
of international trade, by enhancing their produc-
tion, supply and trading capacity, as well as their 
ability to attract investment by creating a new 
trading dynamic. 
Market access 
Improving preferential market access was at 
the core of the ACP States' negotiating position 
on trade matters. The original agreement, based 
on the principle of non-reciprocity, was perceived 
as an important means of fostering growth of 
ACP economies. The EU, though bound by the 
limitations of the current WTO rules, reaffirmed 
its commitment to supporting the development 
efforts of the ACP States by maintaining the 
existing trade provisions during the transition 
period. 
Customs cooperation 
The purpose of the rules of origin is to ensure 
that only ACP products imported into the EU 
benefit from the preferential regime under the 
Convention. In the course of implementing previ-
ous Conventions, the ACP countries had put for-
ward a strong argument that the rules of origin 
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from St Vincent to the EU 
were too stringent and inflexible and unrelated to 
their level of economic development. They had 
argued that these rules did not take account of 
the level of ACP's economic development and 
therefore needed substantial change. 
One area in which the ACP countries have a 
comparative advantage in terms of their resource 
endowment is in fisheries. Apparently, this is also 
an area in which certain EU Member States 
have a direct interest. The rules of origin operat-
ing in this sector tend to be very technical and 
are basically aimed at protecting the EU fishery 
sector. Improvement achieved under the partner-
ship agreement in this sector includes modifica-
tion of the definition of "their vessels." 
For the purpose of applying the rules of origin, 
ACP countries are treated as one territory. This 
allows cumulation to take place amongst the 
ACP countries, and with the EU Member States, 
and Overseas Countries and Territories. 
Following the conclusion of the EU-South Africa 
free trade area, it was necessary to modify the 
provisions on cumulation to allow products within 
the South African Customs Union (SACU) to cir-
culate freely, so that regional integration within 
the region and in the ACP would not be adverse-
ly affected. Consequently, the provisions on 
cumulation had to be adapted to the changed 
circumstances in order to continue; firstly, as 
already provided for under the Lomé Convention; 
secondly, within SACU; and thirdly, within region-
al organisations which have achieved a certain 
level of regional integration. 
Derogations from the rules of origin allow ACP 
countries certain flexibility in the application of 
the rules, especially in the case of fisheries prod-
ucts. The partnership agreement provides for an 
increase of the tonnage on automatic derogation 
for canned tuna, while abolishing the require-
ment for normal derogation. The difference 
between automatic and normal derogation is that 
in the former case ACP countries are not 
required to submit detailed information for the 
derogation to be granted. In the latter case, how-
ever, ACP countries are required to submit 
extremely detailed information and justification. 
Despite providing this information, requests for 
derogation in the fisheries sector were as a rule 
rejected by the Community. 
Additionally, the EU agreed to modify its 
position on the implementation of value tolerance 
for canned tuna. The ACP raised this issue 
because of their practical experience during the 
implementation of the Convention, that their tuna 
canning industries could not utilise the provision. 
The EU has now agreed to provide a mechanism 
for the application of value tolerance for canned 
tuna, which is currently under consideration. 
Finally, one of the major achievements of the 
negotiations in this area is that ACP exporters 
can provide an exporter's declaration in lieu of 
an EUR1 movement certificate for the customs 
authorities in the EU to confirm originating status 
and therefore grant preferential access to ACP 
products. 
Short term fluctuations in export earnings 
Support in cases of short-term fluctuations in 
export earnings recognises the adverse effects 
of unstable export earnings, particularly in the 
agricultural and mining sectors, on the develop-
ment of the ACP States. To this end, additional 
resources would be provided taking account of 
the extreme dependence of the ACP States' 
18 economies on exports from the 
agricultural and mining sectors. 
To qualify for the additional 
resources the following criteria 
must be satisfied: 
• 10% loss of export earn-
ings from goods compared with 
the arithmetic average of the 
earnings in three out of the four 
years preceding the application 
year; 
• 10% loss of earnings from 
the total for agricultural or min-
eral products, where these 
products constitute 40% of total 
export revenues from goods; 2 
per cent in the case of LDCs. 
• 10% worsening in the pub-
lic deficit programme for the 
year in question or forecast for 
the following year. 
Future Prospects 
The first challenge for the 
ACP and the EU is to ensure 
that the new partnership agree-
ment is in sync with the World 
Trade Organisation - globalisa-
tion and liberalisation. The ACP 
and the EU will need to form 
alliances within the WTO to 
ensure that there is ample flexi-
bility in the interpretation and 
application of WTO rules and 
norms so that the development 
interests and peculiar problems 
of the ACP countries are fully 
taken into account. The current 
efforts by the WTO to breathe 
new life into the multilateral 
trading system after the Seattle 
debacle offer a unique opportu-
nity to the EU, and present a 
challenge for the international 
community to rise to this 
occasion and ensure that the 
commitments on special and 
differential treatment are given 
real content. 
The second challenge is to 
develop the necessary capacity 
in the ACP countries to imple-
ment the partnership agree-
ment and to negotiate new 
WTO-compatible trading 
arrangements. Low levels of 
economic development, natural 
disasters and a hostile interna-
tional environment are among 
the main causes underlying the 
ACP's profound economic 
malaise. The lack of capacity in 
most ACP countries is now 
widely recognised as the miss-
ing link in their development 
efforts. It is imperative now that 
ACP countries are assisted to 
create the capacity to plan, 
implement, manage and moni-
tor development programs and 
mobilise their populations in the 
development process. The ben-
efits that could be derived from 
the partnership agreement and 
the opportunities offered by the 
multilateral trading system will 
not be realised unless the 
capacity constraints in the ACP 
countries are addressed. 
Many ACP countries have 
usually lacked commitment to 
and ownership of capacity 
building. Most of them have yet 
to come round to viewing their 
capacity constraints as critical 
for their development. ACP 
countries must demonstrate 
commitment to building the 
requisite capacity by investing 
in their own human resources, 
reforming their institutions and 
managing technical assistance 
so as to benefit from the part-
nership agreement and take 
advantage of the opportunities 
offered by globalisation and lib-
eralisation. In parallel, the EU 
and other donor agencies 
should practically commit them-
selves to the principle of owner-
ship of capacity building within 
their programs. 
Thirdly, introduction of 
reciprocity into ACP-EU trade 
arrangements is likely to have 
costs and benefits. The 
distribution of short-term adjust-
ment costs and long-term per-
ceived benefits will however 
depend on a country's ability to 
respond positively, its level of 
competitiveness and its ability 
to expand investment into 
products and sectors with high 
growth potential. There will be a 
need, therefore, to accompany 
these efforts with genuine finan-
cial resources. In addition to the 
EDF resources, the EU 
Member States should fulfil 
their international commitments, 
including the allocation of at 
least 0.7 per cent of their GNP 
to Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). 
Development of the ACP 
countries cannot depend on 
foreign aid alone. Broad based 
economic growth will remain 
elusive in most ACP countries 
unless the partnership agree-
ment is able to generate ade-
quate investments both from 
within and from abroad. ACP 
countries must therefore ensure 
The concern to 
integrate ACP 
countries into 
the world 
economy 
brought about 
the need to 
adapt the trade 
regime to a 
changed 
international 
environment 
19 WTO headquarters in 
Geneva. 
The first challenge for 
ACP and EU is to 
ensure that the new 
partnership agreement 
is in sync with the 
WTO, globalisation and 
liberalisation 
that priority is accorded to 
measures and programmes 
aimed at attracting both local 
and foreign investment, and 
valorising the opportunities 
derived from knowledge-based 
new technologies. 
Fourthly, there is a need to 
resolve the ACP debt problem. 
From the early 1980s, the debt 
burden of the ACP countries 
has grown more onerous and 
increasingly unmanageable. 
The low capability to service 
external debt is vividly reflected 
in the massive build-up of 
arrears and high service ratios, 
but also by the frequent 
rescheduling that is required. 
The cumulative burden of pay-
ments has been crippling. 
Unsustainable debt has created 
serious foreign exchange con-
straints in a number of ACP 
countries. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa debt servicing absorbs 
nearly one third of foreign 
exchange earnings. The cumu-
lation of arrears has contributed 
significantly to unsustainable 
debt stock which has tended to 
deter investment and under-
mine economic stability. The 
positive results anticipated from 
reform of the ACP economies 
are likely to be compromised by 
the unsustainable debt stock. 
Debt servicing diverts domes-
tic financial resources from 
development. Recent estimates 
show that some 9 billion dollars 
annually is now being used to 
finance debt repayments. For 
some ACP countries the result-
ing distortions have been 
staggering. In the case of 
Zambia, for example, debt 
repayments absorb one dollar 
out of every two dollars pro-
vided in aid. In acknowledg-
ing efforts now underway to 
redress the debt burden one 
can only hope that the inter-
national community will 
respond in a timely fashion to 
avoid further catastrophe. 
Lastly, there is a pressing 
need to address the problem 
of the lack of competitive-
ness and diversification in 
the ACP economies. ACP 
Heads of State and 
Government at their meeting 
in Libreville in November 
1997 agreed that trade pref-
erences, valuable as they 
may be, would neither sus-
tain ACP's competitiveness 
nor improve their export per-
formance. Their commitment to 
undertake comprehensive trade 
development programmes so 
as to enhance ACP's export 
performance and sustainable 
development should now be 
translated into immediate and 
concrete action. The best way 
to achieve this is through 
increased regional cooperation 
and integration. Indeed the 
future of the ACP countries is 
precariously balanced on the 
success or failure of regional 
cooperation and integration ini-
tiatives. The Partnership 
Agreement provides a unique 
opportunity for the attainment of 
this objective. 
"Chief, Trade & Customs Cooperation 
Division, ACP General Secretariat 
e-mail: peter.gakunu@chello.be 
20 The private sector 
in the new agreement 
by Fabrizio Donatella* 
I
t very soon became clear to the negotia-
tors that they shared a number of views 
that would influence the way in which pri-
vate-sector problems were to be handled over 
the coming months. They agreed, in particular, 
on the significance and scope of economic 
change in ACP countries, which had speeded 
up since the previous Agreements, and on the 
need for new private enterprise and technical 
support funding that was being expressed by 
the private sector at a local level, and by for-
eign investors. The analyses and studies 
referred to by the negotiators actually showed 
that, whereas foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
developing countries currently accounts for five 
per cent of total world FDI, the ACP countries 
only account for 0.12 per cent of the world 
total. The negotiators also agreed on most of 
the factors giving rise to this unfavourable 
trend, which is due to a large number of inter-
nal and external constraints, the most impor-
tant being the smallness of many markets, 
political and economic instability, a lack of 
comparative advantage and the generally low 
competitiveness of businesses available for 
partnership. In view of these analyses, and 
contact with representatives of the private 
sector in ACP and European countries in par-
ticular, the ACP countries and the Community 
decided to review the principles of and 
arrangements for implementing a strategy for 
supporting development of the private sector in 
connection with the new partnership Agree-
ment. 
The new Agreement 
The text of the new Agreement emphasises 
the importance of supporting the private sector 
and developing true partnerships between 
local and European investors to balance the 
influence of public bodies, which are often too 
far removed from the market and business in 
some countries. By encouraging the develop-
ment of the private sector and investment, the 
ACP countries can significantly increase the 
chances of more rapid and durable growth and 
have a positive influence on social indices. 
Furthermore, development of the private sector 
is no longer regarded as just another aspect of 
cooperation between the Community and the 
ACP countries, but as a topic relevant to most 
of the areas of cooperation where the private 
sector can play a significant part, sometimes 
deserving special attention and appropriate 
action. For the first time, the text of the Agree-
ment does not contain only basic principles, 
but also mechanisms and criteria establishing 
links between these principles and their 
implementation. 
Principles 
• Based on a view that is now shared by 
everyone involved in development cooperation 
policy: the private sector cannot develop with-
out an appropriate policy for obtaining macro-
economic stability, without the establishment of 
partnership between the public and private 
sectors and without a truly consistent strategy 
embracing all three possible levels of activity: 
macroeconomic; intermediate 
21 A new challenge for 
the private sector - a 
production unit in 
the Seychelles 
("mesoeconomic"), involving 
action with and on financial 
and non-financial intermedi-
aries; and microeconomic of 
the business proper, via 
direct financial and technical 
assistance for small and 
medium-sized businesses 
belonging to the formal and 
informal sectors. 
• The need for all the bod-
ies concerned (enterprises, 
financial institutions, bodies 
representing the private sec-
tor, etc.) to be involved in 
designing and implementing 
the specific activities to be 
undertaken. This is also one 
of the innovations of this 
agreement, since it enshrines 
the need to establish and 
sustain a real dialogue 
between the public sector in 
the ACP countries, the 
private sector in both the 
ACP countries and in Europe 
and Community institutions. 
• The importance of the 
need to reinforce the level of 
domestic and foreign private 
investment to offset the 
reduction in flows of public 
development aid. 
In this respect, although the 
need for and usefulness of 
action to promote investment 
and to protect investment 
and funding were recognised 
in previous Agreements, it 
cannot be denied that the 
text of the new Agreement in 
its current form is an attempt 
to make measures to deal 
with these problems more 
consistent and logical. The 
new text actually provides for 
support in four different, 
intimately linked, forms: to 
reinforce the promotion of 
investment at national and 
regional levels; to help to 
define uniform guidelines to 
help the ACP countries and 
the Community to negotiate 
investment protection agree-
ments, which need to have 
sections in common; to pro-
vide appropriate support for 
public and private intermedi-
ary bodies operating in the 
private investment guarantee 
sector; and to provide 
investors with the funding 
necessary for investment 
proper, in the form of bank 
facilities (loans, acquisition of 
holdings, guarantees, etc). 
But apart from these princi-
ples, the parties to the new 
agreement have also recog-
nised the need to consider 
significantly reinforcing the 
resources to be devoted to 
implementation of this action 
plan. The long-term develop-
ment budget will therefore be 
used to finance all the initia-
tives constructed to meet 
needs at the macroeconomic, 
intermediate and business 
levels. Examples include 
22 support for the reform process, promoting 
investment, reinforcing businesses' competi-
tiveness and structuring the dialogue between 
the public and private sectors and between 
European investors and ACP countries. 
Investment financing will be provided via a 
special new tool: the Investment Facility. 
Without going into details, it is useful to men-
tion a number of aspects that will influence the 
implementation of these activities at an institu-
tional level. The Commission will be responsi-
ble for implementing operations financed from 
the long-term budget, while the European 
Investment Bank will be responsible for man-
aging the Investment Facility. It is obvious, 
however, that the institutions will apply these 
tools by mutual agreement, in a coordinated 
way. The Centre for the Development of 
Industry (CDI) will work even more closely with 
the Commission and the Bank. The text of the 
agreement also provides for fundamental 
restructuring of the Centre, its terms of refer-
ence (to be extended to include all areas of 
economic activity) and its activities on the 
ground. This body, which is to be called the 
Centre for the Development of Enterprise 
(CDE), will continue to provide support and 
non-financial assistance to businesses. 
Investment financing 
A tool as important as the Investment Facility 
justifies further explanation of its scope and 
principles. 
The new agreement provides for the funda-
mental restructuring of the venture capital 
operations conducted previously. The 
Investment Facility can provide finance in the 
form of loans on various terms or of venture 
capital subject to principles more in keeping 
with the market and the needs of the private 
sector. One significant way in which the 
Investment Facility differs from previous 
operations is that it is a renewable fund and 
offers a secure budget for the short-, medium-
and long-term development of the private sec-
tor in ACP countries. The Facility will therefore 
operate on the basis of clearly defined return 
on investment criteria, in the private and public 
sectors. Although the conditions for granting 
funding under the Facility will essentially be 
based on the conditions prevailing in local 
By encouraging the development of 
the private sector and investment, 
the ACP countries can significantly 
increase the chances of more rapid 
and sustainable growth 
financial markets, to avoid excessive distortion 
of such markets the negotiators have included 
the ability to grant consessions to certain oper-
ations that should, by their very nature (in the 
case of some public-sector or private-sector 
projects with a significant social or environ-
mental impact) or as a result of their location 
(in countries emerging from slump), benefit 
from the most favourable rates. 
The new agreement has made it possible to 
improve the structure of the private sector and 
set up a proper development support strategy 
for it in the ACP countries. The challenge 
facing everyone concerned is a daunting one. 
It will require exceptional flexibility, and a new 
partnership between the public sector and 
private operators based on mutual sympathy 
and understanding. 
*DG Development - Private-sector Unit 
23 Improving financial cooperation 
by Cecilia Eld-Thorffin* 
■ 
I
n the past, aid practitioners from the EU 
and the ACP in charge of implementation of 
European Development Fund (EDF) assis-
tance faced a tough and complex task. Over the 
years, the system for implementation of aid had 
grown more and more complex. The money was 
provided through a multitude of instruments, 
each functioning according to its own logic and 
with its own planning requirements. The 
overview, coherence and impact were lost. 
Significant delays in the implementation process 
meant the money did not reach the end recipi-
ents according to schedule. It was generally 
recognised that radical reforms were needed. 
The new Agreement will bring profound change 
in development assistance. Key words are coher-
ence, impact and flexibility. The EU Member 
States have indicated their confidence in the new 
system by allocating considerable resources for 
financial cooperation. During the next five-year 
period, €13.5 billion will be channelled to the 
ACP States through the 9th European 
Development Fund (EDF). 
One grant allocation per country 
The instruments for providing aid in the form of 
grants have been regrouped and rationalised. 
Instead of a multitude of allocations from different 
instruments, each ACP State will get one single 
indication of a lump sum of resources for a five-
year period. This money can be used to finance 
a wide range of operations, and no resources will 
be locked for a specific purpose. For example, it 
will be possible to use these grants for macro-
economic support, sector programmes, traditional 
projects and programmes, debt relief, decen-
tralised cooperation and humanitarian aid. Grant 
assistance may also be used to offset negative 
consequences from shortfalls in export earnings. 
Such allocations will replace assistance previous-
ly channelled through STABEX and SYSMIN. 
Indicative allocations rewarding 
good performance 
During the Lomé era, each country allocation 
was calculated only on the basis of need, such 
as population size and average income. There 
was little flexibility in the system. Resources were 
frozen for specific activities and specific countries 
where they were sometimes not put to good use. 
In future, grant resources will be allocated on the 
basis of an evaluation of performance as well as 
need. The criteria for the evaluation of need and 
performance have been negotiated between the 
ACP and the Community and will be used as the 
basis for a shared assessment. Allocations will 
not be fixed, as needs and performance are not 
static but develop and change over time. During 
the course of implementation of the programme, 
needs and performance will be regularly moni-
tored and. the allocation may be reduced or 
increased as appropriate. 
Concentration on focal sectors 
To improve the coherence of EDF assistance in 
each ACP State, all grants will be implemented 
through one, coherent rolling programming exer-
cise. The starting point will be the establishment 
of a Country Support Strategy (CSS), which will 
include an analysis of the political, economic and 
social context of the country and outline the 
country's own development strategies. It will also 
pay close attention to the activities of other 
donors. On the basis of this analysis, a suitable 
orientation for the use of Community aid will be 
pinpointed. The support strategy will concentrate 
on a limited number of sectors. This is to ensure 
that the overall impact is not diminished as it 
would be if the resources were scattered over 
many different activities. In an operational 
Indicative Programme attached to the CSS, the 
operations to be financed in the focal sector(s) 
will be spelled out. 
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programming 
A flexible and regular review mechanism will 
make it possible to regularly update the CSS, 
the volume of resources and the indicative pro-
gramme to take account of developments in 
need and performance. Progress will be moni-
tored according to impact indicators. A key 
element is the decentralisation of the review 
process to field level, making the review an inte-
gral part of the dialogue between the Community 
and the recipient country. An inclusive approach 
is envisaged, involving non-state actors in the 
formulation of support strategies and in the 
implementation phase. 
Access to risk capital 
The development strategies in the new 
Agreement are to a large extent focused on eco-
nomic growth and private sector development. 
To support these strategies, an entirely new 
Investment Facility, geared directly towards oper-
ators in the private sector, has been created. 
The main objective of the Facility is to help 
develop the private sector in ACP countries. It 
will be managed by the European Investment 
Bank and will be set up through the deployment 
of €2,200 million from the 9th EDF. It will func-
tion as a revolving fund and any returns will flow 
back to the Facility. In the longer term, no further 
replenishment of the Facility from EDF resources 
should be necessary. Loans from the Facility will 
as a rule be granted on market-related terms. 
Interest subsidies will, however, be approved for 
loans to investment projects that fulfil specific 
criteria, such as bringing environmental or social 
benefits. 
Strengthening the regions of the ACP 
Strengthening regional integration in ACP 
countries is identified as an important compo-
nent of the Agreement. The future ACP-EU trade 
regime is also built around the ACP regions. 
€1.3 billion of the 9th EDF has been reserved for 
financing regional support programmes. The 
ACP countries themselves will define the make-
up of the regions with which the EU will cooper-
ate, and the regional programmes too will be 
managed through a system of rolling 
programming. 
ACP and EU partners expect that these radi-
cally reformed mechanisms will make develop-
ment assistance more efficient and coherent. 
' Task Force ACP-EU Negotiations 
The instruments 
for providing aid in the 
form of grants have been 
regrouped 
and rationalised 
25 New beginning at Joint Assembly 
Abuja, Nigeria, 20-23 March 2000 
by Dorothy Morrissey 
The 30th session of the ACP-EU 
Joint Assembly, which took place in 
Nigeria's new capital, Abuja, was 
notable for several reasons. Nigeria 
was hosting the assembly that had 
for years issued resolutions 
condemning its military regime. 
Its location was a tribute to its 
democratic government, newly 
returned to civilian rule after almost 
two decades of military dictatorship. 
Auspicious too was the timing, just 
after the expiration of the Lomé IV 
Convention, and the conclusion of a 
radically overhauled successor 
agreement. 
"Nigeria is not just any country," said Poul 
Nielson, EU Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid. "It is a very important country, 
now witnessing an evolution everybody is watch-
ing very closely, the return to civilian rule, to 
democracy and the rule of law." 
It was an occasion to reflect on the Joint 
Assembly, and its key role in promoting 
democracy. President Abasanjo paid tribute for 
its "valuable contribution" to Nigeria's return to 
democratic governance. 
"This session of the Assembly is the largest 
gathering of democrats hosted by this country 
since the installation of this administration on 
29 May, 1999." 
Nielson too spoke of the significance of the 
occasion, seeing it as "particularly fitting that this 
session take place here today. Parliament is at 
the core of democracy, it is its embodiment. 
It is a powerful symbol." 
Enhanced role 
The Joint Assembly has played an important 
role as an arena for ACP and EU representatives, 
a forum for debate and the exchange of views. In 
the words of Chief Asiodu, Nigeria's chief eco-
nomic advisor, it is "an important organ of the 
ACP-EU partnership, which has made consider-
able success of its role of promoting and defend-
ing the democratic process through dialogue, 
debate and consultation." 
In the new agreement, the Joint Assembly is 
given a more political role, reflected in its new title 
- the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. At present, its 
members, on the EU side, are elected represen-
tatives - Members of the European Parliament. 
On the ACP side, representatives are not neces-
sarily elected, and countries are frequently repre-
sented by their ambassador. The new Agreement 
specifies that ACP representatives will be elected 
members of their national parliaments, or repre-
sentatives designated by the parliament of the 
ACP state. 
Without conferring any decisional role, the 
changes will help to deepen the parliamentary 
dimension of the assembly, and foster a 
parliamentary culture. 
"The new title gives renewed emphasis to the 
parliamentary nature of this institution, and to its 
essentially political role," said Co-President John 
Corrie. "It confers special responsibilities on it for 
the promotion of democracy." But he regretted 
that some responsibility hadn't been granted in 
the area of good governance. 
Members of the European Parliament have the 
advantage of meeting regularly in Brussels and 
Strasbourg. ACP members are likely to meet only 
twice a year, when the Joint Assembly meets. 
This puts them at a disadvantage, for instance in 
preparing common positions, familiarity with the 
procedures etc. Criticisms were made that ACP 
26 voices are much less frequently heard in debate, 
and in tabling questions, and the EU side domi-
nates. Co-Presidents John Corrie and Serge 
Clair recognised this imbalance. The new 
Agreement refers to Joint Parliamentary Assem-
blies meeting on a regional basis. 
New agreement welcomed 
On the heels of the conclusion of the new 
ACP-EU Agreement, the meeting provided an 
occasion for ACP and EU deputies to air their 
views. Generally, the reaction was positive. 
There was consensus on the need for change, 
not only to take account of a new global environ-
ment, but also because the overall situation of 
many ACP countries remains critical. Despite the 
preferences accorded under previous conven-
tions, many ACPs have lost market share. 
"The situation is even more grim in sub-Saharan 
Africa," said Chief Asiodu. "In terms of the share 
of world trade, the marginalisation of Africa is 
depicted by a loss of market share from 6 per 
cent in the 1960s to a mere 2 per cent in 1995." 
Glenys Kinnock, MEP and rapporteur of a 
working group on future ACP-EU relations, wel-
comed the Agreement, calling it "a defining 
moment in ACP-EU relations," showing that the 
EU had "moved some way towards understand-
ing the kind of relationship that was necessary." 
She was happy to see the emphasis on eradicat-
ing poverty, and the facilities for integrating ACPs 
into the global environment. However, she 
warned that questions must continue to be asked 
about the real beneficiaries of globalisation. Will 
the removal of trade barriers really improve 
things? Her view is that free trade does help to 
reduce poverty, but it is only one element. 
The central idea of the Agreement is "the suc-
cessful management of change," said ACP 
President John Horne. "The ACP and the EU 
managed to accomplish what the WTO could not: 
a consensus on the way forward." 
He said that the trade issue was "the most diffi-
cult and sensitive area," and the debate "boiled 
down to the length of the preparatory period." 
President Obasanjo, in his opening address, said it was an 
appropriate moment to reflect on the ACP-EU partnership. 
Some progress has been made during the Lomé I to IV 
Agreements, but "much is yet to be done. An evaluation shows 
a bias towards development assistance as against trade, invest-
ment and private sector development. A disproportionate share 
of development assistance is tied to EU countries. The result is 
that 70% of development assistance to ACP countries is re-
cycled to Europe." 
On trade, results have been disappointing. "The share of 
ACP countries in the European market has been on the decline. 
ACP States accounted for 6.7 per cent of exports into Europe in 
1976 shortly after the coming into force of the Lomé 
Convention. In 1994, in spite of trade preferences, this declined 
to 2.8 per cent." 
He spoke of the growing disenchantment of both donors and 
recipients at the apparent inability of aid, despite two decades 
of assistance,"to arrest the deterioration in the socio-economic 
and political conditions of ACP countries." 
"Perhaps a significant constraint might be the strings attached 
to development assistance. But even more constraining is the 
relentless movement of the terms-of-trade against primary 
producers over the decades. 
"It is my fervent hope that this Assembly will give due consid-
eration to the causes of the disillusionment." He urged the cre-
ation of the "necessary institutional architecture which would 
significantly enhance the effectiveness of development assis-
tance" in the new Agreement. 
He welcomed the focus on the eradication of poverty, and 
intensification of economic and political reforms. Increasing 
attention must be given to "equitable market access for value-
added processed and manufactured goods from ACP countries 
to the EU." 
He was strongly in favour of the emphasis on good gover-
nance. "It is my sincere belief that the Lomé Convention will 
have little or no impact on ACP countries in the absence of 
good governance." 
ACP countries must strengthen their institutions for combating 
corruption. "This is absolutely necessary because corruption 
distorts the outcomes of internationally-accepted competitive 
arrangements and practices. 
"I am glad that good governance and the fight against 
corruption have received a prominent place in the post-Lomé 
Convention. 
"But I am somewhat embarrassed to be told that this should 
have been a major stumbling block in the negotiations." 
Peacekeeping and conflict resolution capacities of regional 
organisations should be strengthened. 
"Let the first decade of the 21st century be one of genuine 
partnership for ACP renaissance and the full restoration of 
human dignity universally. 
"For Nigeria I would accept and I think that all ACP countries 
should accept, that out efforts to improve accountability and our 
determination to fight fraud should become criteria for the allo-
cation of development aid. Wouldn't that be the best way to 
remotivate public opinion in Europe which clearly shows signs 
of aid fatigue?" 
27 The ACP view prevailed on this largely due to 
support from the European Parliament, he said. 
He stressed the need to examine the impact of 
wider liberalisation on ACP-EU trade. A joint 
Ministerial Trade Committee is foreseen for this 
purpose, and he urged both ACP and EU to 
"breathe life into this new institution." 
A number of speakers voiced dismay over the 
clause on the return of illegal immigrants. British 
MEP Richard Howitt said it "risks sending the 
wrong political message, with the potential to fuel 
racism." He asked why the Council had included 
a much less specific readmission clause in its 
Partnership Agreement with Egypt, and accepted 
Turkey's rejection of such a clause. Were the 
ACP states being subjected to double stan-
dards? Luis Amado, President-in-Office of the 
EU Council, admitted his surprise at the Justice 
and Home Affairs decision to include such a 
clause, but the EU needed to have a coherent 
policy. There was a pre-condition that a negotiat-
ed settlement would be reached in bilateral 
discussions with each ACP state. 
Battle of Seattle 
The WTO crisis and its significance for 
developing countries was a topic. John Horne 
referred to it as the "battle of Seattle," fought 
over how to ensure a smooth transition for ACP 
countries to sustainable development. 
The WTO is widely seen as a body which ben-
efits transnational companies, said MEP Caroline 
Lucas. "The invisible hand of trade never favours 
the weak, it makes the strong stronger." She said 
it was unacceptable that 30 developing countries 
couldn't afford to send a delegate to Seattle. 
Commodity prices fluctuate widely when markets 
are liberalised. Most developing countries 
depend largely on commodities, and the poorest 
will suffer. It was, she said, "inconceivable that 
commodity prices were not on the agenda of the 
Seattle talks," supposed to launch a 
development round. 
Commissioner Poul Nielson and Chief Philip Asiodu, chief 
EU re-starts development projects in Nigeria. 
While in Nigeria, Commissioner Nielson also turned 
his hand to the practical matter of development coop-
eration. He signed three development agreements 
worth €32.8 million with the Nigerian government. 
EU development projects had been withdrawn 
because of human rights abuses during the military 
regime. Sanctions were lifted in June 1999, and these 
agreements are the first real, substantial new projects 
that have been signed. The agreements are part of a 
quick-start package to be put into action as soon as 
possible now that sanctions have been lifted. 
The lion's share - €21 million - goes to fund micro-
projects in the Niger Delta. This is the oil-producing 
area, where Nigeria's wealth comes from. But it is an 
area of tension and conflict, where the poor have a 
profound sense of grievance that the oil-wealth has 
by-passed them. They have also suffered the environ-
mental damage caused by the drilling. The project is 
aimed at improving living standards, for instance by 
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installing water supply systems, village transport and 
health systems. 
This is not by any means the poorest region in 
Nigeria, but it was pinpointed because of its huge 
potential for conflict. Included in the project is a con-
flict prevention dimension. Microprojects include a 
strong element of local participation, as the communi-
ty decides on its own needs. 
The second project, worth €10 million, aims to 
improve Nigeria's economic management capacity. It 
will help to strengthen the Federal Office of Statistics, 
the Ministry of Finance, and Auditing, to increase eco-
nomic transparency. "It is not just a technical pro-
gramme to make government work better," explained 
Nielson. "Its purpose is to help make Nigeria's oil 
money translate into better lives for Nigerians." 
The third agreement, worth €1.8 million, is ear-
marked for a programming study on how develop-
ment assistance can best help Nigeria.. This will pro-
vide guidelines for future EU-Nigeria cooperation. 
Mozambique 
The Assembly debated serious situations in 
several ACP states. The flooding and cyclones 
in Mozambique left more than 25% of the popu-
lation homeless. The country's delegate David 
Aloni told the Assembly that the economy had 
been set back 15-20 years. Five hundred people 
died, and many more disappeared. Mines were 
washed up by the water and disease was rife. 
Co-President Serge Clair praised South Africa 
for its speed in aiding the victims. The Assembly 
was reminded that Madagascar too had suffered 
heavily, and an appeal was made to the interna-
tional community to cancel the debt of the two 
countries. Mr Mallam-Hasham deplored the 
"CNN effect" where aid follows TV cameras. 
Commissioner Nielson also referred to this, say-
ing it was easier to mobilise a TV crew than to 
get the logistics in place for aid on such a scale. 
The EU had responded immediately to the crisis 
by sending emergency aid, and its relief opera-
tion will continue for months to come in 
reconstructing the country. 
Resolution on Austria 
For the first time, the Joint Assembly debated 
a problem in an EU state, and adopted a resolu-
tion. Tabled by the Greens, the resolution "con-
demns all forms of political extremism" and in 
particular the xenophobic and anti-European 
statements of Jorg Haider. It rejects any fuelling 
of racism against ACP nationals who are legally 
resident in EU member states. 
Austrian MEP Karin Schede said that Mr 
Haider's statements cannot be defended, but 
they "are not part of the Austrian government's 
position." Austria has a very good record of 
accepting refugees, she said. 
Among other countries debated, there was 
concern at the situation in Zimbabwe, which was 
"at the edge of an abyss." In Angola, the role of 
"bloodstained diamonds" in fuelling the civil war 
was debated. MEP Mrs Maes said that 
Belgians want to see certificates of origin, to 
make the industry more transparent. 
29 Keeping an eye on disease 
by Mina Vilayleck 
Transmissible diseases 
with epidemic potential 
covered by the surveil-
lance programmes are, in 
particular, measles, 
dengue, influenza, 
typhoid, leptospirosis and 
cholera 
Public health laboratories are organising themselves 
as a network 
A network of laboratories recently went into operation to improve 
the detection of and response to epidemics in the Pacific region. 
The participants were laboratory and health 
service specialists from the islands of Fiji, 
Guam, New Caledonia and French Polynesia, 
and biologists from the laboratories in New 
Zealand, Australia and the United States. Also 
represented were member states of the 
PPHSN coordination group, namely Samoa, 
Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, New 
Caledonia and the Solomon Islands. 
"This laboratory network is an additional tool 
in improving the detection and surveillance of 
regional epidemics so that their spread can be 
arrested as rapidly as possible in the affected 
country and also in neighbouring countries," 
explained Yvan Souarès, an SPC epidemiolo-
gist. In a region covering more than 30 million 
square kilometres, where tourist or commercial 
air travel is a daily occurrence, there is a 
considerable risk of an epidemic spreading to 
several countries. After the rats of the 19th 
century, viruses and bacteria have become the 
stowaways that public health professionals 
most fear. Their Red List of infectious diseases 
covered by the surveillance system includes 
influenza, measles, cholera, typhoid, 
leptospirosis and, particularly, dengue-fever, 
which has been responsible for four regional 
epidemics over the last 20 years (several 
thousands of cases). 
A major hurdle in combating transmissible 
diseases in the Pacific has just been over-
come. A network of public health laboratories 
was set up in April at a regional conference 
organised in Nouméa, in New Caledonia, 
under the aegis of the South Pacific 
Commission (SPC) and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO), with contributions from 
the international network of Pasteur Institutes 
and associated institutes. These institutions 
form part of the Pacific Public Health 
Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which, four 
years after its creation, is now in a position to 
operate a regional biological diagnostic ser-
vice. 
30 Sharing diagnostic resources 
"It is important for us to be able to 
detect an epidemic as early as pos-
sible so that we can respond more 
effectively," explained Michael 
O'Leary, a WHO epidemiologist in 
Suva. In actual fact, public health 
measures differ, depending on 
whether an epidemic is one of 
influenza or of dengue, for exam-
ple. In the former case, preventa-
tive action will include an influenza 
vaccination campaign; in the latter, 
the target will be the vectors of dis-
ease, the breeding places contain-
ing mosquito larvae and adult 
insects (distribution of insecticides). 
Prevention is not an empty word. 
In 1997, an influenza epidemic hit 
Papua New Guinea, Australia and 
the Fiji Islands and threatened New 
Caledonia. Alerted by PACNET, the 
PPHSN's early warning system, 
New Caledonia's health services 
organised a mass vaccination 
programme, something they were 
unable to implement in a previous 
epidemic in 1996 because of insuf-
ficient information. The outcome: a 
single death in 1997 as compared 
with 14 in 1996, and non-hospital 
medical costs of 12 million as com-
pared with 350 million in 1996. 
Unfortunately, not all island states 
Sophisticated analyses such as gene amplifi-
cation are carried out by Level 3 laboratories, 
namely the Nouméa Pasteur Institute, labora-
tories in Melbourne and Queensland, and the 
US Naval Medical Research Unit N" 2 in 
Jakarta. 
A three-level network 
Amongst transmissible diseases 
with epidemic potential, measles, 
dengue-fever, influenza, typhoid, lep-
tospirosis and cholera are pathologies 
to which the laboratory network sur-
veillance services give priority. A 
three-level structure was set up by 
professionals meeting in Nouméa in 
April. As Yvan Souarès, an SPC epi-
demiologist, told us, "this is an original 
approach, because we are starting at 
the bottom, out in the field, i.e. at level 
1, to set up the infrastructure required 
not only for gathering samples but 
also for carrying through the entire 
process up to confirmation of the iden-
tity of the viruses, bacteria or para-
sites involved in an epidemic." 
Level 1 or front line laboratories can 
be local, national or provincial estab-
lishments: hospital laboratories or 
provincial clinics and dispensaries. 
These are responsible for gathering 
and managing biological samples 
when a local epidemic is suspected. 
Such laboratories are assisted in 
their research into epidemics by Level 
2 laboratories, which carry out analy-
ses requiring techniques which are 
unavailable locally or which are more 
sophisticated. They offer their techni-
cal support and their biological diag-
nostic services to all countries in 
Oceania. Four island-based establish-
ments have been listed in this cate-
gory as a result of the preliminary 
evaluation work carried out by the 
New Caledonia Pasteur Institute 
(NCPI), with WHO support. 
According to Phillipe Pérolat, NCPI 
Director, "these are the laboratories in 
Fiji and Guam, the NCPI and the 
Malardé Institute in French Polynesia. 
We ourselves hope to act as the 
lynchpin of the whole laboratory net-
work, and it is the desire of the inter-
national network of Pasteur Institutes 
and associated institutes to become 
closely involved with the regional 
environment and establishments." 
Joe Koroivueta, Public Health Labo-
ratory Service Director in Fiji, echoes 
this sentiment, believing that the 
laboratory network in Oceania is 
enhancing the standing of his estab-
lishment. Investment of almost US 
$35,000 financed by the WHO has 
been used to provide more equipment 
for this laboratory and a staff-training 
programme is scheduled. 
Finally, level 3 laboratories carry out 
the most sophisticated biological 
examinations, such as gene amplifica-
tion, and are responsible for quality 
assurance in the field of biological 
analyses for the entire public health 
laboratory network in Oceania. They 
are in the Pacific and beyond, and 
include two WHO collaborative cen-
tres in Australia (in Melbourne and in 
Queensland), the US Naval Medical 
Research Unit N° 2 in Jakarta 
(Indonesia), the New Caledonia 
Pasteur Institute, and also a 
laboratory in New Zealand. 
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and territories have the nec­
essary public health laborato­
ry services to detect and com­
bat epidemics. Cutting-edge 
analytical techniques (gene 
amplification, for example) are 
too costly to set up and there­
fore an unviable proposition 
for these small archipelagos. 
In point of fact, transmissible 
diseases, including some 
which are endemic in a num­
ber of countries in Oceania, 
still represent a heavy human 
and socioeconomic burden, 
their healthcare resources still 
being limited. 
The specialists are also 
preparing for battle. The 
public health laboratory net­
work enables the island states 
to take advantage of the 
services of the most geo­
graphically accessible 
member-establishment of the 
network. 
Transporting biological 
products 
In the field, a mutual-help 
system already exists. In 
October 1999, during a fever 
epidemic in Kosrae, in 
Micronesia, standard clinical 
techniques and biological 
examinations did not make it 
possible to confirm the diag­
nosis - was the fever dengue 
or leptospirosis? Alerted by 
PACNET, the New Caledonia 
Pasteur Institute offered to 
send out the equipment for 
taking biological samples and 
then took charge of analyses. 
One week after the New 
Caledonia Pasteur Institute 
received the samples, the 
result was notified to 
Micronesia's health services: 
it was leptospirosis. 
Immediately, antibiotherapy 
was administered to patients, 
which would have been of no 
use had the fever been 
dengue. 
More recently, the regional 
public health laboratory net­
work has provided further 
proof of its efficiency: the lab­
oratory on Guam, one of the 
four island-based reference 
laboratories in the network, 
confirmed in early May, i.e. 
less than two weeks after the 
appearance of the first cases, 
a cholera epidemic in Pohnpei 
(Federated States of 
Micronesia). 
There is still no formal 
agreement between Oceania's 
countries and territories 
regarding the carriage of bio­
logical products and border 
health controls and inspec­
tions. This is therefore one of 
the main aspects that labora­
tory-network members are 
working on. They also need 
rapidly to define the legal con­
text for using the scientific 
results of biological analyses 
and the long-term methods of 
financing this laboratory net­
work. At the present time, the 
network functions thanks to 
support from the WHO, the 
SPC and self-financing from 
the member-laboratories. 
International partnerships in 
the health field are increasing 
in step with the globalisation 
of commercial — and micro­
bial — exchanges. 
Nowadays, as soon as it 
appears, a cholera epidemic 
in Micronesia alerts all public 
health professionals, whether 
they reside in the South 
Pacific or in the northern 
hemisphere. Health informa­
tion has, in effect, to travel 
more quickly than diseases if 
the outbreak of epidemics is 
to be prevented and the old 
adage is to apply. Prevention 
is indeed better than cure. 
32 The invisible emergency 
by Marc Vergara 
At first sight, there is no visible emergency in 
the mountainous Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia. Farmers and their oxen are working the 
land, children smile and the first scanty rains fell 
a few days ago. But this is deceptive. 
Hundreds of thousands of people are affected 
by drought in Tigray. In this region of Ethiopia, 
there will be more than a million people in need 
of food aid, water, medicines and shelter by July. 
The rains should have arrived at least two 
months ago. The farmers are ploughing when 
they should be harvesting. The children are 
working in the fields and looking after the ani-
mals when some of them should be at school. 
The same children look reasonably healthy until 
they reveal their age, and they are many years 
older than they look. It is feared that the people 
of the Tigray region will suffer the same fate as 
the drought-affected areas in south-east Ethiopia. 
Beyene Birru is UNICEF's project officer in 
Mekelle, the regional capital. Since 1998, he has 
been coordinating relief assistance to internally dis-
placed populations in the Tigray region. "In several 
parts of Tigray, 10% of the population have already 
left their homes to find work, any work, anywhere," 
Beyene said. "Part of this migration is what is called 
seasonal and therefore to be expected. But this 
year, the number of people on the move has been 
multiplied by three." 
What drives people away from their homes is 
hunger or fear of hunger in the months ahead. The 
short rains have failed, there will be no crops in this 
month or next. Near Adigrat, in eastern Tigray, farm-
ers are preparing the land for the next harvest, 
which will be in November. Men and animals are 
weak and the soil is dry, which makes subsistence 
farming even more difficult than usual. As a last 
resort, a family will sell its cattle, but will later have 
to pay three times more to buy back the same ani-
mals. For many people of Tigray, it is worth aban-
doning the fields in search of work elsewhere. 
Families have to decide who is strong enough to 
go in search of work and for how long. But when a 
father or an older son leaves home, a younger child 
must drop out of school to look after the animals. 
Older children might try their luck elsewhere, while 
the younger ones will often be left with their grand-
parents. Ten-year-old Kahsa Gebregergis and her 
brother Tsegay, seven, are staying with their grand-
parents, Hagos Gebregergis and Abraha Meselesh, 
aged 85 and 65, respectively. Their parents and 
three brothers and sisters have left the village to 
find work in other parts of Tigray. "I am too old to 
work the land," Hagos says, "and the children are 
too young." 
They are also too weak to go to school; it would 
take three hours for Kahsa and Tsegay to walk and 
come back. 
Neighbours are helping, but they must plough 
their own fields first. Dinku Hagos, 55, lives next 
door. Her 35-year-old son who supports her has left 
in search of work, but she is content to sleep, with 
her seven-year-old nephew Tsegay, under a leaking 
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have a crop to feed us," she says. She 
doesn't have much; half a dozen goats, a 
cow, a small piece of land, and she depends 
on her neighbours for an ox and a plough. 
If her crops succeed, Dinku will have to share 
her yield with these neighbours. 
Further down the road Hagos Haile Mariam 
says that he can only afford to send two of his 
eight children to school. The lucky ones are 
Zaid and Atsbaha, aged 17 and 20. 
Sometimes, when they feel they don't have 
the strength to walk, they stay at home. The 
roof is leaking. The children are stunted: 
Lemlem is 14, but looks 10, while her younger 
sister, five-year-old Hagosa and her little 
brother, Mehrahtu, two, are similarly affected. 
Now, at last, it is raining. Ironically, the late 
arrival of the rain is not entirely good news: it 
will now be harder to move around, malaria 
cases will increase and shelter is still far from 
adequate. UNICEF distributed thousands of 
blankets to drought affected people in Tigray, 
as well as cold chain equipment (used to pre-
serve vaccines), essential drugs, and shelter 
material. UNICEF is preparing to distribute 
educational materials and set up temporary 
classrooms, not only in Tigray, but also in the 
regions of Amhara and Somali. But the needs 
are far greater than the aid currently being 
planned. This is always the case in Ethiopia 
and it is particularly so this year. The drought 
has a serious impact on the health of children 
who normally survive on poor nutrition, a fact 
of life in most regions of this country. 
Tigray may not look like a desert, but its 
rivers are dry when they should be flowing 
and its fields are bare when the corn should 
dwarf a farmer. For Kahsa and Tsegay, 
Lemlem and Hagosa, or Zaid and Atsbaha, 
the last few months have been much harder 
than what they have been used to in previous 
years. Unless food and drugs arrive quickly, 
the next few months might be harder still. 
Internally 
displaced people 
Well before the current food emergency in Ethiopia, UNICEF 
set up programmes for more than 300,000 displaced persons 
in the northern region of Tigray. Most arrived in June 1998, 
one month after the outbreak of war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. It is estimated that over 60 per cent of the displaced 
population in Tigray have been accommodated among host 
communities. UNICEF's role has been to help the displaced 
and increasingly burdened local communities. 
A walk around the "caves" near Adigrat, in Eastern Tigray, 
shows what has been achieved, but also how much remains 
to be done. For the past two years, thousands of people have 
been living, literally, in caves under the cliffs. The lucky ones 
sleep in tents, but they are hopelessly overcrowded. Sega 
Hailu, 15, lives in a cave with her mother Hagosa Gebru, 50, 
and three brothers and sisters aged between 18 and 22. Her 
father and two more children disappeared in the early days of 
the conflict. They don't know how long they will stay in the 
caves, so they have built an extension to protect the entrance 
against rain. Hagosa would dearly like to move to a tent. "The 
rock is so cold," she says, "and when it rains, the water seeps 
through the rock." Sega would prefer to go home, further 
north, but in the meantime she attends the nearby UNICEF-
assisted school. About 16,000 displaced children receive basic 
education through UNICEF assistance. 
The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) receive food rations 
every month. They wait patiently until their names are called 
out and leave with wheat, lentils, and cooking oil. Whatever 
the displaced persons receive, they share with the host com-
munities - or they exchange according to their respective 
needs: lentils for sugar, oil for meat. In the end, there is still 
not enough to go around. The harsh truth is that the IDPs of 
Tigray are not worse off than the average Ethiopian. Ethiopia 
has one of the world's highest levels of stunting among chil-
dren, 64%. Only a quarter of the country's children attend pri-
mary school. Children as young as five help their families by 
looking after farm animals. 
Last year in IDP settlements, 30,000 children aged between 
nine months and five years were vaccinated against measles, 
through UNICEF assistance. UNICEF also distributed vitamin 
A supplements to 80 per cent of children under five. Still, there 
is a shortage of essential drugs. Patients in IDP camps are 
34 aware of it and they wait patiently 
for a health worker to arrive by 
motorbike from Adigrat, a couple 
of miles away. 
The latest water shortage is 
equally important; families have 
to walk long distances and then 
patiently fill their jerrycans from a 
river (UNICEF-supplied jerrycans 
can hold about 2.6 gallons of 
drinking water and are easy to 
carry in emergency situations), 
now reduced to a stream as a 
result of failed rains over the past 
few months. As part of its regular 
IDP program, UNICEF helped 
50,000 displaced persons - and 
their host communities - get 
access to drinking water. UNICEF 
provided hand pump sets, funded 
the drilling of new bore holes and 
the rehabilitation of other water 
sources. Tsadik Esetemariam, 
who works for UNICEF in 
Mekelle, knows the region very 
well. Wherever he stops the car, 
people come and greet him. He 
is from Adigrat and he knows the 
people, the officials, the rivers, 
and the location of all UNICEF 
pumps. "This year is very bad, 
very bad. There are three rivers 
between Adigrat and Mekelle," he 
says, "and they are all very low 
for this season." Yordanos 
Kebede, 13, and Firehiwet 
Teare, 14, walked from a nearby 
village to collect water from a 
spring. It takes about 20 minutes 
to fill up the 20 litre jerrycan. 
It is when they walk around the 
countryside that children, in par-
ticular, are the most at risk from 
anti-personnel mines and unex-
ploded ordnance. There are an 
estimated 100,000 mines in 
northern Tigray. Last year, 
UNICEF and a local non-govern-
mental organisation, Rehabilita-
tion and Development Organi-
zation (RADO) implemented a 
landmine awareness programme 
focusing on local community par-
ticipation. First, UNICEF and 
RADO targeted government 
authorities and community asso-
ciation members from the entire 
region. Then, stage by stage, 
landmine awareness lessons 
were extended to the community 
level. Beyene Birru, UNICEF's 
project officer in Mekelle, said, 
"Five children were killed only a 
few weeks ago. They just picked 
up strange looking objects, which 
happened to be unexploded ord-
nance. This type of workshop has 
very practical implications for the 
people of the area, and they 
really pay attention to what we 
say." 
No one knows when IDPs will 
be able to go back home. Even if 
Eritrea and Ethiopia sign a peace 
agreement tomorrow, it will take 
years to clear all the mines in the 
region. The only certainty is that 
UNICEF's interventions are pro-
viding water, health services, 
emergency education, and land-
mine awareness. Things could be 
a lot better because so many 
people are obviously surviving on 
very meagre resources and with-
out adequate shelter. Yet 
UNICEF's achievements in Tigray 
should be a valuable source of 
experience and also serve as a 
morale booster for UNICEF's field 
staff in the months ahead. 
Giday Tsota, 30, a blind 
single mother with her 
twins, two and a half-
year old Meaza and 
Tsega, live in a remote 
drought-affected area of 
Central Tigray. The fami-
ly receives limited food 
rations, the children are 
often ill and hungry, 
especially this year 
35 Land or race or politics? 
Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi, 
leader of the Zimbabwe 
National Liberation War 
Veterans Association 
(ZNLWVA), sings 
revolutionary songs 
with supporters in 
downtown Harare, 
Zimbabwe, Saturday 
April 5 
by Gary Younge 
There are more elephants 
(75,000) than white citizens of 
Zimbabwe (70,000), although to 
follow the coverage of events 
over the past few months you 
would never guess it. The deaths 
of three white farmers at the 
hands of squatters and the inva-
sion of white-owned farms by 
"war veterans," not to mention 
President Robert Mugabe's 
assertion that white 
Zimbabweans are "enemies of 
the state" have left the impres-
sion that the country is embroiled 
in a race war. 
Now that President Mugabe 
has set a date for elections (24 
June) it is clearer than ever that 
recent events in Zimbabwe are 
not underpinned by race but poli-
tics. At the heart of the conflict lie 
the country's two main parties, 
Zanu-PF and the Movement for 
Democratic Change. 
Zanu-PF, of which President 
Mugabe is a member, was one of 
the main organisations that liber-
ated the country from white 
minority rule in 1980 and has 
been in power ever since. It is 
traditionally Marxist in orientation 
although its commitment to ideol-
ogy has declined since the end of 
the Cold War. The Movement for 
Democratic Change is only a 
year old and was formed by the 
unions and the churches. Despite 
its union roots - its leader, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, was once the 
head of Zimbabwe's trade union 
movement, the ZCTU - it veers to 
the right politically. Its manifesto 
includes a pledge to impose a 
100-day International Monetary 
Fund style stabilisation pro-
gramme and privatise all state-
owned companies within the first 
two years of government. 
A new party in the running 
While democratic elections for 
both parliament and the presiden-
cy have been held at regular 
intervals, since 1980 the country 
has virtually remained a one-
party state under ZANU-PF 
According to a recent opinion poll 
Zanu remains the most popular 
single party although a large 
number of voters - almost half -
remain undecided. There are 
several reasons for this. ZANU-
PF enjoys an enduring popularity 
because of the improvements 
made in education, health and 
infrastructure during the decade 
after the liberation. The party has 
the state-owned media on its 
side, receives state funds and 
President Mugabe has the consti-
tutional right to appoint 30 of the 
150 parliamentary seats. 
Moreover during the early 80s 
Zanu waged a military campaign 
against its erstwhile liberation 
allies, Zapu, in Matabeleland, 
where Zapu had built a strong 
political base. 
Since then Zanu has faced little 
coherent political opposition until 
the arrival of the MDC. The seri-
ousness of their potential was 
clear after they led a succesful 
campaign against Mugabe's 
plans to change the country's 
constitution which would have 
strengthened many of his pow-
ers. A referendum on the issue in 
February delivered the first rejec-
tion Zanu had ever encountered 
at the ballot box, with a convinc-
ing 55-45 majority. 
This political challenge 
emerged against a backdrop of 
general economic decline. 
Inflation, interest rates and unem-
ployment are all high and foreign 
reserves have dwindled to almost 
nothing. During the referendum 
queues for the polls ran parallel 
to long queues for petrol of which 
there was a severe shortage. If 
this were not bad enough, 
Zimbabwe has sent troops to the 
war in the Congo to support 
President Kabila, which is costing 
a cash-strapped nation around 
$1 million a week. President 
Mugabe blames this situation on 
restrictions placed on the govern-
ment by the IMF; many 
Zimbabweans blame the crisis on 
Mugabe. IMF, they say, stands for 
"It's Mugabe's Fault." 
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The real story is far more com-
plex. Since 1980 Zimbabwe 
maintained a growth rate which 
was higher than average com-
pared with sub-Saharan Africa 
but lower than the rate of popula-
tion growth, which meant a 
decline in living standards. The 
government responded by print-
ing money which sparked infla-
tion, higher taxes and an inflated 
fiscal deficit. By 1990 they were 
forced to negotiate a structural 
adjustment programme with the 
IMF and World Bank. 
The World Bank hailed the 
agreement as an example of its 
new, poverty-focused approach. 
The government agreed to cut 
the budget deficit from 10 to five 
per cent on condition that it did 
not slash public spending on 
health and education. 
In practice however they were 
two of the areas that were hit 
hardest, with spending on health 
falling by one third and on educa-
tion by 29% - its lowest level 
since independence. This is par-
ticularly damaging because the 
economy is being steadily weak-
ened by HIV and AIDS; 
Zimbabwe has one of the highest 
rates of infection in the world. 
Mugabe's inability to control the 
budget deficit has lead to a 
recent freeze on IMF and World 
bank payments. 
It was shortly after the voters 
delivered their verdict in the refer-
endum that violence escalated 
and Mugabe shifted the debate to 
land redistribution and white 
farmers. Like many countries in 
southern Africa where for 
decades race has been politi-
cised and politics racialised, there 
was inevitably a racial element to 
this issue. White Zimbabweans 
make up less than 1% of the pop-
ulation but own 70% of the best 
land and employ 65% of the 
nation's workers. They dominate 
the tobacco and cattle sectors 
which are key to foreign earnings. 
Much of this land was simply 
taken from the indigenous black 
population which was ruled under 
a form of apartheid first by 
British rule and then under 
Rhodesia, which declared itself 
independent in 1965, and has 
remained in white hands ever 
since. 
In short, white people remain 
over-represented among the eco-
nomic elite even though black 
people have taken over the 
levers of political power. But with 
the rise of the MDC, white 
Zimbabweans have also gained a 
far more strident political voice 
than they have had since libera-
tion. Although MDC membership 
remains predominantly black, 
white Zimbabweans have given a 
great deal of financial and politi-
cal support to the MDC. 
Land - a big issue 
Given the centrality of land to 
the economy and its symbolic 
importance in a liberated country 
it is not suprisingly a big issue. 
This is not confined to Zimbabwe. 
The first law passed by South 
Africa's African National 
Congress in 1994 was to permit 
those who had been evicted from 
their land during apartheid to 
reclaim their property. One recent 
opinion poll in a black township in 
South Africa showed that 54% 
supported the squatters in 
Zimbabwe - almost double the 
support in Zimbabwe itself. 
Nor is President Mugabe alone 
in the length of time he has taken 
to sort out the problem. Despite 
it being a priority in South Africa 
only six per cent of land claims 
have been settled and less than 
one per cent of the land has been 
redistributed. 
But land reform, in itself, is not 
a contentious issue in Zimbabwe. 
Although there may be differ-
ences about the scope and scale 
of any future land reform almost 
everyone, white and black alike, 
agrees that there is a need to 
redistribute land more equitably. 
It has become both controversial 
and emotive since veterans of the 
liberation struggle along with 
other Zanu supporters started to 
occupy white land, often using 
violence, with the apparent back-
ing of both Zanu-PF and 
President Mugabe. 
The government says the farm-
ers have provoked the attacks. It 
accuses the MDC of representing 
the interests of a privileged few 
and Britain of reassuming its 
colonial status when it set down 
preconditions for an end to the 
occupations and free and fair 
elections before it would help 
fund land reform. 
Opposition leaders say these 
occupations have been politically 
motivated. They point to the fact 
Morgan Tsvangirai, 
president of the 
Movement for 
Democratic Change 
(MDC) waves to sup-
porters , in the town of 
Murambinda about 5 
km east of the capital 
Harare during an 
election rally. 
37 Attempts to 
mediate from 
Southern 
African nations, 
the 
Commonwealth 
and Britain at 
different times 
and in different 
ways appear to 
have at best 
fallen on deaf 
ears and at 
worst inflamed 
the situation 
that the 19 people who have been killed either dur-
ing the occupations or elsewhere have been mem-
bers of the MDC, that on several occasions squat-
ters have simply ransacked white farms and then 
moved on, and that black farm labourers are now 
under attack. 
Following the first wave of attacks white farmers 
left their land in fear of their lives, but they have 
since returned under an informal deal with the war 
veterans that they would be left in peace if they 
allowed the squatters to stay in certain areas and 
did not allow the MDC to operate on their premises. 
Shortly after that, the government resurrected 
legislation to restrict the movement of party 
activists and ban public gatherings that threaten 
law and order. Zanu-PF, says MDC leader 
Tsvangirai, is creating a climate of intimidation and 
repression to prevent a free and fair election. 
Tsvangirai warns that, if violence against his mem-
bers continues, the MDC might pull out of the elec-
tion altogether. 
Economic damage 
The violence and instability have seriously dam-
aged the economy. The tobacco industry, the 
nation's largest employer and its most important 
export, earning a third of foreign currency, provides 
one example. Zimbabwe is the world's second 
biggest supplier of flue-cured tobacco, after Brazil. 
Yet when trading opened in April the volume of 
tobacco coming into the capital was a third down 
on last year and the price was down by a fifth. 
Many of those who should have been selling their 
wares had not been able to return to their farms to 
prepare for the auction since they were chased 
away by squatters. Others have had their crops 
burned. With 70% interest rates on the loans they 
have taken out against their crops, farmers say 
they need a devaluation of the exchange rate, 
which has been kept artificially high for 15 months, 
if they are going to stay competitive. "We are 
geared for business but it's almost a charade of 
normality," says one. Tourism, another key magnet 
for hard currency, has also been hit. Hotel occu-
pancy rates at Victoria Falls, the country's main 
tourist attraction, was down by a third over Easter, 
the height of the crisis, compared with last year. It 
has so far had less of an effect on foreign aid. In 
1998 Zimbabwe received £216 million in aid, most 
of it earmarked for technical cooperation and aid 
provision. More than half of it came from EU coun-
tries including Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden and Germany. While foreign governments 
have attempted to tie an end to the crisis to more 
aid, it has so far had little effect on the aid that has 
been provided so far. When a Zimbabwean delega-
tion came to Britain to discuss the situation, British 
foreign minister, Robin Cook, promised to help 
mobilise the international community to provide 
financial help from the EU, World Bank and 
America if President Mugabe was "willing to 
behave reasonably." He also pledged to more than 
double development money this year and treble 
next year if the land occupations stopped. 
Intervention by the international community has 
so far borne little fruit. President Mugabe has 
attracted widespread international condemnation 
over the farm occupations. But attempts to mediate 
from Southern African nations, the Commonwealth 
and Britain at different times and in different ways -
South Africa has tried gentle persuasion while 
Britain has been far more strident - appear to have 
at best fallen on deaf ears and at worst inflamed 
the situation. 
It is difficult to establish just how effective, or 
indeed counterproductive, the campaign of intimi-
dation against MDC supporters has been. The 
army has pledged to stay loyal to whoever wins the 
election and the judiciary, which has pursued the 
squatters' leader through the courts, has remained 
independent throughout. If Zanu wins the election, 
which remains the most likely outcome, there are 
fears that a further clampdown on civil society and 
economic chaos may ensue, although there are 
many within the party who remain critical of 
Mugabe and the occupations. MDC activists are 
confident that they will emerge with a sizeable 
minority in parliament to use as a platform to criti-
cise Mugabe's economic policies from the relative 
safety of parliament. 
The situation remains volatile. But the setting of a 
date for elections and the permission given to the 
Commonwealth to send monitors to ensure their 
validity represents a positive and significant step 
towards a more stable and democratic phase. 
38 Louise Frechette, 
Deputy Secretary-General 
of the United Nations 
by Aya Kasasa 
It is never easy to do a 
job that no one has 
ever done before. 
But Canada's 
Louise 
Frechette, the 
United 
Nation's first 
Deputy 
Secretary-
General, 
takes it all 
in her 
stride. In her 
quiet office, 
high in the 
building that 
accommodates 
the UN 
Secretariat, she 
welcomes visitors 
with a warmth that 
seems improbable from a 
career diplomat. She has repre-
sented her country in most parts 
of the world, especially in 
Argentina, and was Canada's 
Permanent Representative at the 
UN 10 years or so ago. Returning 
home after this spell in New York, 
she became Deputy Minister for 
Defence before being selected 
and invited by Kofi Annan to be 
UN/DPI Milton Grant 
the first holder of this 
post, created by the 
General Assembly 
in 1997. Louise 
Frechette 
accepted her 
new position 
early in March 
1998. Among 
the major 
projects for 
which she is 
responsible 
are the 
reform of the 
United 
Nations, which 
takes up much of 
her time, the 
preparations for the 
Conference on Women 
(Beijing + 5) and the 
Sierra Leone situation. 
Despite her heavy schedule, she 
agreed to be interviewed by The 
Courier on the occasion of the 
Millennium Forum. The timing 
was tight, but Louise Frechette 
emphasised her optimism about 
the future of the UN system. She 
began by stressing the impor-
tance of the conclusions of the 
Millennium Forum.... 
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The Millennium Forum was convened by 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the 
NGOs, to invite them to meet on the eve of 
the summit conference and express their 
views. The Forum was organised by civil 
society itself, and the NGOs in particular. 
They had every freedom to run things as 
they wished, and by the time the event 
ends we hope to have a clear idea of their 
concerns. 
The theme that has dominated the 
meetings of the Forum has been 
globalisation. In the action plan 
which he will be submitting to 
the Heads of state in September, 
and which will be debated over 
several days by the representa-
tives of civil society, Kofi 
Annan is launching an appeal 
calling for the benefits of glob-
alisation to be shared equally 
between all the peoples of the 
world. What would be the "UN 
method" of achieving that? 
The problem of globalisation is a huge one, 
one that must involve everyone: not just gov-
ernments but businesses, local communities, 
civil society. "The UN approach" is compre-
hensive, highlighting the importance of new 
partnerships. We cannot give globalisation a 
human face, we cannot avoid the opening of 
the gap between rich and poor within and 
between countries, unless all the actors are 
completely involved and working in harmony. 
That is what we are trying to achieve, particu-
larly through meetings like the Millennium 
Forum. 
in the new millennium, poverty 
will continue to be the main 
scourge of the Third World, the 
main obstacle to its development. 
All the aid donors are working to 
combat poverty. Does the UN 
intend to take control of efforts 
to harmonise these activities? 
The SG's report for the Millennium Summit 
does indeed establish the campaign against 
poverty as the top priority of the international 
community, and proposes a number of specific 
ways of going about it. But, of course, the fight 
against poverty is not just a problem for aid 
donors; people in every country, every com-
mittee, have to commit themselves to the fight 
against poverty, and especially to establish 
universal primary education and access to 
health care as national priorities. Because it is 
through the national efforts that the interna-
tional community must make its contribution. It 
must not dictate to individual countries what 
their priorities should be, but support their 
national strategies. The necessary approach, 
then, will involve mobilising resources in every 
country and, of course, obtaining much better, 
much more substantial support from the rich-
est countries. There is government 
40 development aid, which is a more direct form, 
there is debt relief, the opening-up of markets, 
and increased investment - all of these are 
types of resources that can be mobilised in 
order to achieve the goal. 
A corollary of poverty is con-
flict, which is particularly 
destructive in Africa. Several 
speakers on the Forum platform at 
the opening session criticised the 
slow reaction of the United 
Nations. Can you see any way round 
that? 
First, you have to realise just how difficult it 
is to resolve conflicts, especially internal con-
flicts. There are no magic bullets, no proven 
recipes - the international community is still 
very inexperienced at that kind of action. 
Clearly, one part of the necessary response is 
the deployment of troops, and if they can be 
deployed rapidly that makes a big difference to 
conflict management. But, of course, the 
United Nations depends on its Member States 
and their provision of the necessary troops. In 
addition, those troops have to be properly 
equipped: ideally, they should be trained 
before they are expected to take action. It is 
very difficult to produce a coordinated force 
overnight when you have units coming from all 
over the world. It is true that we could improve 
our system of managing conflicts by investing 
a bit more in preparation and prevention, and 
we could also focus on creating rapid deploy-
ment systems of the kind we lack at present. 
When he came to office in 1997, 
Kofi Annan made it his mission to 
reform and restructure the UN 
system. You are in charge of that 
project, your contribution is an 
essential one, and this Forum 
should allow a considerable step 
forward, what is the overall 
position achieved so far, and what 
remains to be done? 
All of us - the Secretary-General and every-
one working at the Secretariat - regard reform 
as a continuous event. Any institution, in order 
to survive, always has to seek to improve 
itself, to adapt to changing conditions. All of a 
sudden, we have a situation where the new 
information technologies have become vastly 
more important over the last two years to 
become a key element in the economic future 
of every country on earth. We need to be able 
to adapt, quite apart from more technical pro-
posals for reform. To me, reform is more than 
just fiddling with structures or budgets; it 
means the ability to see beyond tomorrow, to 
have clear objectives, and to be able to 
improve the work we do and the action we 
take to suit the World's needs. Having said 
that, I do think that the Secretary-General has 
done a great deal to change the Secretariat's 
working methods since he came to office. 
There have been structural adjustments and, 
especially, new coordination mechanisms have 
been brought in both at the Headquarters of 
the various UN bodies and among the UN 
teams on the ground. Every week, we hold dis-
cussions with all the Bureau Heads and Heads 
of Department at the Secretariat. Now, nearly 
three years on, it is clear that the UN's system 
has become enormously more capable of 
effective combined action, because information 
circulates more smoothly and our joint strate-
gies are better planned. On the ground, all the 
countries that work with us, especially the 
developing countries, have noticed a change. 
We draw up specific strategies in consultation 
with the countries where we work. We intend 
to continue along that road: it is true that 
resources are limited and the system is rather 
complex. If we had to start all over again we 
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over the world 
came to listen to 
Kofi Annan 
would obviously go for some-
thing less complex, but what 
we are demonstrating today is 
that if we have the right instru-
ments we can make things 
work better, especially under 
a strong leadership. Kofi 
Annan has made this consis-
tent, integrated action of the 
UN system one of the major 
themes of his term of office, 
and it is beginning to bear 
fruit. 
The negotiations on 
the renewal of the 
special partnership 
between the European 
Union and the ACP 
States have resulted 
in a new Agreement 
that will be signed 
shortly. Can the UN 
draw any inspiration 
from this in planning 
its own activities and 
drafting some of its 
development policies 
and visions? 
I would say that the 
European Union has hugely 
improved its relations with its 
partner states. There are 
aspects of its cooperation pro-
gramme which can genuinely 
set an example to other parts 
of the world. We of the United 
Nations are a universal organ-
isation, and we cannot con-
clude partnership deals with 
particular groups of countries 
- in any case, not being a 
state, we cannot offer trade 
benefits, for example. Here, 
we are spending relatively 
modest sums, by comparison, 
but what we do contribute is a 
forum for debate and a source 
of common rules and strate-
gies. That is very important, 
when you think of the results 
of the major conferences dur-
ing the 1990s which really set 
very clear objectives. We can 
also help countries by provid-
ing technical assistance and 
humanitarian aid, but I believe 
there is a gap in technical 
assistance that is extremely 
important to the UN; being 
universal, we aspire to impar-
tiality, and many countries feel 
at ease working with us. 
Our time is nearly up, 
but let me end with a 
rather more personal 
question: what, today, 
might persuade Louise 
Frechette to leave her 
office and demonstrate 
in the streets? 
Probably the campaign 
against AIDS. We have 
known of its existence for a 
long time, but last year it sud-
denly took on the scope of a 
disaster. At present, outside 
Africa, the disease is spread-
ing, becoming a tragic pres-
ence in other regions of the 
world. I am totally convinced 
that the struggle to control this 
pandemic, working with the 
most seriously affected coun-
tries, must be one of the 
greatest priorities for our 
organisation. 
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An age of solidarity 
The work done by the hundreds of 
representatives of civil society who 
met in New York for the Millennium 
Forum will have amounted to much 
more than "just another week of 
meetings at the UN." 
On 26 May 2000, the Forum adopted 
its final Declaration, the work of the 
NGOs, associations and members 
of civil society who had contributed 
their views and opinions on the crit-
ical issues of today. The Declaration 
is their response to the appeal by 
the Secretary General of the UN to 
"make globalisation a positive force 
for everyone." 
Before passengers alight from the yellow cabs 
that criss-cross the grid of New York's streets, 
a recorded message invites them to take 
advantage of the Capital of the Year 2000. 
And the name seems well chosen when one 
sees the hundreds of representatives of civil 
society advancing towards UN HQ. Some of 
them have already been in town for several 
days, and have got to know each other 
through the vagaries of hotel allocation or in 
endless corridors. 
In the holy of holies, this is an emotional 
day: the opening of the first session of an 
event for which everyone has been preparing 
for months. In just a few minutes now the 
Secretary-General himself will address the 
members of civil society. The atmosphere is 
electric but cordial. No false modesty here: 
everyone is alert for the photo-opportunity, 
snatching for a moment or two the opportunity 
to appear at the microphone on the platform 
they have so often seen on television, where 
so many important speeches have been deliv-
ered. People are queuing as they would at 
supermarket check-outs, though more pati-
ently. There is no standing on ceremony -
people sit where they like. There is a tangible 
aura of satisfaction at the thought that, for five 
days, they will be working non-stop to produce 
a historic document; that they will be able to 
express the opinions of all those they have 
come here to represent; that all the years of 
effort are finally going to bear fruit. 
An invitation from Kofi Annan 
More than 23,000 sets of credentials have 
been allocated, to the representatives of 1400 
NGOs and individuals from 145 countries. 
They have come to attend the most important 
meeting yet of members of civil society, a 
meeting whose self-appointed task is the cre-
ation of inclusive globalisation. Taking its cue 
from the opening words of the United Nations 
Charter, "We the peoples...," the Forum 
organised at the invitation of the Secretary 
General has been working for a week to 
enable the peoples of the world to express 
their beliefs directly rather than through their 
governments. The idea of this Forum was 
proposed by the Secretary-General in 1997. 
When submitting his proposals for a reform of 
the UN, Kofi Annan suggested that the year 
2000 should be marked by a "Millennium 
Assembly," which should set itself the task of 
preparing the UN to meet the main challenges 
and needs of the international community in 
the 21st century. And, he proposed, this 
Assembly should go hand-in-hand with an 
Assembly of the Peoples. The NGOs immedi-
ately buckled down to the task of organising 
the Millennium Forum. The challenges were 
vast: explosive population increase, globalisa-
tion, conflicts, the fight against poverty, AIDS, 
43 preservation of the environ-
ment and control of climate 
change. The UN's duty, as the 
Secretary General stressed, 
was to "think about the only 
global organisation to which 
we can turn: the United 
Nations Organisation." And 
so, to consider ways of 
strengthening the role of the 
UN, its General Assembly 
resolved to designate its 55th 
session, which would begin 
on 5 September 2000, as the 
"Millennium Assembly" and to 
hold a Millennium Summit. 
That summit would be the 
largest gathering of the Heads 
of State and Government ever 
convened. For Kofi Annan, it 
was essential that the 
Millennium Summit should 
give those attending an 
opportunity to "reaffirm their 
moral commitment" to the 
principles laid down in the 
United Nations Charter and to 
give a fresh political impetus 
to international cooperation. 
Revolution in the 
NGOs 
Kofi Annan stressed 
the power that lies in 
civil society - a power 
which has been able 
to exploit the informa-
tion revolution to act 
and react, and so 
demonstrate its 
strength in Seattle 
and Washington. 
"The issue here is 
not to give the 
impression of a retro-
grade civil society, 
nervously contemplating the 
advance of globalisation, but 
of one which calls for globali-
sation with a human face, of 
which the power of the NGOs 
is an excellent example," was 
the substance of his 
message. 
This idea came to dominate 
the discussions. Kofi Annan 
must be credited with having 
brought civil society into the 
arena. 
"In the past," declared 
Techeste Ahderom, Co-
Chairman of the Forum, "the 
NGO meetings were held 
simultaneously with major 
meetings of the UN, and it 
was difficult for their members 
to submit cohesive and coor-
dinated proposals to Heads of 
State, who had already left 
before our discussions 
ended." Producing the docu-
ments in advance, then, was 
an obvious solution that 
enabled delegates to alert 
governments to their views 
before the Millennium Summit 
took place. 
The United Nations in the 
twenty-first century 
After a week's work, a decla-
ration was adopted. The first 
recommendations were 
addressed to governments to 
give them a real idea of the 
commitments solemnly 
entered into at the various 
meetings. Then came recom-
mendations addressed to the 
United Nations, suggesting 
structural changes that would 
enable the organisation to 
fulfil its tasks more efficiently. 
Finally, civil society itself was 
called upon to do everything 
in its power to help to bring 
about a better world, even 
without the aid of the govern-
ments or the United Nations. 
The Declaration sets out the 
visions of civil society on the 
six main issues considered at 
the Forum: peace, security 
and disarmament; the eradi-
cation of poverty; human 
rights; sustainable develop-
ment and the environment; 
facing the challenges of glob-
alisation; and strengthening 
and democratising the United 
Nations and other interna-
tional organisations, while tak-
ing due account of the various 
action programmes produced 
by civil society over the past 
10 years. 
The Forum called upon the 
United Nations to establish 
immediately a Global Poverty 
Eradication Fund which would 
ensure that poor people had 
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adopt cultural development as the theme for 
one of the remaining years of the International 
Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1996-
2007). The document also invited govern-
ments to address issues relating to indigenous 
peoples, poor families, the incidence of 
HIV/AIDS, economic reforms and debt 
cancellation. 
Considerations of safety 
The Declaration called for the establishment 
of a corps of at least 50 professionally trained 
mediators for more effective conflict preven-
tion. This corps resulted from what delegates 
described as a "distressing" finding: the UN 
and its Member States have not been able to 
achieve their principal responsibility of pre-
serving peace and human life. 
Recommendations to governments included 
the initiation of a worldwide freeze on armed 
forces and a 25% cut in production and export 
of weapons, including small arms. 
Acknowledging the indivisibility and inter-
dependence of human rights, the Declaration 
called upon the UN to review its own human 
rights institutions and practices to achieve 
balance in the allocation of resources, and to 
adopt binding international instruments on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, minorities, older 
persons and the disabled. Regarding sustain-
able development and the environment, the 
Forum requested the United Nations to make 
a global assessment of unsustainable devel-
opment and its impact on the environment, 
and social development. Civil society should 
adopt and disseminate the Earth Charter as a 
tool for promotion of values and actions that 
would create sustainable development. 
Waiting for the Summit... 
This declaration was formally presented to 
Louise Frechette, Deputy Secretary General 
of the UN. At the closing ceremony, it was 
recalled that the basic principles and action 
programmes contained in the final document 
would be left open during the month of June 
to allow the incorporation of the findings of 
Peking +5 and Copenhagen +5, as well as 
those of other international fora. This would 
allow those NGOs unable to attend the Forum 
sufficient time to submit their contributions. 
The final proposal would then be presented to 
the President of the General Assembly. The 
Declaration would be formally presented at 
the Millennium Summit in September 2000. It 
could be said that the task of civil society 
really begins today: what is needed now is for 
its representatives to disseminate the 
Declaration to as many people as possible, 
and defend its principles to their national 
governments. 
An end to conflict 
In the corridors of the UN, after each meeting, 
there was a brisk trade in business cards. It was 
impossible to take a single step without being 
asked to sign a petition or listen to a passionately 
militant defence of one NGO's contribution to the 
finished text. The fact is that five days is not 
enough. For most of those commuting between 
the plenary sessions and the workshops, this 
was a unique opportunity that would not recur for 
many years. A unique opportunity, too, to listen 
to orators who can inspire an audience to fresh 
efforts because they speak from the heart. One 
example was Swadesh Rana, a specialist in 
small arms and conventional weapons. It was 
standing room only in conference room number 
four, which was so packed that many of the audi-
ence were forced to stand at the back of the 
room to hear the debate. The subject was peace, 
security and disarmament. All eyes were on the 
lady wearing a sari in various shades of orange. 
45 You began by paying a sincere tribute to 
women, young people and all the members of 
civil society who are not organised. Do you 
believe they hold the key? 
It seems to me that we have to acknowledge the 
power of civil society. It has too often been 
described as a victim. It is true that the victims are 
civilians, but I think that in the traditional societies 
of Africa and Asia the unit of social cohesion is not 
a political party but the family, the clan, the tribe. 
The examples I chose came to my attention 
through my work on small arms at the United 
Nations. In my project with the Swiss and German 
governments, I have to pay attention to the unor-
ganised sectors of civil society: they are not only 
victims, they can and must become instruments of 
change. 
What can the international community do to 
help them? 
Most weapons are in the hands of people who 
become involved in hostilities as a result of the 
escalation of street brawling - brawling that takes 
on a communal, ethnic or religious aspect and 
moves into a wider theatre. If we were to give them 
better opportunities for prosperity, better education, 
more hope, they would become less inclined to 
resort to violence. I can tell you frankly today that 
the international community has spent nearly 5.6 
billion dollars on Somalia. If that money, instead of 
being spent 'on' Somalia, had been spent 'in' 
Somalia, it would have totally transformed the 
entire country. 
You are appealing for deliberate use to be made 
of civil society... 
Yes: positive efforts have to be made to recruit 
the services of women, older people, clan leaders, 
children and young people. I see them as powerful 
instruments. They sometimes use weapons 
because they are poor, as a way of getting atten-
tion. That is why I would like to see this Forum 
organising local forums for ordinary representatives 
of civil society. Giving young children who know 
nothing about politics but have been recruited any-
way, the opportunity to express their views and tes-
tify to what their situation really is. I am not talking 
about the NGOs alone - we also have to listen to 
those who have no interest in combining to form 
organisations or associations yet still suffer the 
effects of the use of small arms. All over the world. 
I would also like to see poverty officially recognised 
as a form of violence. Finally, the private sector 
should mobilise and attract young people in the 
developing countries. The same young people 
who, for lack of economic opportunities, let them-
selves become drawn into a world of violence. 
These are a few specific points that I suggested to 
the Forum to enable us to move forward in the right 
direction. 
She agreed, "out of respect and 
admiration for the organisers of the 
Forum," to give a paper on the 
need to address the problem of the 
harm done by small arms. At the 
end of the session, she was 
mobbed by people anxious to talk 
to her, thrust publications into her 
hands or ask her to support their 
cause. With unfailing courtesy she 
promised to take an interest in their 
cases, and repeated several times 
over that she could never under-
stand why she always produced 
this effect. It is hard to believe that 
she is unaware of her own charisma, or the energy she inspires in 
those who believe that it is always possible to "change things." 
For Swadesh Rana, (above), the very nature of civil conflict means 
that its forms are ever-changing. Initially, civil conflict confronted gov-
ernments with highly organised rebel forces, as in Angola, 
Mozambique and Nicaragua. Subsequently, these rebel groups lost 
their "legitimacy" and, especially, the support of the population, who 
were exposed to the terror tactics they used to generate publicity, most 
notably the taking of civilian hostages. 
Swadesh Rana emphasised a number of important issues for the 
international community. She reminded her audience that small arms 
are easy to get; they are not expensive and there are enough available 
to keep the world supplied for the next 20 years. Governments know 
that, because governments sell them. In addition, there is a supply of 
weapons available from smugglers, organised crime, former members 
of the armed forces, etc. Furthermore, their capacity to do harm is 
almost inversely proportional to their size and sophistication; civil con-
flict is brought about by people who very often find themselves 
involved in the first place because they have to defend themselves. 
As in the sad cases of Rwanda and Burundi, they use machetes, burn-
ing tyres, stones and other home-made weaponry. In the past, the 
international community has given priority to taking away manufac-
tured weapons from former troops. Yet it has been estimated that for 
every thousand weapons recovered under peace agreements, there 
are one hundred thousand more in the hands of unorganised sectors 
of civil society. For the specialists, the question now is who is using 
these weapons, their origin being a matter of secondary concern. 
Because the tragedy is that most of these arms are in the hands of 
civilians, who are using them. 
46 UK Development Aid 
by Sue Wheat 
Cautious optimism seems to 
be the mood in British develop-
ment circles about the UK's 
Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA). After the 
1997 national elections which 
brought a change of govern-
ment after 17 years of Tory rule 
to New Labour, the tide has 
definitely turned. British over-
seas aid has taken a much 
higher and often controversial 
profile and government is far 
more open to consulting with 
and listening to advocates in 
the development sector. 
Described as "one of the 
most progressive donors" by 
The Reality of Aid 2000 and 
"one of the most professional 
and innovative aid agencies in 
either the bilateral or multilater-
al sectors" in the Development 
Cooperation Review of the UK 
by the OECD's Development 
Assistance Committee in 1997, 
Britain is basking in its Feel 
Good Factor. 
ODA increased in 1998 by 
7.8 per cent and the UK now 
ranks fifth out of 21 D AC 
donors for the volume of aid 
given. 74.4% of its aid is also to 
low income countries, a higher 
proportion than 15 other 
donors. The UK has also been 
at the forefront of calling for for-
eign debt cancellation, particu-
larly for Heavily Indebted 
Poorer Countries. A strong 
emphasis has also been made 
on "ethics," particularly by sup-
porting an Ethical Trading 
Initiative which encourages 
improved labour and environ-
mental standards amongst 
British companies trading over-
seas and on supporting 
Fairtrade products from the 
South. 
"The change of government 
brought a whole new 
approach," explains Richard 
Manning, Director General of 
Resources at the Department 
for International Development 
(DFID), the newly-named gov-
ernment department responsi-
ble for overseas development 
issues, formerly the Overseas 
Development Administration 
(ODA). 
"We now have a separate 
department, with a cabinet min-
ister. In particular, the whole 
government agreed to a White 
Paper in November 1997 which 
has an overarching focus on 
world poverty and commits us 
to various international targets, 
particularly the OECD target of 
halving absolute poverty by the 
year 2015, decreasing child 
mortality and increasing num-
bers in school." 
M* ■-·-', 
'Manning describes the 
process of compiling country 
strategy papers and institutional 
strategy papers with the EU, 
World Bank and UN agencies 
through far-reaching consulta-
tion with civil society, as unique. 
These papers, plus a series of 
papers currently passing 
through the consultation 
process on international tar-
gets, will inform the country's 
medium-term framework and 
funding strategy. 
Central to the new philosophy 
is an emphasis on working with 
governments, international 
agencies and directly with inter-
national civil society in a "rights-
based approach," rather than 
through aid agencies providing 
services. This view is champ-
ioned very forcefully by Clare 
Short, the Secretary of State for 
International Development. 
"Too much of development in 
får ü 
Ex-soldiers building 
roads in Mozambique 
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the past has been about isolat-
ed development projects," said 
Ms Short at a conference on 
NGOs in a Global Future this 
January. "The new agenda is 
increasingly about sector-wide 
approaches, helping govern-
ments to provide key services, 
such as health and education." 
Development consultants, 
academics and NGOs broadly 
applaud the focus on poverty 
elimination, but are wary of 
what sometimes seems like a 
personal vendetta by Ms Short 
against NGOs. Many British 
development agencies are 
fearful that her view is over-
simplistic, that such a policy 
threatens their funding from 
DFID, and that they will be 
unable to fulfil commitments to 
their Southern partners on aid 
projects. 
"This is the first time a 
donor has taken this tack, 
rather than a left-wing aca-
demic, and it took people by 
surprise," says Alistair Fraser, 
Advocacy Officer at the 
umbrella organisation for 
British Overseas NGOs for 
Development (BOND). "Clare 
Short has been very harsh on 
service provision - which is 
what so much of development 
agency programmes are 
about." 
Civil society is the new 
development catch-phrase -
meaning trade unions, cooper-
atives, women's organisations, 
the poor, consumer groups and 
so on. 
"In a way, she's on to some-
thing - tinkering about with 
small projects can't transform 
global poverty, and that's what 
she's committed to do," says 
Fraser. But expecting Southern 
civil society to suddenly stand 
up and be counted may be 
naive. "Poor people often do 
not have the ability to pres-
surise their national govern-
ments - either because it is 
politically dangerous or practi-
cally impossible because they 
are poor, lack resources or 
lack education. NGOs have 
"We have seen a very 
good shift in strategy, 
but the eradication of 
poverty is a nonsense" 
also found that doing advocacy 
work is also only possible after 
everyday links have been 
made with communities 
through service provision -
digging wells and improving 
medical facilities and so on." 
Some development analysts 
are also sceptical of DFID's 
insistence on the term "eradi-
cation" of poverty, instead of 
alleviation. 
"We have seen a very good 
shift in strategy, but the eradi-
cation of poverty is a non-
sense," says David Seddon, 
Professor of Development 
Studies at the University of 
East Anglia. "Population is 
increasing, inequalities are 
increasing, and the number of 
poor is increasing, poverty can 
never be eliminated - that is 
totally Utopian." 
Professor Seddon agrees 
that a focus on poverty allevia-
tion is right, but questions the 
government's belief in the ben-
efits of globalisation. "What is 
wrong with UK development 
policy is that it doesn't focus on 
the reasons behind inequalities 
or the problems of social jus-
tice. DFID argues that market 
forces and globalisation are 
good and must be harnessed, 
but this is a real problem. We 
know very well that strategic 
protectionism is often very 
helpful - the US, UK and EU 
have all benefited from that -
yet trade agreements are not 
allowing Southern govern-
ments to do the same. I would 
like to know where specifically, 
the UK is prepared to argue 
strongly for increased global 
intervention in the World Trade 
Organisation or the Bretton 
Woods organisations." 
This is a view echoed by the 
authors of The Reality of Aid 
2000 who give significant 
emphasis to the contradiction 
that the UK government is in 
effect promoting two different 
development paradigms. 
One prioritises partnership, 
poverty focus, and the interna-
48 tional development targets 
which can be described as the 
Rights approach; the other pri-
oritises international rules (such 
as trade, patenting and invest-
ment) that discriminate against 
poor people and is the Global 
Liberalisation approach. 
Such faith in the liberalisation 
process is not unique to the 
British government, but British 
NGOs in particular have lobbied 
on this, particularly in the lead-
up to the last World Trade 
Organisation meeting in 
Seattle. 
Two controversial aspects of 
UK aid policy have featured in 
public debates since New 
Labour came to office. The 
first, namely tying development 
cooperation disbursement to 
the purchase of British compa-
nies' products has been criti-
cised as a back door way of 
supporting British industry 
under the guise of helping 
developing countries. Clare 
Short has been active in reduc-
ing this, and received support 
for this from the cross-party 
Parliamentary Committee, 
despite the protests of British 
industry. 
Few other donors have 
addressed these issues so pub-
licly and the UK's tied aid at 
20.4% is now slightly less than 
the DAC average of 23.2% but 
substantially less than others 
such as the US at 71.6% and 
Spain at 73.9%. 
A more famous controversy 
relates to the strong New 
Labour stance on ethical for-
eign policy and highlights con-
flicts between DFID, the 
Foreign Office and the 
Department of Trade. With 
DFID promoting strengthening 
of civil society in Asia while the 
Foreign Office allows arms 
sales to Indonesia, the contra-
dictions are obvious. 
Contradictions all arms-selling 
countries have difficulty 
addressing. 
The UK Government's push 
for debt relief can be attributed 
as much to the strong support 
of the Chancellor, Gordon 
Brown, who has treasury sur-
pluses to comfort him, as to 
Clare Short's efforts. She has 
been at pains to point out that 
debt relief alone will not solve 
all the South's problems, and 
has kept a watchful eye on her 
own budget, insisting debt relief 
doesn't cut into it. 
DFID's positive OECD review 
needs to be tempered by a 
hard look at the figures. 
The UK still only stands 14th 
out of 21 in the DAC generosity 
league with regard to ODA as a 
proportion of GNP, and aid 
spending in 1998 was 0.27% of 
GNP (only 0.01 per cent up on 
1997 which was the lowest 
level since 1990), which is still 
a long way off the UN target of 
0.7%. There has been no com-
mitment to a timescale for 
increasing the UK's contribu-
tions or to setting any interim 
•targets. Britain's claim that 
74.4% of its aid goes to poor 
countries also needs a good 
look, as it has made an admin-
istrative split between payments 
paid to poor countries (out of 
the ODA budget) and payments 
made to middle and high 
income countries with historical 
connections to the UK (which 
go through the Foreign Office 
budget). This is something 
other donors tend not to do, 
making the comparative statis-
tics less favourable on paper. 
That there has been a signifi-
cant shift in government under-
standing and political will since 
the change in government is 
not disputed. Whether the dra-
matic change in terminology 
and focus turns out to be a pio-
neering strategy or merely an 
inventive change in rhetoric is 
something that will only be 
revealed in coming years. 
Forestry in Guyana 
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participation in development 
by James Mackie* 
The position and influence of NGOs in ACP-EU 
cooperation has evolved over time. 
The WTO meeting in Seattle six months ago 
brought the power of civil society to all on global 
TV screens, and now the new ACP-EU Agree-
ment has its new provisions for civil society 
involvement. 
Putting words into action 
All well and good; civil society participation 
may be flavour of the month in development 
cooperation circles, but the difficult part, as many 
advocates of new policies have discovered in the 
past, is changing fine words and rhetoric into 
mainstream policies, and achieving practical 
results on the ground. 
The new ACP-EU Agreement contains plenty 
of references to civil society, but how to ensure 
that all this is really put into practice? NGO cam-
paigning during the Green Paper debate on the 
future of Lomé focused on this issue, but, while 
the final Agreement clearly states the obligation 
of parties to involve civil society in all stages of 
development, ACP and EU states can choose to 
ignore it. 
Another example is the discussion paper on 
NGO-Commission Relations: Building a Stronger 
Partnership, published by the Commission earlier 
this year. That the paper should be published at 
all is a major landmark, but it avoids recom-
mending a formal obligation on the Commission 
to dialogue with NGOs on policy issues. 
Or again: in March the Commission gave 
NGOs only 10 days to comment on a draft of the 
new EC Development Policy paper. NGO lobby-
ing persuaded the Council and Commission to 
extend the period of debate on the final version 
by a further six months, but this did not come 
naturally - NGOs had to argue for it every step 
of the way. 
This extension of the consultation period 
should however allow for more considered 
debate involving not just a few highly-organised 
groups with good access but also stakeholders 
further afield, such as Southern NGOs and 
civil society groups (see it on the DG 
Development Web Site). 
We cannot afford to leave dialogue with civil 
society on development cooperation to chance. 
NGO experience shows that participatory devel-
opment is usually also better-quality develop-
ment. NGOs are born out of civil society: groups 
of citizens getting together on a voluntary basis 
to take direct action to make a difference. This is 
the essence of NGO action and it is strongest 
when it remains true to these roots. At the same 
time many NGOs realise that project work on the 
ground can only be fully effective in an enabling 
environment and they have moved on to 
incorporate in their strategies public awareness, 
advocacy and information work both in Europe 
and in ACP and other Southern countries. 
European NGOs have a responsibility to 
encourage public debate on poverty and 
development issues in Europe, and conduct 
advocacy work with the European institutions and 
EU Member State governments. To be effective 
they must remain in close contact with Southern 
NGOs and their networks. 
Euforie 
All stakeholders in the ACP-EU Agreement will 
need information to participate fully in its imple-
mentation. European NGOs with their contacts 
and access to the European institutions also 
have a particular role to play here and this is why 
the major European NGO networks have joined 
other interested groups to set up and run, with 
some financial support from DG Development, a 
specialised Internet web site dedicated exclu-
sively to European development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid policy: Euforie (Europe's Forum 
on International Cooperation). This is proving an 
increasingly valuable tool for development 
groups all over the world to access in one well-
referenced place on the Internet a lot of key 
documents in the field. 
www. euforic.org 
'Secretary General 
NGD0-EU Liaison Committee 
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by Tim Clarke* 
A new Millenium, new challenges 
The Commission and the NGO Liaison 
Committee of Development NGOs celebrated 
their 25th birthday in April last year. It was a 
remarkable achievement: 25 years that had 
changed the nature of cooperation financed by 
the Commission in developing countries, and 
had witnessed a dramatic expansion in activities 
initiated and managed by the NGOs themselves. 
Precise figures are hard to determine, but a 
conservative estimate of 15% - as much as 
€ 1 billion per year - of the entire Community 
budget for external cooperation is channelled 
through NGOs. The views of NGO advocacy 
groups are being heard - and respected - at all 
levels of the Commission. 
The birthday celebrations were not, however, 
an unqualified success. Increasing criticism was 
levelled at the Commission by NGOs and sever-
al European institutions - notably the European 
Parliament and the European Court of Auditors. 
The dramatic expansion in NGO projects and 
programmes managed by the Commission was 
taking its toll (more than 50 times the volume of 
funding compared with 20 years ago, with no 
equivalent expansion in human resources). 
Delays in processing project applications and 
payments were snarling up the system. 
Confidence and trust built up over two decades 
was being damaged. 
The Commission's troubles (which led to the 
resignation of the Santer Commission, and the 
appointment of the Prodi Commission in 
September 1999) were also reflected in deterio-
rating Commission/NGO relations. It was time to 
rethink and rebuild. The internet age and the 
new Millenium brought new challenges. The 
Commission had to modernise and reform. 
NGOs had to seize the new opportunities provid-
ed by their increasingly vocal presence. The new 
Millenium Round debacle in Seattle, followed by 
the Citizens' Agenda 2000 Conference at 
Tampere in Finland in December 1999, showed 
that people's interests had made it to centre 
stage. 
New NGO confidence and power was begin-
ning to have an even more significant impact on 
decision-makers within the European Union and 
elsewhere. At the end of 1999 and in early 2000, 
commentaries on the new role and power of the 
NGOs took up many inches in correspondence 
columns of respected journals and newspapers. 
To its credit, the Commission has responded 
swiftly and imaginatively. An Inter-service NGO 
Task Force initiated by Commissioner Liikanen 
in April 1999 and chaired by DG Development's 
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2000, to the approval by the Commission of a 
Discussion Paper on building a new relationship 
between the Commission and the NGOs. A two-
month consultation process with all NGOs has 
just been completed and the ideas and initiatives 
resulting from this are to be translated into a 
new Commission document to be addressed to 
the European Parliament and the Council, later 
in the year. 
This new document will itself be partly inspired 
by other Commission intiatives in February and 
March this year: the publication of the 
Commission's Work Plan for 2000, its Strategy 
for the period from 2000 to 2005, and the 
Commission's overall reform package 
announced on 1 March 2000. All emphasise the 
central role of the citizen in pursuing the 
European ideal. 
Never before have NGO interests been so 
high on the Commission's agenda. It is an 
opportunity - and a responsibility - for all con-
cerned to come up with creative and effective 
ideas. 
What are NGOs? 
Neo-Government Organisations? Non-govern-
able organisations? DINGOs, RINGOs, 
NGONGOs, INGOs - the literature is full of 
acronyms. 
In fact, no universally-acceptable definition 
exists. The Commission's document mentioned 
above does not attempt to enter this minefield 
but confines itself to NGO characteristics, leav-
ing the reader to judge whether a particular 
organisation should or should not fall into this 
category. Even the Council Regulation on NGO 
Co-Financing does not attempt a definition, nor 
do the two sets of NGO Co-Financing General 
Conditions (approved in 1988 and 2000). 
One thing is certain: NGOs are increasing very 
fast indeed. This is particularly true in new 
democracies and countries undergoing transi-
tion. An OECD Inventory of European 
Development NGOs financed by the 
Commission in April 1996 identified some 6,000. 
The figure now is probably 50% higher. 
One thing is certain: NGOs are increasin 
new democracies and cc 
What has the Commission/NGO relationship 
delivered so far? The first real manifestation of 
the Commission's interest in establishing a rela-
tionship with development NGOs came with the 
establishment of a new Budget Line in 1975 
allowing the Commission to co-finance activities 
in developing countries proposed by European 
NGOs and awareness generation in Europe. 
This Budget Line was given a budget of €2.5 
million. 
It was introduced at a time when there was a 
general feeling that traditional government-to-
government cooperation was missing a vital tar-
get: local communities. It was recognised that 
European NGOs and their partners in the devel-
oping world were better placed than government 
officials (in Brussels or in the partner country) to 
identify and address real grassroot needs. 
Everything works in their favour: low-cost, high-
impact, rapid mobilisation of resources, driven by 
local initiatives rather than donors. 
It is thus not surprising that the Budgetary 
Authority (the European Parliament and the 
Council) started to expand the resources allocat-
ed to this Budget Line. At the same time the 
NGO Liaison Committee (CLONG) was estab-
lished, and a secretariat was set up in Brussels. 
National NGO Platforms started to be estab-
lished in each of the Member States. Elected 
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very fast indeed. This is particularly true in 
ries undergoing transition. 
representatives from these National Platforms 
took seats on the Board of the Liaison 
Committee and directed their work. 
The Commission became the single most 
important donor support for the CLONG. It has 
provided 85% of the CLONG's annual budget (for 
the year 2000 it is just over €2 million), the bal-
ance of 15% coming from its constitutent mem-
bers. The Budgetary Authority consistently 
ensured that specific reference be made to the 
CLONG in Budget Line commentaries so that its 
continued finance could be assured. 
The increasing financial resources devoted to 
NGO co-financing were matched by increases in 
the access given to senior Commission officials 
and Commissioners. NGOs could no longer be 
regarded as marginal groups within society. 
Resources provided to the NGO Co-Financing 
Budget Line have expanded since 1975. Last 
year, 764 projects in 78 countries were financed 
from this Budget Line, for a total of €200 million. 
As a general rule, 90% of these activities are in 
developing countries and 10% within the 
European Union. This 10% focuses on aware-
ness-raising and education, and underpins the 
Union's overall development cooperation policy. 
For the first 10 years, there were no formal 
criteria for NGO co-funding. In 1988, some 
General Conditions for NGO Co-Financing were 
agreed, both for activities in developing countries 
and for awareness generation within Europe. 
These have been in force for the last 12 years. 
In July 1998, comments from a number of 
European Institutions questioned the 
Commission's right to manage such significant 
financial resources without a formal legal basis. 
The Council adopted a Regulation that now pro-
vides this. It is to be reviewed in 2001. The regu-
lation sets out in detail the range of NGO projects 
and programmes that can be co-financed, and 
provides for the establishment of a Council NGO 
Co-Financing Advisory Committee chaired by the 
Commission. The Commission is obliged to 
report to this Committee on all the projects that 
have been financed. For projects exceeding €2 
million the Committee's opinion is needed. The 
first Committee met on 8 July 1999. The latest 
Committee (the fourth) met on 24 February and 
approved the Commission's proposals for man-
aging the Budget Line during the year 2000. 
Prompted in part by this new Regulation, the 
1988 General Conditions on Co-Financing have 
been carefully brought into line with new political 
priorities and with the new legal basis. 
The Commission approved the new General 
Conditions on 7 January 2000. The first projects 
and programmes under these new conditions will 
probably be financed in the second half of 2000. 
Whilst the NGO Co-financing Budget Line pro-
vides a major source of Community funds for 
NGOs, there are many others that NGOs can 
access. Full details of these can be found in a 
publication available in English and French, pro-
duced by the CLONG. In some fields, for 
instance the provison of food aid and emergency 
aid, NGOs are a long way ahead. They have a 
talent for being in the right place at the right time 
- working often in the most harrowing and haz-
ardous circumstances - and this makes them nat-
ural partners for the Commission. 
Stifled by success 
NGOs have been victims of their own success. 
The explosion of all these initiatives designed to 
address NGO needs, reflected in myriad financ-
ing, budgetary and contractual procedures and 
consultation mechanisms, has completely suffo-
53 cated the system. NGOs no longer know whom 
to address to solve problems. The mismatch 
between limited Commission human resources 
and increasing tasks is only too evident. Nor has 
the Commission been the only organisation to 
suffer. The EU Member states have been trying 
to grapple with the same problem. 
At the political level, concerns are being 
expressed that NGOs have become too powerful 
and too dominant. Some consider that they lack 
political legitimacy; that they are undemocratic 
bodies answerable to no-one. They believe the 
rush to jump on the bandwagon has led to the 
creation of many NGOs that do not appear to 
have the necessary expertise and skills. Impact 
studies in the field show that the picture may not 
be quite as rosy as it should be. Some NGOs -
now household names -
have a remarkable 
track record in the field, 
but others have been 
found wanting. 
The growth of NGOs 
in developing countries 
has reflected their growth in Europe. They have 
become an industry. NGOs specialising in human 
rights, democracy and environmental issues 
have proved to be thorns in the flesh of many 
fledgling governments. The power they wield, 
promoting well-researched and hard-hitting cam-
paigns, often fuelled by information gleaned from 
the internet, can have a dramatic impact. New 
NGO networks are springing up all the time. 
Links are being established between groups in 
the North and the South and in the East and the 
West. 
Going global 
The negotiations surrounding the post-Lomé 
Partnership Agreement demonstrated all too 
clearly the fears and concerns of many govern-
ments in the face of burgeoning civil society 
interests. Here again, the issue is one of legiti-
macy, but the legitimacy of governments to 
reflect civil society's interests rather than the 
legitimacy of civil society itself. 
The beginning of the 21st century is proving to 
be a turning point in the international debate on 
these issues. The post-Seattle mood is seeping 
into many international institutions: the World 
Trade Organisation, the World Bank, the IMF, the 
European Commission, the UN system... all are 
having to re-examine their approach to NGO and 
civil society issues. 
The future? 
At the Commission, the first six months of 2000 
has been a challenging time. Evaluations of the 
NGO Co-Financing Budget Line and 
Decentralised Budget Lines will be well under 
way. New management procedures have been 
introduced to simplify and rationalise NGO grant 
management mechanisms. Present consultation 
procedures with NGOs will be re-evaluated as 
part of the Commission Reform programme. 
NGO data-bases will be established. Plans for a 
new Communication 
In developing countries... NGOs specialising in 
human rights, democracy and environmental 
issues have proved to be thorns in the flesh 
of many a fledgling government 
on Commission/civil 
society relations are 
being produced. New 
Commission 
Communications on 
development coopera-
tion, and the link between relief and rehabilita-
tion, will emerge. And NGOs will be consulted 
fully on all these documents. 
These changes will require the NGO communi-
ty to adapt and reform. Issues of transparency, 
accountability, and professionalism are emerging. 
The Information Society, skilfully exploited by the 
NGO world, is giving unparalleled access to 
knowledge. This in turn is spawning specialised 
NGOs - experts in a multitude of different fields. 
Is this next decade to be the Age of the NGO? 
If so, how will power be wielded? New power 
means new responsibilities. For us in the 
Commission, the challenge is to build upon the 
experience gleaned over the last 26 years. To 
deepen and broaden our dialogue on many 
fronts. We will all be judged on what we deliver: 
our ability to provide real improvements to peo-
ple's lives, particularly the most vulnerable. It is 
an exciting and honourable adventure. 
Head of the Civil Society, NGO, Good Governance and 
Decentralised Cooperation Unit, DG Development 
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by Sue Wheat 
Anybody who's worked in development has probably been stricken by 
doubts at some time or other about the role and effectiveness of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). They are there to Do Good, but all 
too often get accused of undertaking inappropriate interventions, 
disrupting local or even national politics, being cultural imperialists, and 
creating inequality and dependency amongst Southern communities... 
What are they for? 
Non-governmental organisations are essential-
ly any organisation or association that isn't direct-
ly connected to government and isn't profit-mak-
ing. They range from the tiny (a collection of 
people working in a specific community using just 
their own labour and intellectual skills) to the 
massive (an international NGO working through-
out the world with a multi-million dollar budget). 
Collectively, they are certainly an economic force 
that can't be ignored. More than 19 million peo-
ple work for NGOs world-wide and they trade at 
least US$1.1 trillion a year. 
Over the last two decades, aid has increasingly 
been channelled through international NGOs by 
bilateral and multilateral agencies fearful of gov-
ernment bureaucracies and inefficiencies, and in 
many cases eager to reduce their bilateral aid 
contributions post-Cold War. Northern NGOs are 
often the first recipients of donor aid which is 
then passed on to Southern NGO partners. 
Some 400 to 500 international NGOs are current-
ly active in global humanitarian and development 
activities, collectively spending some $9-10 bil-
lion annually, supposedly reaching some 250 
million people living in abject poverty. 
"To governments, NGOs appear to offer the 
prospect of a different, and in may ways more 
acceptable face of development assistance," 
explains David Seddon, Professor of 
Development Studies at the UK's University of 
East Anglia. 
"They profess more cultural sensitivity and 
stronger links with Southern NGOs and commu-
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get their 
money, 
Northern 
NGOs get 
more of it than 
Southern 
NGOs which 
means control 
remains firmly 
in the North. 
Funds are 
distributed to 
Southern 
partners, but 
often tied into 
the conditions 
laid down in 
the Northern 
NGO's 
funders' 
strategic plans 
nities than the national govern-
ment. They also have a good 
reputation for cost-effectiveness 
and efficiency - although this is 
not always true. Whatever their 
weaknesses or disadvantages, 
they are not the government 
and that is enough for some." 
Corporatisation 
of development 
Such rapid growth has meant 
that many NGOs are now multi-
national, million dollar organisa-
tions. But the proliferation of 
NGOs and the forces of globali-
sation has meant that over the 
80s and 90s, NGOs have 
adopted a more competitive, 
corporate management style. 
Many have vast media and 
communications centres con-
stantly on-call, policy teams 
which jet-set around the globe 
in a continuous schedule of 
international conferences, politi-
cal lobbyists and slick celebrity-
backed marketing campaigns. 
"In many ways the large 
NGOs are no different to multi-
national corporations," says 
Kenyan Wanjiku Kamau, a 
policy advisor to international 
NGOs. 
"I am often at meetings where 
the talk is about budgets, mar-
ket share, visions, and 'the 
brand.' We could be talking 
about a retail franchise system, 
not a development agency pro-
viding wells and healthcare." 
Managing funds in a more 
businesslike manner may not in 
itself be a bad thing, especially 
as NGOs or 'voluntary organi-
sations' gained a reputation for 
being worthy but inefficient dur-
ing the 60s and 70s. But does 
the increased efficiency trans-
late into an improved 'product' -
that is - a reduction in overall 
poverty? Unfortunately, after 40 
years or more of some interna-
tional NGOs working in 
Southern countries, although 
we are seeing a growing middle 
class in many countries, the 
number of those living in 
absolute poverty is growing. 
The degree to which this is the 
fault of NGOs is of course, 
unquantifiable. But certainly, the 
product of development is 
'faulty' and NGOs have a critical 
role in its 'production.' 
Dancing to the funders' 
tunes 
The use of the management 
tools adopted from Northern 
business practice has tended to 
have a top-down approach 
which is often difficult for 
Southern NGOs to relate to. 
An environment of enforcing 
and regulating has been estab-
lished, but accountability rarely 
goes both ways. 
"For most Northern NGOS, 
accountability long ago shifted 
away from their constituencies 
towards the donor agencies," 
writes Firoze Manji, ex-Director 
of Amnesty International's 
Africa Programme in a critical 
report of the development 
industry, Development and 
Patronage, by Oxfam. The 
focus of NGO activity changes 
not so much according to com-
munity needs in the South, he 
says, but to donor trends in the 
North and funding proposals 
drawn up around the latest 
development buzzwords. 
And for those that fundraise 
largely from the public, the ulti-
mate aim is always to present 
their work in a way that contin-
ues to raise funds in the long-
term. "What it comes down to 
for the big Northern agencies is 
maintaining their financial 
base," says Rod Leith, a British 
fundraising consultant for 
Northern NGOs. 
"To put it crudely, that means 
making sure it's their organisa-
tion's T-shirts that people see 
on the six o'clock news." 
However they get their 
money, Northern NGOs get 
more of it than Southern NGOs 
which means control remains 
firmly in the North. Funds are 
distributed to Southern part-
ners, but often tied into the con-
ditionalities laid down in the 
Northern NGO's funders' strate-
gic plans. 
"These plans may be written 
thousands of miles away, be 
designed according to non-
translatable project concepts 
and be subject to distant and 
unchallengable funding deci-
sions by the funders of the fun-
ders," points out Professor 
Seddon. 
"If that is not enough, the 
very right of Southern commu-
nities to define their own prob-
lems might be challenged by a 
stranger who once had a week-
end PRA course in London or 
Washington. It is not coinciden-
tal that such a process, despite 
some rearrangements, pre-
served the power and defined 
continuing roles for those who 
were powerful in the industry to 
start with." 
This inequality between 
Northern and Southern NGOs 
56 is something that has been 
acknowledged by both sides in 
recent years. Northern-led 
NGO operations, although 
often focused on capacity 
building on paper, may actually 
undermine Southern NGOs 
and communities in practice. 
"I'm worried that Northern 
NGOs occupy space that could 
be occupied more effectively 
by Southern community-based 
organisations," says Wanjiku 
Kamau. "International NGOs 
generally come with certain 
values and help to those with 
the same values instead of 
helping communities find their 
own voice." 
Southern governments' abili-
ty to operate national develop-
ment strategies may also be 
weakened by the NGOs' over-
riding presence. United 
Nations agencies have com-
plained that in Africa increas-
ing flows to NGOs were under-
mining "systems of cooperation 
and coordination in large-scale 
emergencies." 
And in Kenya, says Wanjiku 
Kamau, where a lot of the 
health services are channelled 
through NGOs, the state health 
system is being undermined. 
"The health system is in cri-
sis, particularly as a result of 
Aids. Kenya is getting some 
help through the bilateral sys-
tem, but NGO aid is often inde-
pendent of this. The result is 
that there is no longer a com-
prehensive national health sur-
veillence system. The NGOs 
aren't supporting the govern-
ment health system, aren't 
working within the national 
health strategy, and aren't 
necessarily working where they 
are most needed." NGOs 
have often filled the gap left by 
the retreat of the state and 
either acted as a smokescreen 
to hide the fact that public 
services as such, are disap-
pearing or prevented the state 
from coordinating a national 
development programme. 
Most recently, Northern gov-
ernments have been question-
ing the role of Northern NGOs 
and seeking to empower 
Southern governments and 
civil society groups more 
directly. This is a particularly 
strong line of Clare Short, the 
British Minister for International 
Development. Suggestions that 
funding should more frequently 
by-pass Northern NGOs and 
go directly to the South have 
been met with fear by British 
NGOs. 
A survey by the British gov-
ernment in 1995 revealed that 
80% of British NGOs surveyed 
opposed aid being channelled 
directly to Southern NGOs 
because they felt Southern 
NGOs lacked the experience 
to manage, monitor and evalu-
ate projects, would be more 
vulnerable to donor influence, 
would respond to the availabili-
ty of money rather than need, 
would fill a void created by a 
retrenching state, and would 
be susceptible to manipulation 
by donor agencies or political 
groups. 
Firoze Manji interprets this 
as "a considerable deficit of 
respect and trust for their 
counterparts in the South." 
What is striking about the list 
of reasons given, says Manji, 
is that on the criteria they 
state, most Northern NGOs 
wouldn't qualify to receive 
funds either. "It is tempting to 
draw the conclusion that the 
raison d'être for development 
may no longer be to build sus-
tainable development and insti-
tutions in the South, but rather 
to keep the home team going," 
he says. Their fearful reaction 
is patronising, hypocritical and 
largely unfounded. What is 
more likely, he insists, is that 
NGOs realise their own future 
is at risk. "It is the cri de coeur 
of the dinosaur facing potential 
extinction." 
57 The NGO movement in Africa 
by Fatma M Aloo 
At the end of the Cold War, Africa experienced 
liberalisation in waves from the Northern States. 
With it the notion of a one-party state began to 
crumble. As nation states engaged in the turbulent 
process of multi-partyism, civil society began to 
have some - albeit limited - room for manoeuvre. 
The NGO movement and the press began to thrive. 
Globalisation 
The world economy of the late 80s and 90s 
demanded the opening up of borders as capital 
sought markets. Globalisation was a term embraced 
unconditionally by the developing world. This path 
of development demanded maximum profit at the 
expense of social development. African states 
began to fail to protect the wellbeing of most of their 
population. 
Social classes began to be more clearly defined, 
and the haves and have nots became separated. In 
the meantime, the romance of the flag of independ-
ence has worn off and reality has dawned. 
Civil society had to get its act together to survive. 
UN Conferences 
Around this time also there were a number of UN 
Conferences on issues like the Rio Environment 
Conference, health issues in Cairo, Socio-Economie 
issues in Vienna and Women's Issues in Beijing. 
These conferences had a double impact. Social 
issues were prominent and pertinent to peoples' 
lives and raised public consciousness of human 
rights. 
Secondly, because government had to produce 
reports and pledge support it put them in a bind of 
accountability to their own people. NGO awareness 
was enhanced through these declarations. 
Rights as Issues 
Africa, as the founder of the Human Rights 
Charter through the African Charter, took its place. 
Numerous organisations, associations, and councils 
mushroomed and registered as NGOs. The term 
NGO was new. What was familiar were the commu-
nity-based organisations (CBOs) around which the 
tempo of society clicked. 
Initially, registered NGOs followed the bureau-
cratic culture they were used to. Many people within 
them came from government or kept NGO work as 
a sideline to their regular jobs. NGOs were volun-
tary and so they have had quite a struggle to keep 
themselves going. 
The role of NGOs in society is beginning to be 
understood and a new breed of NGO has begun to 
emerge. This is particularly so in the environmental, 
women and youth movements. They had a more 
dynamic tempo and ways of organising and have an 
impact at advocacy and policy level. They also have 
begun to become more professional. 
Donor impact 
As the NGO sector is taken more seriously, it has 
also begun to demand accountability and trans-
parency from its members. Donors who had lost 
faith in the performances of government structures 
began to put resources into the NGO movement. In 
the 90s the buzz words in the donor community 
were gender and empowerment, from which the 
women's movement benefited greatly. With empha-
sis by UN bodies on gender and its own awakening, 
the women's movement in Africa was able to make 
tremendous strides. Effective networking and advo-
cacy at national, regional and international level 
played its part. At policy level also, laws were 
changed in favour of women, as pressure mounted 
from this movement within nation states. At regional 
level, organisations like the OAU, COMESA, 
SADCC were also lobbied. Effective regional net-
works were founded and flourished: 
AAWORD (Senegal), FLAMME (Zambia), AMW 
(Zimbabwe), ASWA (Egypt), DAWN 
(Nigeria/Senegal) and many more. 
The environmentalists have not fared badly 
either. After Rio effective programmes have been 
developed by the NGO community on issues of land 
and people. This issue is high on the agenda of the 
NGO movement, be it in Nigeria (the Ogoni issue) 
or Kilimanjaro (the Maasai, Bairbag issue) and 
many others on the continent. Massive educational 
campaigns have been undertaken as conservation-
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community involvement one cannot talk of preser-
vation. The Jozani forest in Zanzibar is an example 
of its effectiveness. 
Children's rights is another issue that the NGO 
community has adopted as society becomes 
painfully aware of the plight of children in Africa 
through displacements, wars and poverty. 
Weaknesses and needs 
However lively the NGO sector in Africa, there 
are some who have set up to make money: "brief-
case NGOs" which are basically fraudulent. 
Capacity-building potential within the NGO move-
ment means that support systems and accountabili-
ty are now necessary. Many NGOs lack vision, and 
the dearth of mission statements and management 
skills is an issue in Africa. This is partly because 
most NGOs are run on a voluntary basis. 
Several capacity-building bodies have begun to 
emerge to address organisational development: 
The East African and Southern Unit Network 
(EASUN) based in Arusha, Tanzania; PODDER 
based in South Africa; MWENGO based in 
Zimbabwe and some others on the continent. 
In Zanzibar there is an NGO Resource Centre 
(NGORC), a project funded by the Aga Khan 
Foundation which has been operating for the last 
four years and has actively played a role in provid-
ing an enabling environment through which NGO 
and CBO community can organise effectively. The 
Centre encourages and supports basic research 
and capacity-building training. 
Macro-micro connection through 
cyberculture 
Information technology (IT) is changing the 
nature of the NGO movement. Access to informa-
tion is faster so it can be a tool of empowerment. A 
case in point is the tourism industry. With a tourist 
boom in some parts of Africa (Tunisia, South Africa, 
Tanzania) the issue of land has come to the fore. 
Many hotels have sprung up and national parks set 
up for the tourist industry. Foreign-owned deals 
continue to be brokered without the knowledge of 
local residents; community-owned land is appropri-
ated in the name of development. Through IT some 
of this dealing is exposed in time for the local com-
munity to take action. This is done in conjunction 
with watchdog organisations, for instance Tourism 
Concern based in Britain collaborates with environ-
mentalist/media NGOs like MISA (Namibia) and 
JET (Tanzania) who in turn disseminate information 
through the press and work with local groups to 
advertise the issue. 
Conclusion 
As the NGO movement in Africa begins to move 
forward, there is a concerted effort to contain it 
through policy documents and systematic checks in 
the legal system. This has a double impact. It gives 
the movement a legitimacy, but on the other hand it 
curtails its effect as a dynamic force. The challenge 
facing the NGO movement in Africa today is for it to 
emerge as a viable force and an agent for change. 
The other struggle is for it to build its own infra-
structure and managerial capacity and to be able to 
function on a more professional level. 
The women's NGO movement in Africa is a step 
ahead in this struggle, for it has succeeded in caus-
ing change at policy level, notably in Zambia, 
Ghana, Tanzania, Morocco, and Uganda . 
As the power of cyberculture begins to affect the 
continent, interactive dialogue becomes a reality 
between forces of change and the establishment. 
The speed at which information flows, and with a 
concerted effort on the part of committed NGOs 
working at grassroots level, NGOs will continue to 
gain bargaining power, and to use it to influence 
change. 
59 NGOs and humanitarian aid 
by Gianni Rufini* 
The 1990s have been the decade of humani-
tarian aid. Never - in the history of this century -
have the populations of great parts of the globe 
been affected by wars and natural catastrophes 
with the same frequency and violence. Ten years 
ago, humanitarian and emergency aid still 
represented a relatively marginal sector in inter-
national cooperation with developing countries. 
Most NGOs were reluctant to get involved in this 
activity, whose techniques, methodology and 
principles were considered poor relations to the 
better-acknowledged disciplines such as devel-
opment aid, human rights and environmental 
protection. 
At the end of this difficult decade hundreds of 
NGOs with roots in more traditional domains are 
increasingly devoting their resources to assisting 
people affected by conflicts and natural disasters. 
A conspicuous effort is being made to link these 
actions with a broader developmental approach, 
through the principles of the continuum of Relief-
Rehabilitation-Development. 
This radical change is rooted in two major fac-
tors: the enormous growth in number, intensity 
and cruelty of wars after 1989 and the increased 
re-occurrence of natural catastrophes (by 900% 
in 40 years). Underdevelopment is now an 
unsustainable tragedy. 
Too often these events have wiped out serious 
efforts and important investments. This is as 
much the case for Angola, Mozambique and 
Central America as for West Africa, Bangladesh 
and Indonesia. In some cases, development 
programmes have been steadily replaced by 
permanent humanitarian actions as in Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Iraq. 
On the donor side, the already low develop-
ment aid is being gradually diverted towards 
humanitarian aid, which is more politically 
rewarding and appeals to public opinion. 
Europe and humanitarian aid 
The European Union developed a sound 
humanitarian policy as late as 1992, when ECHO 
was established. Nonetheless, in a few years 
Europe has become a major player, today the 
biggest donor and best performer in humanitarian 
aid. 
The strategic choice of providing direct assis-
tance through the non-governmental system has 
strengthened citizens' support while ensuring 
flexibility and cost-effectiveness. The adoption of 
special administrative tools like fast financing 
procedures and the Framework Partnership 
Agreement (FPA) has allowed prompt response 
to crises. In a few years, the ECHO-NGO 
partnership has become the human face of 
European aid: disinterested, impartial, based on 
needs and rights. 
NGOs 
On their side, NGOs have adopted a reluctant 
approach to humanitarianism: few specialised 
agencies used to work in this field in the early 
80s. During the 90s, more and more organisa-
tions expanded their activities and developed 
new skills. At the end of the decade ECHO had 
170 NGO partners, while 400 more requested to 
sign the FPA. 
One easy explanation of such a trend is the 
increased funds available for humanitarian 
response, but the determining factor is that there 
is nothing we can do for development as long as 
wars and natural catastrophes systematically 
delete all progress in our work. We are no longer 
able to draw political attention to poverty eradica-
tion as long as peace and stability remain the 
60 first concern for the internation-
al community. Funding for 
development has decreased by 
25% in seven years, while 
many developing countries are 
dragged decades backward by 
conflicts and devastating 
events. This situation has 
become unbearable and NGOs 
face new responsibilities. 
The collapse of Somalia and 
West Africa, the Iraqi war and 
the genocide in the Great 
Lakes were just the first shock: 
the Balkan crisis brought the 
war to our doorstep and gener-
ated a strong solidarity among 
citizens to whom a response 
had to be given. This meant 
adopting a new framework for 
action: no more long and care-
ful planning or participatory 
appraisal, with little space for 
capacity building; new methods 
and techniques were learnt 
and even ethical issues had to 
be reviewed. 
Today, almost two-thirds of 
European humanitarian aid is 
delivered by NGOs, who also 
raise one-third of overall fund-
ing through citizens' donations. 
The end of a decade 
Despite all efforts, the bal-
ance between increased 
engagement and relief capacity 
remains dramatically negative 
and the limits of humanitarian-
ism as a response to world 
crises becomes evident. In the 
last couple of years, two main 
events have been particularly 
relevant for this process: 
Hurricane Mitch and the 
Kosovo war. 
The Kosovo crisis has 
uncovered the major weak-
nesses of our discipline, the 
lack of coherence within the 
international community, the 
absence of a European Union 
foreign policy and the inade-
quacy of the existing structures 
for emergency response. Not 
only has the crisis not been 
prevented (although probably it 
could have been), but all 
manner of contradictions and 
polemics have emerged in its 
management, determining a 
relatively late and confused 
Remind you 
of someone you know? 
A young member of the 
Kosovo Liberation 
Army patrols the 
streets of Prizren. 
Kosovo, 1999 
61 response. The reconstruction process might also 
be going along the same lines. 
Hurricane Mitch struck a region that for 
decades has represented a major working field 
for development NGOs and international organi-
sations. The disaster has reopened the debate 
about the definition of development in the region: 
the role of the traditional economy, security, 
démocratisation, human rights, the debt, defence 
of minorities and vulnerable groups, participation 
and capacity building have all been integrated by 
Shortsighted policies miss the 
chance for a major shift towards 
prevention, the only sound 
approach 
NGOs in the design of strategies to face the 
crisis and plan the reconstruction. This ongoing 
exercise will certainly lead to more coordinated 
action in all sectors of international aid in the 
region. Still, shortsighted policies miss the 
chance for a major shift towards prevention, the 
only sound approach. 
Shifting to prevention 
A structural approach to natural disaster pre-
vention implies reducing vulnerability. This is 
essentially a development challenge. It is appro-
priate therefore that preparedness in recent 
years has shifted away from the humanitarian 
actors and is being given greater consideration in 
the development community. Nonetheless, the 
expertise acquired through a decade of humani-
tarian operations is also fundamental to address 
sound preparedness/prevention strategies. The 
know-how is there, the main problem is the lack 
of policies. Prevention is a quiet, long-term 
activity that does not attract media attention, 
consensus or donations. 
The conflict-prevention side is no clearer. 
Kosovo has been paradigmatic also in this 
sense: for 10 years the UN and NGOs have 
warned the international community about the 
level of tension and the worsening social and 
political situation, warning of the risk of 
imminent conflict. We know the result. 
The international community remains 
essentially reactive and not proactive, incapable 
of promoting long term programmes to build 
structural stability. 
EC - NGO relationship 
Whatever change occurs in policies, humani-
tarian aid is likely to increase as the problems of 
global unbalance, poverty and rights keep the 
world unstable. For the humanitarian community 
the issues are quantity and quality: the size of 
international response is still miserable compared 
to the size of crises, and their effectiveness is far 
from adequate. While we work on techniques, 
methodology, training and coordination, a serious 
effort must be made to improve strategies and 
financing. 
Donor/Agency partnerships 
At European level, one of the main issues is 
how to upgrade the partnership between donors 
and agencies, going beyond the financial rela-
tionships towards more qualitative ones. After a 
difficult start, ECHO and NGOs are cautiously 
testing a higher level of partnership by increasing 
common strategic planning, efficiency and cost 
effectiveness, and discussing major problems. 
Should this method work, it would benefit 
operations and victims. 
This does not happen easily and there is still a 
cultural resistance against a full acknowledge-
ment of the role of NGOs. We can say that we 
are all working in the right direction but still have 
a long way to go. 
'VOICE Coordinator 
62 What future for fair trade? 
by Paolo Logli 
Fair trade offers small-scale farmers 
and craftsmen in developing 
countries the chance to find outlets 
for their produce and make a decent 
living from it, even though they are 
excluded from trading circles. 
In general, they have the support of 
bodies based in the industrialised 
countries which launch specific 
projects and take over the 
importing, distribution and control 
of the goods in question and help 
to create consumer awareness. 
In most cases, the goods concerned are food 
products subject to sharp variations in world 
prices, like coffee or tea, or craft products 
(clothing, pottery, etc). As a result, even in cases 
where prices are more stable, producers in the 
South are often at the mercy of middlemen who 
pay them only a minute fraction of the market 
price and force them to take out loans at 
extortionate rates of interest. 
With the support of specialised NGOs, small 
producers are combining to form cooperatives to 
improve their living and working conditions, and 
to make use of environmentally compatible 
production techniques. A fair trade enterprise is 
defined as one that observes socially and 
environmentally acceptable production conditions 
and redistributes the profits of its activities 
to its workers. 
Under a long-term agreement with the import 
bodies, fair trade producers undertake to supply 
merchantable goods at a "fair" price - in other 
words, above the market price, whatever that 
may be, with possible advance financing of their 
production or harvest. Definitions here vary from 
one body to another, although efforts are being 
made to standardise these criteria. 
At present, the fair trade bodies are working 
with 45 of the world's developing countries and 
more than 800 local organisations - half a million 
small producers in all. It is estimated that several 
tens of millions more would be interested in fair 
trade, and are looking for ways of profiting from 
the recent adjustment and liberalisation pro-
grammes. 
In Mexico, for example, there are 250,000 
small-scale coffee planters. Their product quality 
is good, yet they earn an average annual income 
of no more than 600 dollars as most of the profits 
from coffee marketing are absorbed by middle-
men. Several thousand planters have combined 
to form a fair trade cooperative to organise their 
exports to Europe. As a result, their incomes 
have almost doubled, their working and living 
conditions have improved, and they have been 
able to build warehouses and launch social 
welfare projects (such as drinking water supply 
and school buildings). 
The importance of labels 
In Europe, many of the importing centres which 
apply the principles of fair trade and have 
concluded agreements with producers have 
combined to form the European Fair Trade 
Association (EFTA), which is trying to standard-
ise criteria and definitions and is bringing pres-
sure to bear on national and community authori-
ties in the interests of fair trade. The specialised 
bodies arrange for goods to be moved through 
two distribution outlets: specialist stores, such as 
OXFAM's World Shops forming part of NEWS 
(Network of European World Shops), and the 
traditional distribution outlets such as super-
markets. 
Specialist stores - of which there are a few 
thousand in Europe, often run by volunteers - are 
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alerting public opinion to development issues. 
When run by competent, motivated volunteers or 
by professionals, they can give customers accu-
rate details of the provenance and production 
conditions of the goods offered for sale. 
Although these shops handle a variety of 
goods, sales through the ordinary retail circuit 
are confined to a few foodstuffs, such as coffee, 
tea, honey, bananas and chocolate. Even so, 
this accounts for about 60% of the fair trade 
turnover. These outlets have the disadvantage of 
not providing direct personal contact with cus-
tomers, but they do ensure compliance with a 
very strict specification, thanks to the involve-
ment of specialist bodies such as Max Havelaar 
(in France, Belgium and the Netherlands), 
Transfair (in Germany, Austria and Italy) and Fair 
Trade Mark (in the United Kingdom and Ireland). 
These bodies, now combined under the FLO 
label (Fair Trade Labelling Organisation) super-
vise, in particular, the conditions under which 
goods are bought from small producers and are 
eligible to be labelled as such, for payment of a 
royalty. 
Currently, the FLO has registered 181 cooper-
atives for coffee (mainly in Central America and 
the Caribbean), 47 for tea (in Asia and Africa), 
23 for honey. Its work is also proving essential in 
smoothing out various strategic differences 
among the supervisory bodies. In order to pre-
vent fraud, some are suggesting that the label 
should be granted only to products which comply 
with a long and specific list of criteria (such as 
very high percentages of "fair" raw material, in 
terms of both quantity and quality), while others, 
to make it easier to sell at more competitive 
prices, accept that the "fair trade" label can be 
awarded under less rigid conditions. The FLO is 
trying to reduce these disparities, though their 
harmful effects on custom would still be subject 
to the de facto separation between 
national markets. 
European objectives 
Fair trade affects various aspects of European 
Union policies: trade, environment and con-
sumption, both inside the EU and outside; but it 
is in terms of development aid policy that the 
need to adopt an effective and consistent 
approach is most obvious. 
Two reports presented to the European 
Parliament (Langer 1994, and Fassa 1998) pro-
posed to the Commission that fair trade should 
be incorporated into its aid policies (including 
those subsequent to Lomé), that a study of the 
creation of an ad hoc budget line should be 
undertaken, that coordination between the vari-
ous Commission services dealing with fair trade 
should be improved, and that objective criteria 
should be defined to provide a basis for the 
Commission to create a unique European label. 
These proposals, however, have not been wel-
comed everywhere, even among some fair trade 
bodies, perhaps because of the political and 
technical difficulties. The drafting of a communi-
cation in 1999, after lengthy discussions among 
several DGs, complied with a specific under-
taking by the Agriculture DG to answer a ques-
tion from the Agriculture Council on the issue of 
Caribbean bananas versus "dollar" bananas. 
This text proposes that the principles of fair trade 
be clarified and the powers of the monitoring 
bodies strengthened, and also suggests that the 
possibility of going further should be left to a 
later communication, after in-depth discussions 
with the actors concerned. 
For their part, the fair trade defence organisa-
tions, especially EFTA, NEWS, FLO and IFAT 
(the International Federation for Alternative 
Trade, whose membership includes European 
and non-European organisations and produc-
ers), are continuing to exert pressure on the 
Commission's services. The dialogue with 
European civil society, recently recalled by 
President Prodi, will therefore have to develop 
along these lines, enabling the Commission to 
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in a forthcoming communica-
tion. 
Furthermore, as the new 
Partnership Agreement refers 
to fair trade but without specify-
ing the means for implementing 
it, a dialogue with ACP civil 
society will be necessary before 
any projects are prepared. 
Outstanding questions 
The dialogue with European 
civil society should deal with 
issues that have already been 
raised by the communication 
and others which are already 
the subject of heated debate 
among the fair trade actors. 
A unique label 
Despite the FLO's efforts at 
coordination, European con-
sumers are sometimes con-
fused by the proliferation of 
labels, which leads to some dis-
trust, and is inevitably becom-
ing worse with the emergence 
of "ethical" production (gener-
ally referring to large or medi-
um-sized enterprises which 
guarantee their workforce 
acceptable working conditions 
in conformity with a code of 
conduct, for example in accor-
dance with the ILO standards) 
and the proliferation of more or 
less official labels ("biological" 
and "natural" products, etc.). 
The actors involved (often the 
same ones) need to think care-
fully about the links between 
fair trade and these other situa-
tions. 
The words "fair trade" are not 
covered by any legal definition 
or protection. Anyone can bor-
row, or indeed abuse them. It is 
reasonable, anyway, to wonder 
whether several labels within 
the European Union are gen-
uinely compatible with the 
single market. The debate 
continues, especially within the 
FLO, with some suggesting 
recognition for existing labels 
and others recommending the 
adoption of a single label, with 
control bodies to monitor it. 
Greater efficiency 
Recently, some NGOs and 
other bodies have been stress-
ing the need to move beyond 
the voluntary stage of fair trade 
or, more accurately, to increase 
its volume. Small producers, in 
any event, could significantly 
increase the quantities they 
offer for sale, at a time when 
European consumers seem 
ready to step up consumption 
of fair trade products, at least 
under certain conditions. 
Although it has not stopped 
growing, after 30 years, this 
kind of trade is still marginal: 
even the flagship products, 
such as coffee, are rarely more 
than one per cent of European 
consumption. 
A more professional 
approach to ultimate distribution 
seems essential, since the con-
sumer, while making more and 
more use of fair trade products, 
has become more exacting 
where prices and, especially, 
quality are concerned. Very 
high prices displayed in spec-
ialist shops can be explained by 
very high fixed costs payable 
on quite low quantities. 
Furthermore, an effort to 
improve professionalism was 
called for at a recent NEWS 
conference. 
Finding production 
opportunities 
65 Although 
specialist 
shops handle 
a wide variety 
of goods, 
sales through 
the ordinary 
retail circuit 
are confined 
to a few 
foodstuffs, 
such as cof-
fee or tea. 
These outlets 
have the 
disadvantage 
of not 
providing 
direct contact 
with 
customers, 
but they do 
ensure 
compliance 
with a very 
strict 
specification 
But the producers, too, must make their own 
efforts. They should be able to increase produc-
tivity by using more sophisticated farming tech-
niques and devoting more care to equipment 
maintenance, administration and product quality, 
for example by reinvesting some of the resources 
they earn. They could also prepare for selling on 
international markets by finding outlets in local 
markets, consider additional financing by 
contacting microcredit organisations, etc. 
At European level, the NGOs could do more to 
boost consumer awareness through information 
campaigns carried out in collaboration with other 
civil society actors (European World Shops Day, 
EFTA Fair Trade Day at the European 
Parliament, campaigns to promote bananas or 
chocolate, consumption of "fair trade" coffee in 
the canteens of national and European public 
institutions, etc.). In their relations with the small 
producers, the European NGOs could encourage 
them to do more to take account of productivity 
imperatives. 
The development of co-financing 
The promotion and financing of fair trade are 
current operational objectives of the Civil Society, 
NGOs and Decentralised Cooperation Unit under 
the budget line Co-financing with European 
NGOs, in two parallel forms: within the frame-
work of education and development, in Europe, 
and through future projects in developing 
countries. 
There are dozens of projects dealing with the 
co-financed portion in Europe. They have helped 
to disseminate knowledge of fair trade products, 
and also to strengthen the intermediate bodies. 
Trade promotion activities do not currently qualify 
for financing. 
A number of quite large-scale projects put for-
ward by experienced NGOs are currently in 
progress in the developing countries. Some of 
them (in Latin America and Asia) support the pro-
ducers' efforts to increase their productivity, but 
the majority are concerned with laying the 
groundwork for the first organisation of margin-
alised small-scale producers. In future, fair trade 
may perhaps become the subject of a call for 
tender from the responsible Unit, in which case 
the number and value of the projects would 
increase sharply, with the implementation of gen-
uine programmes as envisaged in the new condi-
tions for application of the budget line. 
At present, it is the European NGOs that 
decide whether or not it is worth proposing a co-
financing scheme for a fair trade project. The 
responsible Unit can only "guide" their choices, 
and unfortunately they are still concentrating on 
objectives other than fair trade. 
The political acceptability of fair trade 
For fair trade to achieve a genuine advance in 
quality and become an effective lever of local 
development, some people believe it needs to 
benefit from the financial and technical resources 
and development policy instruments of the 
Commission and Member States. In this context, 
it is realised that conflicting logic may govern fair 
trade, and that a choice must be made. 
The integration of fair trade into aid policies is 
proving difficult in the current context of complete 
liberalisation of international trade. The "alterna-
tive" concept is liable to attract criticism from 
those who fear it will bring calls for preferential 
systems, special customs tariffs, etc. The more 
commercial concept would be more acceptable. 
It would pursue two objectives: in the short term, 
combating the poverty that afflicts small produc-
ers (an objective, incidentally, which should be 
sufficient to justify the granting of subsidies and 
respect for "fair prices"); and in the long term, 
their gradual integration into international trade, 
when small producers will be strengthened by 
the reinvestment of the profits derived from sell-
ing their goods at a "fair price." The projects 
would then have to be designed so as to make 
the profits of the fair-trade enterprises available 
to producers (without enforcing redistribution for 
social purposes) and guarantee the temporary 
nature of assistance to them until they are able 
to stand up to international competition. 
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Tuaregs, above, have 
laid down their arms -
after a rebellion from 
1990-96 that Impeded 
development in the 
vast north of Mali. 
They now rely heavily 
on tourism and sell 
their magnificent 
cloths and jewellery 
All photographs by 
Joan Baxter 
he setting is the well-cooled interior of 
the Palais des Congrès, on the banks 
of the Niger River in the Malian capital, 
Bamako. The gleaming marble floor in this hall is 
a tangle of wires, connected to computers, con-
nected to the Internet. The event is Bamako 
2000, the much-touted international fair intended 
to promote the use of the Internet not just in Mali 
but in the rest of Africa. The Malian organisers 
were so enthused about their Internet gala and 
its international appeal that they issued an invita-
tion to Microsoft magnate, Bill Gates. He hasn't 
shown up. But neither his absence, nor the fact 
that in all of Mali there are still only about 2,000 
computer users, has dampened enthusiasm or 
deterred anyone, especially not Malian President 
Alpha Oumar Konaré. 
In a rouse-the-nation speech to close the 
week-long computer extravaganza in the capital 
of one of the poorest countries on earth, 
President Konaré has just revealed his dream to 
hook up to the Internet all 701 newly-created 
municipalities in this vast nation, half of which is 
covered by the sands of the Sahara Desert. He 
also reiterates his commitment to have a school 
in every village in Mali by the end of 2000. He 
says that three feasibility studies have been done 
and that he's done the calculations himself. The 
total cost for both would, he says, be a mere 16 
billion CFA francs (about US$30 million). The 
President argues that this is not "an impossible 
dream." He contends that a little goodwill on the 
part of the donor and creditor community would 
make all of this, and much more, possible. This 
68 year, he points out that Mali will 
spend three times that much 
(about $100 million US) on debt 
repayment. 
Speeches like this have 
earned President Alpha Oumar 
Konaré an international reputa-
tion as a leader with "vision." 
And Konaré is nothing if not a 
master of rhetoric labouring the 
principles of democracy and 
political stability, and the fight 
against the proliferation of small 
arms in West Africa. Many in 
the donor or diplomatic commu-
nity refer to Mali as a model for 
Africa. On a short stopover in 
Bamako late last year, US 
Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright told the world's media 
that Mali had been "blessed" to 
have a President like Konaré, 
whom she dubbed a "remark-
able leader." 
This year, he is serving a 
one-year term as head of the 
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and 
the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), and 
has leapt into both roles with 
energy and enthusiasm. He 
spends much of his time host-
ing high-level summits or travel-
ling in the region to champion 
the cause of West African inte-
gration. 
First elected President in 
1992, then re-elected in 1997 in 
controversial and expensive 
elections (estimated to have 
cost about $30 million), which 
the opposition collective, or 
COPPO, boycotted, Konaré has 
two years left in his allowed 
term in office. But he's also had 
eight years to put his words into 
actions, and these days his 
flowery rhetoric is wearing a 
little thin on the Malian public. 
Many people in Mali, from politi-
cal opponents to the people on 
the street watching the educa-
tion levels drop while corruption 
escalates - two ills that Konaré 
himself has acknowledged and 
denounced in speeches - say 
they have the impression that 
their President is speaking 
"more to impress an inter-
national audience than he is to 
Malians." For that speech in the 
Palais des Congrès, for exam-
ple, he earned himself the 
headline in one private news-
paper: "After his dreams, Alpha 
falls into the wishing well." 
The reasons for scepticism 
about Konaré's stated goals are 
not evident inside the Palais 
des Congrès, a grand structure 
that is anything but representa-
tive of what's on the outside. 
There, Malian reality intervenes 
and the reverie is interrupted. 
The capital city, with a popula-
tion of anywhere between one 
and two million, is chaotic, 
crowded and poor. Apart from 
the stunning white Presidential 
palace on a cliff overlooking 
Bamako and a few elite neigh-
bourhoods where the super-rich 
are putting up massive villas, 
the city is generally squalid and 
very run-down. 
Hard facts and reliable statis-
tics to quantify the hardship are 
hard to come by, according to 
World Bank sources, which say 
they are planning a series of 
surveys to get at the real pic-
ture. Even without those statis-
tics, however, it is evident that 
Mali is plagued by a painful lack 
of basic infrastructure - pass-
able roads, zoning, public sani-
tation and hygiene, decent 
housing, designated market 
areas. Such basic amenities 
such as water and electricity 
are lacking in much of the capi-
tal. Thoroughfares are choked 
69 Livestock is key to Mali's 
rural population's way of 
life, but it also puts 
enormous pressure on 
precious and scarce 
water resources during 
droughts months long -
and on precious 
vegetation 
with vendors desperate to sell 
something to earn their daily 
bread, or a portion thereof. 
Small mountains of plastic 
waste collect wherever there is 
a patch of open ground. These 
are burned each evening, 
adding to the choking blanket 
of toxic smog formed each day 
by ailing, dilapidated vehicles 
that make their way here from 
other continents with strict 
emission standards. 
Staggering unemployment is 
evident in the numbers of 
young men sitting under trees, 
traipsing the streets to hawk 
cigarettes or imported trinkets, 
or begging, or worse - turning 
to petty crime. 
Life in rural areas is different, 
but even tougher. And a trip to 
almost any of the municipali-
ties created as part of the vast 
programme of decentralisation 
reveals that most of the newly 
elected mayors still have no 
offices or funds - let alone 
electricity, telephone lines or 
the computers they would 
need to make the President's 
dreams of the Internet come 
true. 
As any student or teacher or 
university professor will argue, 
there are many very pressing 
problems that urgently need 
attention. There is widespread 
student unrest, with frequent 
strikes and demonstrations that 
are regularly brought under 
control by riot police using 
tear-gas. And in the vast 
desert north of the country, 
insecurity persists. The peace 
accord signed four years ago 
with Tuareg rebels has been 
largely adhered to and devel-
opment organisations have 
focused many of their efforts 
on development in that region. 
Mali's fabled town of Timbuktu 
is once again becoming a 
Mecca for travellers seeking 
mystery and adventure. But 
the brutal slaying of three 
Dutch tourists near the 
Algerian border in March has 
raised fears about the deterio-
rating situation and lawless-
ness. One NGO, Action Contre 
le Faim, has suspended work 
while others have restricted 
their movements in the region. 
With all this to deal with, 
diplomats and Malians them-
selves shake their heads over 
government's choice to spend 
scarce and precious resources 
on what they view as "frills." 
Mali is gearing up to host the 
African Cup of Nations soccer 
tournament in 2002, for a cost 
of about $200 million, despite 
widespread opposition from 
donors who say, in private, that 
schools and water should take 
precedence over stadiums and 
hotels. Then there are the 
extravagant monuments going 
up at major intersections in 
Bamako, when so many roads 
in the city are barely passable 
and a public sanitation system 
is still just a pipe dream. 
Mali remains one of the 
world's least developed coun-
tries, coming in 166th out of 
174 on the 1999 UNDP human 
development report. Ten out of 
every 100 children born will not 
live past their first birthday. 
Two in three Malian children 
never set foot inside a school. 
The World Bank reports that 
more than 70% of Malians fall 
below the poverty threshold, 
which is set at an average per 
capita income below $240 a 
year. Falling cotton prices, cor-
ruption and a stagnating 
administration have taken their 
toll; economic growth peaked 
in 1997 at 6.5%, before start-
ing to drop again. 
Debt relief worth almost 
$400 million pledged by the 
World Bank last year has been 
on hold for months because of 
Bank dissatisfaction with the 
privatisation of state telecom-
munications and utility compa-
nies, and with mismanagement 
in the country's parastatal cot-
ton company, CMDT, the 
70 economie powerhouse in this country where an 
estimated 60% of the population depends on cot-
ton for income. Together, cotton and gold exports 
account for about 20% of GNP. Late last year, 
the press leaked results from an EU audit of 
three ministries: health, education and public 
works, which had benefited from EU financing 
meant to alleviate the effects of economic reform. 
Those results showed serious mismanagement 
and mishandling of those funds. An EU 
spokesman in Bamako confirmed that the audit 
was sent to the President, but months later, there 
has still been no Presidential acknowledgement 
of the document. 
Disenchanted Malians in all walks of life say 
they are "disappointed with democracy" and 
claim that the democracy they fought for with 
their "blood" (hundreds of students were shot and 
killed before former President, General Moussa 
Traoré was toppled in 1991) "has been hijacked" 
by interests outside their country. Like many on 
the continent, they find themselves in an increas-
ingly competitive global economy that is neither 
attuned to nor very interested in the kind of 
wealth that abounds here - cultural riches. The 
legacy of the great empires that flourished in this 
country is a highly complex society in which the 
nobles, as determined through heritage, are still 
obliged to look out for the people of "caste" - the 
griots, blacksmiths, weavers, as well as those 
whose ancestors were once slaves. It is this cul-
ture of sharing and traditional responsibility for 
extended family and the community, which former 
Minister of Culture Aminata Traoré says has 
allowed Malians to survive in the face of the crush-
ing material poverty that faces the vast majority of 
the population. That is not to say that there is not 
a growing sense of despair and disillusionment. 
"We're poor and we're watching those at the 
top get richer. They don't care about us, they 
care about the donors. If that's your [Western] 
democracy," says one businessman, "then you 
can keep it." 
The dozen men in his small office chant their 
agreement, not able to conceal their anger and 
frustration. 
In the face of mounting pressure both at home 
and abroad for change, in February President 
Konaré finally named a new cabinet and appoint-
ed a new Prime Minister, a man with a solid eco-
nomic track record with the Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, Mande Sidibé. His 
appointment has been widely acclaimed by the 
donor community. But even optimists from the 
World Bank in Bamako admit that Prime Minister 
Sidibé has a monumental task in front of him. He 
has to try to clean up the public sector and the 
country's weighty administration and in doing so 
meet the strict criteria laid out by the Bank for 
debt relief. He must also wade through moun-
tains of murky dossiers on mismanagement and 
corruption in state enterprises, telecommunica-
tions and energy, which are due for privatisation. 
He must adhere to tough fiscal restraint policies 
that are likely to send the country's students and 
public sector workers out onto the streets in 
anger. In short, he must try to balance the budg-
et, please the donor community and an increas-
ingly frustrated populace - all the while pleasing 
the man who appointed him, the far-sighted 
President. 
Bamako. 
Vendors resort to any 
goods they can get their 
hands on to sell for a little 
income - such as second-
hand shoes from Europe 
and North America. 
Tragic for local leather 
workers and artisans 
71 Fine phrases and good ideas 
by Joan Baxter 
t's Saturday, 6 May, the long-awaited day 
that Mali's newly-appointed Prime Minister, 
Mande Sidibé, will deliver his General 
Political Declaration to the National Assembly. 
The huge hall that constitutes the National 
Assembly is overflowing with members of parlia-
ment, Sidibé's new cabinet, journalists, curious 
citizens and even two European ambassadors to 
Mali. Unfortunately, the air conditioning in the 
auditorium is in a sorry way, and it is clear that 
Sidibé is feeling the heat in his magnificent green 
damask boubou and matching fez. 
Aides rush to his rescue with a stand-up fan, 
but unfortunately the fan, like the air conditioning, 
turns out not to be in working order. There is 
much wiping of brows as the Prime Minister 
launches into his 90-minute declaration. 
This is the first time Sidibé has faced the 
National Assembly since he was appointed by 
President Alpha Oumar Konaré in February. 
There has been much backroom grumbling by 
MPs of the ruling party, ADEMA, which holds the 
vast majority of seats in the Assembly. According 
to Mali's constitution, the ruling party and not the 
president is responsible for nominating candi-
dates for the post of Prime Minister, who in 
return, chooses cabinet ministers to form the 
government that he heads. 
There have been widespread reports of a seri-
ous rift within the ruling party since Mande Sidibé 
appointed the 21-member cabinet. Some of the 
ADEMA executive, loyal to former Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Boubacar Kei'ta who remains president 
Many plead passionately for 
improvements in the country's 
education system, roads, 
hospitals, agricultural sector, their 
pleas echoing the hardship their 
constituents face every day of 
their lives. It's a marathon 
18-hour session 
of the party, feel they have been excluded from 
the new government. They complain that the 
core of the cabinet comprises only presidential 
intimates who come from a political grouping 
within ADEMA that is known popularly in Mali as 
the "CMDT clan," since they all passed through 
the CMDT, the country's large parastatal cotton 
company, before they moved into the political 
arena. 
With all the turmoil inside the ruling party, this 
speech is a test for the new Prime Minister. For 
the first time since 1997, this Assembly that so 
represents the interests of ADEMA and a few 
other closely-aligned parties, may not behave like 
a rubber stamp. 
As he reads out the 33 pages of his eloquent 
political speech, Sidibé lives up to his reputation 
as a competent technocrat and a sophisticated 
economist with an international reputation earned 
at the IMF and the Central Bank in Mali. It is 
laced with attractive phrases and development 
rhetoric that are sure not to upset any mango 
carts, neither here in Mali nor outside among the 
donor community or international financial institu-
tions. Nothing startling here - the speech is very 
much an endorsement of the progress Mali has 
made in recent years under President Konaré. 
Sidibé states, for example, that between 1990 
and 1999, the percentage of children in school 
rose from 29% to 50%. He also says that 
between 1995 and 1999, economic growth aver-
aged above 5%, surpassing population growth 
while inflation has been kept to "tolerable levels." 
As the private press would sum up in the days 
that followed the PM's declaration, it was a plan, 
essentially, for more of the same. Sidibé 
applauds the process of decentralisation, which 
he says has "created conditions for effective par-
ticipation of the population in managing their own 
development while strengthening and deepening 
democracy, and is now at the stage to be put to 
work." Referring to President Konaré's current 
term as Chair of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), he declares, 
72 "On the international scene, Mali is making its 
voice better heard, and the country has taken the 
lead in the combat for West African integration." 
However, the Prime Minister also admits that 
there is "a lot to do and the challenges are 
many." That's a euphemistic way of admitting that 
Mali remains a desperately impoverished nation, 
with extremely poor living standards and infra-
structure, and no hope of any miracles to allevi-
ate the suffering of the population. Many Malians 
say they have lost faith in their politicians to put 
Many Malians say they have lost 
faith in their politicians to put the 
people's pressing needs first 
the people's pressing needs first. 
Sidibé goes on to promise that his government 
is conscious of the importance of the upcoming 
presidential elections in 2002, and of the need to 
avoid a repetition of "the difficulties" that afflicted 
the elections of 1997. He calls for a "serene polit-
ical climate" to "protect Mali's fragile democracy," 
but makes no mention of new electoral lists, 
which the opposition collective has been 
demanding since before the last elections were 
held without their participation. By the end of the 
speech, the Prime Minister has covered all the 
key sectors, recognising the problems that 
plague education in Mali - by lack of facilities and 
a very rebellious student union that has students 
boycotting classes for two or three months each 
year. He has touched on the obvious need for 
better health care, the President's much-publi-
cised fight against corruption, the government's 
pledge to continue servicing its debt, as well as 
the importance of the private sector. He has 
carefully avoided giving a precise timetable for 
the privatisation of the state telecommunications 
and energy corporations, even though the 
Bretton Woods institutions are still holding up 
US$270 million of debt alleviation until that 
privatisation is done. 
Sidibé rounds off his declaration with a plea to 
MPs for their "confidence and support." 
The question is, will they give it? 
Two days later, Monday morning, it is the MPs' 
turn at the podium. In the traditional Malian way, 
the MPs are polite and congratulate the Prime 
Minister for his declaration. But many go on to 
plead for improvements in the country's educa-
tion system, roads, hospitals, agricultural sector, 
echoing the hardship their constituents face 
every day of their lives. It's a marathon session, 
lasting 18 hours. 
Then comes the vote. No one rejects the dec-
laration; 129 vote in favour. There are seven 
abstentions from MPs of the PARENA party, 
which some interpret as the party trying to dis-
tance itself from the ruling party and jockey for 
popularity in anticipation of the elections in two 
years' time. The opposition collective hasn't 
deemed it worthwhile to make a public statement 
on the declaration in a National Assembly and 
from a Prime Minister it doesn't recognise. 
None of this is surprising. The Prime Minister 
has been thrifty with details of how he plans to 
accomplish all that is written on paper. But he 
has managed to cover all the bases to present a 
cautiously optimistic picture for the people of this 
Sidibé applauds the process of 
decentralisation, which he says has 
"created conditions for effective 
participation of the population in 
managing their own development 
while strengthening and deepening 
democracy" 
landlocked and sand-swept country in the Sahel, 
steeped in tradition, historical pride - and poverty. 
It is now that Sidibé and his government have 
their work cut out for themselves, trying to trans-
pose some of those fine phrases and good ideas 
into tangible results. 
And that's what impoverished farmers in rural 
communities, with no water, schools, health facili-
ties, roads or electricity - and precious little 
income - are waiting to see. It's a tall order to 
satisfy within two years, which is when President 
Konaré's mandate - and thus the Prime Minister's 
- comes to an end. 
73 This pottery is part of 
Mali's cultural heritage 
and has been recovered 
by the police 
All photographs by 
Jos van Beurden 
Mali - losing the race to preserve 
its culture? 
by Jos van Beurden 
- >M «a 
ali has three places which have an 
important cultural heritage. The best 
known is the old city of Timbuktu with 
thousands of old Arab manuscripts circulating 
there. The Dogon area is known for its wooden 
sculptures, masks, doors and door-poles. In high 
caves the oldest textiles in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have been found. The city of Djenné is known for 
its mud mosque and houses and its many 
archaeological sites. For the people of Mali these 
treasures are part of their identity. But treasure-
hunters and dealers don't care about that. They 
grab what they can. The effort to limit the 
o» — 
damage has been most effective in Djenné, but 
is it a lost cause? 
Djenné 
It begins on Sunday afternoon. Several heavily 
loaded trucks and numerous horse- or donkey-
drawn carts cross the small bridge to the city, 
heading for the centre. On Monday morning 
many more arrive. The weekly market of Djenné 
is a magnet for the surrounding region. The city 
is still the same as it was in the 14th century, 
when trans-Saharan caravans passed through it. 
Yet there is more to Djenné than its market. It 
is a city of merchants and marabouts (scholars of 
74 the Koran). A large Mosque 
made of clay stands on a 
plateau. Built in 1907, it deter-
mines the image of the market 
and the city. Palm poles in its 
walls are permanent scaffolding 
for masons who renew the 
mud. In six places mud-stairs 
have been constructed, each 
with a sign Entree interdit à 
non-musulmans. Beautiful 
brown doors with tin decoration 
give entry to the prayer hall. 
The mosque is one of the most 
outstanding examples of clay 
architecture in West Africa, and 
the city is on UNESCO's list of 
World Heritage sites. 
In 1990 45% of sites 
had traces of pillage. In 
1996 it had reached 
more than 65% 
The guild of masons in 
Djenné is renowned throughout 
West Africa. Master mason 
Bouboucar Kouroumansé is 
involved in a large restoration 
project. Over 100 houses will 
be restored to their 1900 condi-
tion. In one of the small shad-
owy streets live Mr Touré and 
his family. Kouroumansé would 
like to put their house on the list 
for restoration, that needs care-
ful study and preparation. Some 
walls will have to be rebuilt. The 
turrets which decorate the 
façade have been covered by 
cement. That is forbidden, and 
will have to be replaced with 
clay. In some places the pan-
nelled ceiling will have to be 
renewed. Mr Touré says that he 
needs the permission of his 
brother in Bamako and another 
one in Paris before he can 
agree to the restoration. The 
three of them own the house. 
Pillage 
The Cultural Mission of 
Djenné keeps an eye on more 
than 800 archeological sites 
where treasure hunters cause a 
lot of damage. According to 
director and archaeologist 
Bouboucar Diaby, pillage is no 
new phenomenon. 
"It has been like this since the 
1850s. French colonial officials 
and travellers considered our 
culture archaic and our archae-
ological treasures their property. 
As none of them was a real 
archaeological craftsman a lot 
was lost. 
"Since then there have been 
various upsurges in the pillage, 
the last one around 1980 when 
American archaeologists, the 
Mclntoshes, broadcast their find 
of a 1,000 year old terracotta 
statuette. 
"A big run began, the prices 
increased tremendously and 
the damage was enormous." 
In 1990 45% of sites had 
traces of pillage. In 1996 it had 
reached more than 65%. 
Timbuktu and the Dogon 
region have suffered similar 
losses. The Centre de 
Recherche et Documentation 
Ahmed Baba in Timbuktu has 
15,000 Arab manuscripts, the 
oldest ones dating from the 
11th century. Some contain 
facts about life at that time in 
this city of Islamic learning and 
culture. Families in the town 
have many more manuscripts 
but according to a spokesper-
son at the Centre, "they often 
sell these to dealers or tourists, 
although this is forbidden by 
law." 
And for the manuscripts 
which are kept by the Centre 
"there is no plan or personnel 
for their preservation and 
storage." 
The same goes for the ethno-
graphic and archeological 
objects from the Dogon region. 
Much has disappeared. 
Main entrance door to 
the big mosque in Djenné 
75 The EU, Mali and culture 
The EU will fund several projects to help 
Mali to preserve its cultural heritage. One is 
the restoration and expansion of the National 
Museum in Bamako and the setting up of 
three regional museums, one of them in 
Djenné. Institution building will be promoted 
at the Ministry of Culture. Money will be set 
aside for small cultural initiatives. 
Mobo Malga is a dealer in 
Djenné who admits to having 
profited a lot from these disap-
pearances. His shop is an 
ocean of terracotta and wood-
en sculptures. 
"My best years were those 
between 1974 and 1982. I sold 
many authentic objects to the 
big antique dealers in Bamako 
who in turn sold them for a 
large profit to their customers, 
dealers and collectors in Paris, 
New York, London, Munich, 
Zürich or Brussels." 
His profit has allowed him to 
open a shop in the more 
Northern town of Mopti, and 
several in Djenné. 
In 1985 a law was approved 
for the protection of Mali's cul-
tural property. No terracotta, 
manuscripts and sculptures 
were allowed to leave the 
country. 
"From one day to the next 
my trade became illegal. When 
the Cultural Mission was 
established it became more 
difficult." Yet Mobo Mai'ga has 
found a new way to make 
money. 
"To make a copy of an old 
statuette takes two years but it 
is not too difficult. Copies are 
treated with fire and cooling 
water and kept in the soil for 
two years. Dealers in Bamako 
know the difference but I can 
assure you that quite a number 
of terracotta statuettes in 
Europe and North America 
have come from my 
workshops." 
"In general the work of 
treasure hunters and 
traders is increasingly 
considered to be 
wicked" 
Ban 
While Mali is one of the most 
serious victims of this transact-
ing of its cultural heritage, it is 
also the country in Africa doing 
the most to minimise the dam-
age. In the early 1990s Mali 
requested the US Government 
to agree to a ban on the import 
of all terracotta from Mali. 
"US Customs officers have 
been very strict since," says 
National Museum Director 
Samuel Sidibé in Bamako. But 
has this really had an impact? 
"One cannot express it in fig-
ures. But it has become much 
more troublesome to smuggle 
terracotta from here into the 
USA. Moreover, the ban has 
made an impression in Europe. 
When it became public knowl-
edge in 1997 that the French 
President Jacques Chirac had 
received as a birthday present 
a statuette which had been 
stolen in Djenné, he felt forced 
to return it." 
Sidibé would be delighted if 
European states imposed a 
similar ban. 
Another milestone was the 
exhibition Vallée de Niger with 
objects from several cultures in 
Mali and other West African 
countries. It was held in Paris, 
Leyden and the capitals of six 
West African countries. 
"The best pieces attracted a 
large number of people here. 
That made Malians more 
aware of the importance of 
their cultural heritage." 
Other exhibitions have fol-
lowed. 
Some other measures have 
been taken. The National 
Museum has started to register 
its own collection according to 
international standards. 
"So far we have photo-
graphed and described some 
2,000 pieces, one fifth of our 
collection." 
Plans have been made for 
three new regional museums. 
"In general," concludes 
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is increasingly considered to be wicked." 
Mobile brigade 
The Cultural Mission in Djenné has set up a 
mobile force to make surprise visits to the 800 
archeological sites. "Recently we noticed a dust 
cloud in the distance," says its Director Diaby. 
"We went there and arrested two men, aged 
45 and 67, digging at a site. After interrogation 
and some detective work it turned out that they 
were part of a team of 10. They had set up their 
own hut and kitchen and had been working there 
for two months." 
But how could they dig for such a long time 
without being stopped? According to police offi-
cer Abdullahi Sidibé "treasure hunters often 
threaten village people so they do not betray 
them. They even use violence." Another reason, 
he admits, "is the poor relationship between 
police and public in Mali." 
When Diaby set up the Cultural Mission local 
police and judges refused to help. 
"That has changed. Police and judges have 
become more cooperative." 
The two men were sentenced to three months' 
imprisonment and a heavy fine. 
"We have become strict. The other day a 
tourist was intercepted with an old jar. He had to 
hand it over." 
Another activity of the Cultural Mission is to 
make the public more aware of what's going on. 
Last year the National Theatre staged a play 
about the subject, and this year research has 
been done in six villages about its impact. 
"In one village no progress was made," 
explains Diaby, "while in the five others there 
has been a change. Most villagers wanted more 
information." 
He knows, however, that to stop the pillage 
and illegal trade is impossible. 
Street scene in Djenné 
<H 
77 The unkindest cut of all 
by Ruth Evans 
Hanging on the wall in Fatoumata 
Sire's office is a propaganda poster 
against female circumcision. On the 
desk is a framed photo of her 
receiving the Legion D'Honneur. 
er involvement started when her own 
baby daughter was circumcised with-
out her permission or knowledge by 
one of her father's co-wives. Since then she has 
campaigned tirelessly against this ancient but 
previously taboo cultural practice. 
Mali is now perhaps the only country in West 
Africa that has not introduced a law against 
female circumcision. It's estimated that perhaps 
80 percent of young girls are still circumcised, 
and here the ceremony involves cutting off a 
girl's clitoris as a way of initiating her into wom-
anhood and preparing her for marriage. 
"I prefer to use the term female genital mutila-
tion," says Fatoumata, "because circumcision 
Outside, a queue of women wait 
their turn to see this dynamic 
woman, who has spent the last 20 
years of her life campaigning 
against female circumcision in Mali. 
suggests that nothing important is cut, whereas 
female genital mutilation acknowledges that a girl 
is deprived of a very important part of her body." 
Fatoumata Sire's campaign has given her a 
very high profile in Mali. She's a controversial 
figure who is either loved or loathed by her 
countrymen. Efforts to draft legislation for the 
government have resulted in a backlash from 
conservative forces in the country. 
"I have death threats against me," she says, 
"there have been attempts to burn down my 
house, I have been in three car crashes and 
every day, Islamic radio here in Bamako 
broadcasts curses against me." 
But she is undaunted by what people think of 
78 her, and she gives the distinct impression that 
nothing will deflect this determined woman from 
her campaign. 
Cultural aggression 
Mahmoud Dikko is Director of the Islamic 
Radio station that Fatoumata says has been 
orchestrating much of the campaign against her. 
We went to visit him in his office overlooking 
Bamako's Central Mosque and the busy market, 
full of shoe repairers, booksellers, souvenirs and 
fetish stalls. At first he refused to shake my hand 
or to let me into his office because presumably 
as a woman I would have defiled him and his 
space. 
We put Fatoumata's serious allegations to him 
and he denied that the station had been running 
any campaign against her. 
"No, it's not true," he said, "it's all in her mind, 
it's not true!" 
Asked what Islam teaches about circumcision 
he told us: 
"Circumcision is a very ancient custom here in 
Mali. Islam found it when it came and Islam toler-
ated it...but it does have a moral value because 
it has to do with chastity. It helps to keep women 
chaste within marriage because it controls their 
sexual needs." 
Mahmoud Dikko denounces what he regards 
as a Western-inspired campaign against circum-
cision. People like Fatoumata Sire, he says, are 
simply dancing to the West's tune and this 
amounts to nothing less than "cultural 
aggression." 
"What right has the West to come here to lec-
ture us, about a tradition it does not understand, 
when it tolerates things like homosexuality and 
sex before marriage? For us these things are 
shocking...they make us vomit!" 
Clearly, it is going to be a tough job to change 
attitudes and traditions that are not only so 
deeply entrenched but also so sensitive and 
taboo. But Fatoumata says that one effective way 
of doing this is to persuade the women who per-
form the circumcisions to stop. "Persuading one 
female performer to stop could save the lives of 
hundreds of young girls," she says. 
Alternative income 
The town of Segou is a couple of hours' drive 
from the capital, with wide dusty boulevards adja-
cent to the River Niger. Here Fatoumata's organi-
sation has set up a weaving project, which aims 
to give women who used to perform circumcision 
for a living, an alternative source of income. It's 
also a potent signal of gender empowerment, as 
weaving is traditionally a male preserve in Mali's 
highly complex and stratified society. 
Fanta sits at a large loom, weaving a blue and 
white-checked cloth, against a backdrop of anti-
circumcision posters. She's a gentle, quietly 
spoken-woman with a warm smile. She says she 
used to earn about 1000 CFA (about one pound) 
for each circumcision she performed, and often 
used to do several in one day. Her mother and 
grandmother before her had performed circumci-
sions and it was a highly respected job in the 
community. She explained that the operation was 
traditionally performed after months of prepara-
tions and initiation into womanhood, as a way of 
"keeping little girls clean and stopping them 
running after men." 
Once she learned of the dangerous conse-
quences from infections and potential loss of life, 
she had stopped because she now realised cir-
cumcision constituted violence against women. 
Another effective way of changing attitudes is 
through theatre. We went to the southern village 
of Mana with Theatre Don, a travelling troupe of 
dancers and actors who put on performances 
about development and health issues in villages 
that have never before seen theatre. Director 
Karim Togola says theatre is a popular and effec-
tive vehicle for getting messages like this across, 
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response of the villagers of Mana is anything to 
go by. Hundreds of men, women and children 
gathered together under a starlit sky to watch 
the players dance and sing a play that tackled 
the sensitive issues of circumcision head on, 
illustrating the medical dangers and social 
taboos. It was a lively tour de force, full of 
humour and music that had the audience 
shouting and clapping along as they recognised 
familiar scenes. 
Afterwards, the chief of Mana village, a digni-
fied old man in a green woolly bobble hat, emu-
lated his theatrical counterpart in the perform-
ance, by announcing that now they understood 
the dangers of circumcision, the village would 
put a stop to the practice. 
The following morning, sitting in his compound 
surrounded by village elders as three young girls 
pounded millet under a nearby tree, the chief 
reiterated this pledge. But he also quoted a 
Bambara proverb to the effect that these things 
would not change overnight. 
Change will certainly come slowly if methods 
like these are all campaigners have to rely on. A 
more effective means to an end, argues 
Fatoumata, would be to introduce a law banning 
circumcision outright. But government has been 
sitting on draft legislation for some time, and 
Fatoumata believes this is because it is nervous 
of fundamentalist Islamic reaction. 
High up on the hill overlooking the red dust 
that permanently envelops Bamako sits the seat 
of government and Presidential palace. Here in 
his oak panelled office, Pascal Babu Couloubaly, 
the Chef de Cabinet of the President's Office, 
explains that in his opinion a law would not be 
effective because literacy rates in Mali are so 
low few people would be able to read it and it 
would therefore be unenforceable. Besides, he 
says, now wearing his other hat as an anthropol-
ogist, circumcision has today largely lost its 
meaning as part of the rites of initiation and mar-
riage. Marriages are no longer arranged and 
these rites have died away, so that all that is left 
is the operation, which is being performed at an 
earlier and earlier age, sometimes on young 
babies, and this means it has completely lost its 
meaning. 
"Circumcision will disappear of its own 
accord," he says, "because it has lost its raison 
d'être." 
But he also believes that in the overall order of 
things, circumcision is not on the list of priorities 
or concerns for most Malians. 
"Circumcision is just a little cut of the clitoris, 
that takes five minutes," he says, "What we real-
ly suffer from here is poverty, not circumcision." 
He adamantly believes, however, that it is for 
Africans themselves to address this issue, not 
for the West to campaign against something 
whose cultural context it does not understand. 
"The best way to deal with this is not to lecture 
to people but to allow them to reach their own 
conclusions with dignity and humour, through 
things like theatre and education, and that way 
circumcision will disappear," argues Pascal. 
"This is democracy in action!" 
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by Thibault Grégoire 
Strolling around the Conference Centre, I 
found out that it's now possible to buy a 
computer on line. When all the details have 
been taken, the cheapest still costs more than 
CFAF 500,000. So, as you see, we're making 
great progress ...." 
This anecdote was recounted by Habib Koité, 
a Mandingo singer, who is very popular amongst 
Mali's youth, between two songs at a concert he 
was giving in a Bamako restaurant. Haifa million 
- for the overwhelming majority of Mali's citizens, 
this represents considerably more than one 
year's salary. The Internet, new technologies, 
e-mail ... are these just pipe dreams or could 
they be a genuine asset in Africa's development? 
It was specifically to respond to this question 
that the Bamako 2000 Conference was organ-
ised (Bamako 2000, Les Passerelles du 
Développement). Held in the Malian capital from 
20 to 25 February 2000, it was a runaway suc-
cess. Some 300 to 400 participants had been 
expected, but over 1,500 attended, almost 
exclusively Africans. 
Bamako 2000's mission was to separate myth 
from reality. To do this, in addition to the plenary 
sessions which were punctuated by traditional 
discourses from political leaders and profession-
als in telecommunications, the week was primari-
ly divided up into a number of workshops: 
women, training and research, e-commerce, 
healthcare on the Internet and sustainable devel-
opment - myriad meeting places where everyone 
could exchange experiences and ideas. For 
instance, what might be the role of the new 
information technologies in education? Is 
e-commerce going to be a launch pad for the pri-
vate sector in Africa? What reforms are needed 
to provide fair access to information? These were 
just a few of the many topics discussed. 
Amongst the various workshops, many were 
particularly interesting, such as the session on 
the media. For many observers, the new informa-
tion technologies are undoubtedly a preferred 
tool for accelerating the development of the 
media in the southern hemisphere. Not only do 
they limit censorship, but, above all, they should 
allow easier acquisition of documents (over the 
Internet and via e-mail). By the same token - and 
this is an essential point - they offer unbelievable 
potential for easier circulation of specifically 
African content. For example, the creation of new 
archive banks for the traditional - written and 
audiovisual - media, and long-term partnerships 
amongst the media in the southern hemisphere 
and also between North and South. 
Feet firmly on the ground 
Admittedly, a damper has to be placed on such 
enthusiasm. Throughout the Conference, it was 
sometimes difficult to keep one's feet on the 
ground, not only during the speeches, but also 
during the workshops. Take the media work-
shops, for example, from which it clearly 
emerged that countless difficulties remain to be 
overcome: the costs of infrastructure, new tech-
nologies in the throes of development and which 
are thus rapidly obsolete, the need to have multi-
disciplinary specialists available, etc. 
Furthermore, within the context of the globalisa-
tion process of which the Internet is a part, 
making progress and guaranteeing specificity is 
Young people thronged 
to the Conference 
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Thibault Grégoire 
81 no small task, be this in terms of comprehension 
and conception of information or in terms of 
maintaining one's own language. 
And then there are statistics, notoriously recal-
citrant statistics: the current figures simply cannot 
be ignored. At a global level, 91% of Internet 
users are in the northern hemisphere. The 
country hosting the Conference - Mali - has five 
access providers for barely 500 users ... out of 
11 million inhabitants. Furthermore, western 
NGOs and expats make up the vast majority, and 
these figures relate only to the capital. 
Admittedly, not all countries in Africa are in the 
same boat, yet, although the Maghreb and 
Southern Africa appear to be a bit better off, 
most countries have fewer than 3,000 to 4,000 
users. Only South Africa really has its foot in the 
technological door with almost half a million sub-
scribers. 
Yet it is not enthusiasm that is lacking, particu-
larly in the case of young Malians, and that was 
the most remarkable aspect of the week: the 
young people packed into the Conference 
Centre. The organisers had had the brilliant idea 
of leaving the doors wide open, at times giving 
the Conference the appearance of a huge fair-
ground. Many came to the venue "just to have a 
look," their numbers swollen by students and 
academics from the University of Bamako which 
had been on strike for several weeks. They came 
to look and also to try out - a dozen or so PCs 
were made available to them, free of charge. 
They just had to register and join the queue. 
Greetings cards and football 
The initiative was down to ISOC-Mali (Internet 
society), which entrusted the smooth running of 
operations to an Internet surfers' club recently set 
up by students from the University. "We are 
giving people a lot of help because even young 
school kids are turning up to surf the net," 
explained Scholastique Tchoumbou, a sixth-year 
medical student who helps to run the club. The 
young peoples' interests vary, although there are 
a couple of areas they tend to concentrate on. 
Although, generally speaking, they are all inter-
ested in visiting sites related to their studies, the 
great majority of girls spend their connection time 
sending greetings cards, and setting up a mail-
box to receive e-mails from their new correspon-
dents. The boys spend their on-line time playing 
computer games or visiting sports sites, which 
are inevitably football-related. 
For a good number of them, this visit to 
Bamako 2000 is their first encounter with the 
Internet, about which they have heard so much. 
"As regards the future of young Africans, e-com-
merce, the Internet and all these new technolo-
gies have to become more readily accessible, 
and that is the main objective of our club," 
Scholastique continued. Another of their aims is 
to put pressure on the few cybercafés which 
have been established in Mali's capital to reduce 
the cost of Internet access. The battle has 
already been partly won, since the cost for club 
members has come down to CFAF 750 per hour 
from the CFAF 1,000 usually charged (and dou-
ble for non-students). "These cybercafés are the 
only places where we can train our members, 
because the University's faculties have only a 
very small number of computers. Not only that, a 
student grant is only CFAF 26,000 per month." 
The pooling of hardware and subscription costs 
is undoubtedly a realistic alternative for all these 
young people. Perhaps the scheme should be 
extended to a large part of Africa. 
Bamako 2000 was also the occasion for the 
awarding of prizes to particularly interesting sites. 
A competition had been launched, with several 
categories available. One example was the SIUP 
(People's Urban Information System), set up in 
late 1997 in Yoff (Senegal), which was the winner 
of the cultural links category. 
Even the elderly are in on the act 
"The idea was to set up a website to manage 
the village's cultural and land assets," Ndiare 
Mdoye, the young website overseer, told us. "The 
entire population has supported the project, so 
now the site is an amazing source of information. 
Everything about the village is put on and up-
dated, be it historical information, information 
about the village's traditions, resources, day-to-day 
urban management or even its inhabitants. This 
makes it possible not only to manage local devel-
opment better, but also to facilitate dialogue." 
82 One notable aspect has been the fact that set-
ting up the website has brought young and old 
together. "Formerly, young people had no say in 
matters. We were living under a gerontocracy. 
But we asked them to help us set up the site, 
particularly to tell us about their past, in order to 
supplement and enrich the site's content. When 
we'd explained everything and shown them the 
results on screen, they couldn't believe it! Since 
then, they have actually listened to us and are 
giving us their full support." 
The creation of the SIUP and the use of the 
new information technologies that it involves is 
based on a genuine social project. Is that always 
the case? Will the information society not, in real-
ity, simply increase the North/South divide? The 
issue is still being hotly debated. 
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African radio stations 
face techno-apartheid 
by Serge Bailly* 
Recent liberalisation of the airwaves has led to a 
whole crop of radio stations opening up amid glori-
ous chaos. In West Africa, Mali was the radio pio-
neer - in 1992 there were only four radio stations, 
as compared with the 95 which now have an official 
frequency. The initial enthusiasm of the broadcasts 
entertained listeners with its audacity; then things 
slackened and led to increasing demands for a 
professional approach. 
As Fily Keita, the President of Uriel (Union of 
Free Radio and Television Broadcasters of Mali), 
explained at the Festival of the Airwaves, a major 
gathering of representatives from African radio sta-
tions organised in November 1999 by the Panos 
Institute, "analogue radio is practically a thing of the 
past. It's definitely on the way out. If African radio 
stations want a role, they are going to have to 
adapt. If they do not, information and news will be 
shaped by international groups." 
The challenge of new technologies is at odds with 
the day-to-day problems encountered by radio pre-
senters in Africa. A station's survival depends firstly 
on its being connected to the genie of electricity: the 
station has to be able to pay the bill or to find the 
means to purchase the fuel to enable it to operate a 
generator. Solar technology is indeed an alternative 
in rural areas, but despite there being no fuel costs, 
the initial investment in solar panels is much higher. 
Everyone agrees that setting up an FM studio costs 
less today than it cost to get a radio station off the 
ground 10 years ago, but digital radio is still exorbi-
tantly expensive in terms of reception. 
'Sponsorship' by market traders 
Radio stations are usually forced to struggle 
along, their only income coming from local small 
businesses or for the broadcasting of family news. 
At certain small radio stations in Mali, presenters 
receive CFAF 200 (FF 2) from peanut vendors in 
the market. 
Popular sponsorship has turned out to be a stroke 
of inspiration on the part of African station man-
agers. One station in Bamako was able to ensure 
its survival in 1995 because a presenter had 
Send a message or surf 
the net, free of charge 
83 persuaded local market traders to sponsor a broad-
cast about popular sayings and proverbs. It was an 
instant success. The close relationship between a 
radio station and its audience is a permanent fea-
ture of the African landscape. Radio Bamakan once 
appealed to its listeners to help it pay the electricity 
bill, and they turned out en masse to contribute a 
few coins in order to enable the station to continue 
broadcasting. 
Radio stations also often organise listeners' clubs. 
Radio Rik, a small community station in Bamako 
which targets the youth market, has set up just such 
a club simply in order to be able to continue broad-
casting: in exchange for a few francs per month, 
In the region, there had been talk of the 
formidable power of radio, with the presence of 
Radio Kayes, Mali's pioneer station, which 
devotes a great amount of its time to 
programmes of development and education. 
However, proof was needed of the old men's 
support 
people become members and are entitled to a say 
in what is broadcast. 
Nevertheless, this close relationship between lis-
tener and presenter is not always good: the spectre 
of patronage is omnipresent. Not long ago, a rich 
family in Bamako had no scruples about handing 
out money to a radio station for it to announce the 
marriage of one of its daughters. 
Part of the decentralisation process 
Radio in Mali also has a major role to play in the 
process of political decentralisation. The govern-
ment has deemed it necessary to use the services 
of radio to promote peoples' awareness about the 
division of the country into communes. For several 
weeks, the rural Oualia radio station, in the West of 
Mali, explained on air the consequences of decen-
tralisation, namely greater responsibility on the part 
of the communes in the management of their 
resources, the grouping together of villages, 
educational advantages, etc. 
In a remote mountainous region, the Oualia 
commune is more than 300 km from Bamako and 
almost 200 km from the principal town of the Kayes 
region. It began broadcasting in May 1998 thanks to 
financial support from an Italian NGO, Terra Nuova. 
The project was encouraged by the Alliance of 
Associated Groups of Badumbé, an assembly of 
wise men from a number of villages in the vicinity. 
In the region, there had been talk of the formidable 
power of radio, with the presence of Radio Kayes, 
Mali's pioneer station, which devotes a great 
amount of its time to programmes of development 
and education. However, proof was needed of the 
old men's support. As Moctar Foulani Sissoko, 
founder and main presenter of the small Oualia 
radio station, remembers, "we had to have the 
approval of the village leaders in order to set up the 
radio station. Initially they were not very positive, 
and we had to hold regular meetings. We had to 
persuade them that a radio station would be advan-
tageous for the community." The wise men finally 
accepted and clubbed together to set up a rudimen-
tary studio with solar panels for its power supply. 
The radio station changed everything. "Before, it 
took from two days to a week to call together the 
village elders. We had to cover a region of approxi-
mately 1,000 km
2 with about 30 scattered villages. 
We used to do it on foot or by bicycle, but it took a 
long time and was sometimes impossible, particu-
larly in the rainy season," the radio station's young 
manager explained. The announcements convening 
the meetings of the Alliance can be heard up to 90 
km away without any relay facilities, as can notices 
of death (very important to the community), appeals 
for people to come forward as part of immunisation 
programmes, and awareness campaigns in connec-
tion with the education of children. "With the dis-
tances involved, parents are often reluctant to send 
their children to school, so they have to be remind-
ed on a regular basis. Women also have to be 
warned about the re-emergence of malaria or 
informed about childbirth or antenatal facilities. An 
agricultural technician regularly comes to talk about 
new techniques, the use of pesticides, etc." 
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hours of programmes per day, from 8 to 10 in the 
morning and from 6 to 10 in the evening. However, 
the lack of sunshine in winter means that it is not 
possible to charge the solar batteries sufficiently 
and the station is then forced to limit its 
programmes to two hours in the evening. 
Radio Menaka, a radio for peace 
A different region, and a different reality. Northern 
Mali, marked by the Tuareg rebellion between 1987 
and 1995, was unsafe and insecure. After several 
years of latent conflict between nomadic popula-
tions and Mali's army, a peace treaty was signed. 
Menaka, 1,600 km from Bamako, is the principal 
town of a large cercle (province) two and a half 
times the size of Belgium. Its population of almost 
64,000 inhabitants is made up of both sedentary 
and nomadic peoples, divided into different groups: 
Kei Tamacheq, Sonraï, Haoussa, Arabs and a few 
minority ethnic groups (Peul, Bamanan). In collabo-
ration with the Netherlands Volunteer Service, the 
Panos Bamako team looked into installing a local 
radio station in Menaka, as part of a conflict-resolu-
tion project. The principal aim was to find the best 
way in which to pursue peace together. Nowadays, 
Radio Menaka supports and promotes the cercle's 
development activities, promotes local know-how 
and cultural heritage, seeks to step up the use of 
local languages and also to further peace and 
understanding between all strata of the population. 
In addition, it is a driving force behind the life of 
local communities. Its first success was securing 
popular involvement in the construction of the build-
ing which is home to the studio. Never before had 
Sonrais and Tamacheqs been seen to become 
involved together in the same project. In order to 
guarantee support from local populations, the 
Netherlands Volunteer Service gained the trust of 
local leaders: Radio Menaka's Board of Directors is 
composed of leading figures from the region. 
Nowadays, the radio station broadcasts three hours 
per day via a one-kilowatt transmitter which has a 
range of 120 km. The station has succeeded in 
persuading both Sonrai and Tamacheq journalists 
and presenters to work as reporters. News is still a 
rare commodity, owing to difficulties of travel, and 
programmes are limited to regional news, official 
notices and announcements of deaths or mar-
riages, etc. Nevertheless, the next step looks set to 
be a filling-out of the information content, leading to 
the setting-up of a network of correspondents to 
expand the cercle. 
Local information 
Programme content is the central concern of pre-
senters at Radio Menaka, Radio Oualia and other 
rural radio stations in Mali. Should they favour 
neighbourhood information or information about the 
rest of the world? "What is the use of reporting that 
a plane has crashed in Massachusetts if listeners 
are unaware that locusts have devastated crops in 
a neighbouring village? The role of neighbourhood 
radio stations is not to carry the same information 
as international stations," André-Eugène llboudo 
(AMC), responsible for rural radio stations in 
Burkina Faso, told us. "The choice of format is 
fundamental for our radio stations. Neighbourhood 
radio cannot consist of broadcasts of jazz music. 
The fact that we are neighbourhood radio stations 
means that we have to be relevant to our area 
rather than, for instance, providing news about the 
war in Chechnya." 
Most community radio stations have no pro-
gramme schedule and continue to improvise on a 
small scale thanks to donations of equipment and 
community subsidies. Reference to audiovisual 
considerations often comes down to a question of 
survival: are we going to be able to find the fuel for 
the electricity? Will the income from classified ads 
enable us to pay the presenter at the end of the 
month? And so on. Talk of technological change 
and going digital is just about as far from reality as 
it is possible to be - in fact, often light years away. 
Nevertheless, radio stations can no longer ignore 
the need to be self-financing. To miss the boat 
would be to expose themselves to what is already 
being termed "techno-apartheid." 
'Journalist, Media Résistance Project Coordinator (Cota) 
What is the use of 
reporting that a 
plane has crashed 
in Massachusetts if 
listeners are 
unaware that 
locusts have 
devastated crops in 
a neighbouring 
village? 
85 Donor giving blood at 
Bamako bloodbank 
amako's hospitals and clinics and its 
surroundings need 20,000 blood 
donations every year. A great deal of 
progress has been made to improve the 
blood-bank's operation. Recently the building 
was refurbished and improved. 
The fresh colours of CNTS (Centre National 
du Transfusion Sangline) in the centre of 
Bamako catch the eye. Inside the wood still 
smells of its rose paint while the new white 
tiles shine like mirrors. The red dust of the 
northern Sahelian harmattan has not yet been 
able to dim them. 
At Reception a nurse takes the name of a 
new donor. In a separate room two men are 
lying on beds with small tubes in their left 
arms. A nurse is watching them. 
"Our selection has become rather rigorous," 
explains CNTS Director, Professor Anatole 
Tounkara. "No people with fever or who have 
been seriously ill during the last year are 
accepted as donors. During the intake we dis­
cover sometimes that potential donors have a 
hidden agenda. They have come to have their 
Making 
a difference 
Updating 
a Bamako blood-bank 
by Jos van Beurden 
blood checked for HIV infection." 
All blood received is analysed for Aids, 
syphilis, hepatitis Β and blood group. 
"Although we would like to make a more 
thorough analysis, our approach has yielded a 
reasonable first result. In five years the propor­
tion of blood from HIV-infected people has 
been reduced from five per cent to less than 
2.5 per cent." 
The CNTS blood-bank has only 400 regular 
donors. Together with a much larger number 
of incidental donors they provide 12,000 bags 
of blood annually. 
"That is very few indeed," admits Professor 
Tounkara, "but we lack the people and the 
means to raise public awareness." 
All over the country large billboards call 
upon people to take responsibility for the 
prevention of the further spread of AIDS. 
"For AIDS awareness there are many funds, 
that makes the difference." 
One way to increase the number of donors 
is a mobile blood-bank to visit larger compa­
nies in the area. "More donors means more 
stock. If blood is received now, it is distributed 
almost immediately. More stock will enable us 
to keep it a bit longer and to do more 
research." 
Outside the Bamako area, at regional level, 
there are no separate blood-banks. Each hos­
pital has its own policy and makes its own 
arrangements. 
"We would like to have antennae in those 
regions to be sure that blood is collected, 
researched and distributed in a responsible 
manner." 
86 Environmental training 
Students of Class Six 
following 
environmental 
education 
ragile ecosystems, desertification and 
drought are the Sahal's major environ-
mental problems. Ten years ago an 
environmental education programme was 
initiated which aimed at sensitising Sahelian 
youth about these problems and teaching them 
that simple actions help. Hundreds of primary 
schools in nine Sahel countries have partici-
pated. Mali is one country where the programme 
has been successful. 
A group of pupils of the Madame Sow Ai'ssata 
Coulibaly public primary school on the outskirts 
of Bamako is sweeping the courtyard. They put 
the leaves on a pile, to be removed later that 
day on a donkey-cart for compost. The rest of 
the litter is put in big green bins. The trees in the 
courtyard are well kept and watered. There is a 
vegetable and flower garden. 
Interactive learning 
Class Six has 58 pupils and is relatively small. 
Classes with 100 pupils are not uncommon. The 
teacher, Alion Tounkara, has just pushed away a 
blue curtain from the blackboard and one of the 
girls has to read aloud: 
"Every region experiences changes. That is 
part of life. Dry regions change according to the 
manner they are treated. These changes do not 
necessarily represent dangers. But when a culti-
vator has too many cattle or if the villagers cut 
too much firewood, the natural cycle is dis-
turbed. Vegetation becomes rarer. The soil is 
washed away easily. This process is called 
erosion." 
Others repeat the text. Then Tounkara asks 
questions and encourages the pupils to inter-
rogate each other on the subject. Next each 
pupil takes his slate and a piece of chalk and 
writes a text on it. Alion Tounkara calls this 
"interactive learning." 
The lesson is part of the large Training and 
Information Programme on Environment, 
financed by the European Union and implement-
ed in Mali, Burkina Faso, Capo Verde, Chad, 
Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Niger and 
Senegal. About one million primary school stu-
dents have benefited from it, 135,000 in Mali. It 
was started in 1990 when drought and desertifi-
cation were key problems in the development of 
the region. Soon 25 per cent of the primary 
schools in each country were selected, and 
87 Teacher Alion Tounkara 
and his class during 
environmental education 
Many primary schools 
in West Africa have 
this signboard 
ECOLES PFIE DE 
N'TOMIKOROBOUGOU 
Í-¡" CYCLE A ET Β 
LUTTONS EN FAVEUR 
DE LA PROTECTION 
DE NOTRE TERROIR 
there are signboards all over 
the region saying PFIE Halte au 
Desertification, with the name 
of the primary school 
concerned. 
"The Programme has been 
planned at a regional level," 
explains Brehima Tounkara of 
PFIE-Mali, "but each country 
adjusts it to its own circum-
stances. In Gambia for instance 
the focus is more on the crum-
bling of the coast and coastal 
management. In many parts of 
Mali desertification is the key 
issue, while in Bamako it is 
more waste." 
Each pupil has a book and a 
notebook. For teachers there is 
a guide. All materials have 
been produced in the French 
language. Why not in the local 
languages? Director Tounkara: 
"That is a weakness we are 
working on. But many parents 
want their children's education 
to be in French and not in a 
local language." 
Pupils are supposed to con-
vey their newly acquired knowl-
edge to their families. Is this not 
going against Mali's culture? 
"On the one hand that can be a 
problem. On the other, parents 
send their children to school, 
because they expect them to 
learn more than they them-
selves ever did. Most parents 
think that their children have no 
future without education. In 
general, respect is more crucial 
in the relationship between a 
child and his parents or teach-
ers than hierarchy." 
In many schools pupils have 
staged sketches: for instance, a 
father and mother are quar-
relling about the lack of fire-
wood. Their neighbour enters, 
asks what is going on and says, 
"I have a solution for you." She 
tells them about her own cook-
er which needs only one third of 
the firewood a traditional cooker 
needs. "Parents have shown 
their appreciation," assures 
Tounkara. "The pupils explain 
to their parents and other family 
members about the connection 
between firewood and desertifi-
cation." 
About a quarter of all primary 
schools in Mali and the other 
countries has been reached by 
the Training and Information 
Programme on the 
Environment. All directors and 
some teachers, all in all 3,500 
people, from 350 schools have 
attended courses to teach 
Environmental Education. 
The PFIE would like to 
extend the programme to other 
sectors in society, to secondary 
education and women's groups 
for example. In Bamako the 
Programme has approached 
women who are painting mate-
rial. They unthinkingly throw 
away the used painting-water 
without realising how this dam-
ages the environment. 
"We are discussing other 
methods with them and they 
show a lot of willingness to 
change their habits. For them 
we do need instruction materi-
als in local languages," says 
PFIE director Tounkara. 
That is also true for a number 
of unemployed youngsters who 
have formed a cooperative and 
who come to the PFIE schools to 
gather leaves and other garbage 
which can be composted. 
"Environmental education is 
crucial for the future of Mali and 
the rest of West Africa." 
88 PROFILE 
Mali 
General Information 
Area 
Population 
Capital 
Languages 
Religions 
Economy 
Currency 
GDP per capita 
GDP growth 
GNP per capita 
Total external debt 
Debt service ratio 
Main primary products 
Main sectors(GDP) 
Main exports 
Main trading partners 
1,240,192 km
2 
10,108,569(1998, est.) 
Bamako. Other towns: Segou Mopti, Sikasso 
French (official); Bambara 80%, numerous African languages 
Muslim (90%), indigenous beliefs 9%, Christian (1%) 
CFA franc, 1€ = 655,95 FCFA 
US$271 (1997) 
5.1% (1997) 
260 US $ (1997) 
2,945.1 US $ 
10.5% 
Cotton, fish, groundnuts, livestock, maize, millet, rice, sorghum, 
sugar cane, vegetables 
Agriculture (46%): only 3% of the total area is arable, but 80% of 
the people make a living in agriculture, which accounts for about 
80% of GDP. Industry (17%), services (37%) (1996) and tourism 
Cotton (55%), groundnuts, livestock and gold (1996) 
France, Ivory Coast, Germany and the UK 
Politics 
Head of State 
National government 
Political structure 
Main political parties 
Others 
Social Indicators 
Life expectancy 
Infant mortality 
Access to primary education 
Access to secondary education 
Adult literacy 
Access to drinking water 
Access to health services 
Human development index rating 
President Alpha Oumar Konaré (since 8 June 1992) 
The Prime Minister (Mandé Sidibé) and his appointed Council of 
Ministers; the current government is dominated by Adema 
Presidential system. The president is elected by universal suffrage 
for a five-year term. The legislative branch is composed of a unicameral 
National Assembly or Assemblée Nationale (147 seats; members are 
elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms). Much of the opposition 
boycotted the last elections, held 11 May 1997; next elections for 2002 
Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema, the ruling coalition). 
Parti de la renaissance nationale (Parena); Rassemblement national pour 
la démocratie (RND); Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès (PDP); 
Union pour la démocratie et le développement (UDD). The main 
opposition alliance is the Collectif des partis politiques de l'opposition 
(Coppo). It includes the Mouvement Patriotique pour le renouveau (MPR); 
Rassemblement pour la démocratie africain (US-RDA); Congrès national 
d'initiative démocratique (CNID); Mouvement pour l'indépendance, la 
renaissance et l'intégration africaine (MIRIA) 
53.3 years (1997) 
145/1000 births (1997) (221/1000 in 1970) 
38.1% (1997) 
17.9% (1997) 
28.3% female; 43.1% male; combined : 35.5% (1997) 
34% 
80% 
0.375 (166th out of 174) 1998 
Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit's country report (2000), European Commission, UNDP Human Development Report (1999) The work of Claire 
Kane 
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EBAS - Four letters that 
really make a difference 
by Laurence Guigou and Aya Kasasa 
Clearly, Dakar designer Claire 
Kane has hardly had time to 
draw breath. She heard of 
EBAS (the ACP-EU Business 
Assistance Scheme) through a 
European official working for 
the Abidjan delegation. "Since 
1989 I have been involved in 
the whole production process, 
from weaving to dressmaking. 
My business had reached a 
crucial point in its development: 
a team of 30 people, several 
sales outlets. It was time for me 
to give it new impetus, to take it 
a step further." 
Her product is unusual -
clothing labelled 100% Dakar, 
designed and made with local 
materials and using exclusively 
local manpower. 
"It's part of an initiative to 
support the local craft industry. 
All the materials are hand-
woven according to an ances-
tral method mastered by 
Mandjak craftsmen who were 
originally from Guinea Bissau." 
When she heard of EBAS, she 
wasted no time at all: "it all hap-
pened really quickly. I submitted 
two portfolios - a marketing 
dossier and a reorganisation 
dossier. The latter is about 
drawing up an inventory of fix-
tures, in order to restructure my 
business and attract financial 
partners. Our aim is to be able 
to expand overseas, to widen 
our market." 
Thanks to EBAS, Claire Kane 
has been able to launch two 
promotional campaigns, one in 
Paris and one in Dakar. 
"EBAS met half the costs of 
the press officer who assisted 
me in these campaigns. We 
have also begun to audit for the 
reorganisation. The analysis, 
the business plan and the sup-
port for setting up the proce-
dures, especially in terms of 
accounting and taxation - all 
this is very expensive and 
would have been impossible 
without EBAS." Other sectors 
As soon as EBAS was 
launched, we were contacted 
by Catherine Guichard, 
Managing Director of 
COLEACP (the ACP-EU liai-
son committee for the promo-
tion of ACP horticultural 
exports) in Rungis. She told 
us: "African horticulturists need 
to improve the quality of their 
products for exportation, to set 
themselves standards and to 
take responsibility for monitor-
ing their own businesses inter-
nally." She described a plan to 
draw up Codes of Conduct, 
which the national associations 
of five countries in Southern 
and Eastern Africa intend to 
enforce in their countries. The 
idea has certainly been gener-
ally welcomed, but monitoring 
is costly: small horticulturists 
cannot afford the luxury of call-
ing in the SGS or Bureau 
Veritas to ensure that stan-
dards are adhered to. "Can 
EBAS help the horticultural 
associations to train their own 
inspectors?" 
Horticultural agronomist Bob 
Bush is one of the senior man-
agers of NZTT - the Zambian 
centre for horticultural training 
and research. He offered to 
organise training courses for 
the 12 future auditors. Visiting 
us in Brussels, he told us: "The 
Zambia Export Growers 
Association (ZEGA) will submit 
an application for a grant on 
behalf of the 6 other African 
associations in the region. We 
will run the courses and follow 
them up in the field." 
The application, formulated 
jointly with the EBAS services, 
was duly submitted to the ACP 
secretariat, which approved it, 
and the European Commission 
granted ZEGA a subsidy of 
€40,000. COLEACP gave an 
additional subsidy representing 
17% of the total cost. 
A delighted Dr Mabel 
Mandela, Managing Director of 
ZEGA, rang EBAS in May 
2000: "Training of the inspec-
tors has gone well. They are 
now getting practical experi-
ence among producers, under 
the supervision of the NZTT 
experts. In a few months, they 
will be able to carry out inspec-
tions for compliance with the 
Codes of Conduct on behalf of 
the horticulturists of their own 
countries. The cost of their 
operations is a third of what it 
was before! All horticulturists 
can now have access to the 
internal auditing services of 
their association. Their 
capacity for export is greatly 
enhanced, thanks to the aid 
this programme has given us." 
Solid backing 
Claire Kane and ZEGA are 
just two of the 19 projects 
already benefiting from the 
EBAS facility. More than 200 
applications for services and 
technical assistance are cur-
rently being processed. EBAS 
is the latest in a series of 
schemes aimed at supporting 
the private sector in ACP coun-
tries. Just a few weeks away 
from the signing of the new 
partnership agreement which 
will unite the European Union 
and ACP countries for the next 
20 years, the emphasis is 
firmly on regionalised econom-
ic integration of ACP countries 
to enable them to join the 
world markets. It is only natu-
ral, then, that all energies 
should be focused on giving 
assistance to the principal 
actors for economic integra-
tion. EBAS - four letters that 
can make all the difference - is 
a matching grant fund primarily 
aimed at private enterprises 
and intermediary organisations 
such as professional associa-
tions and Chambers of Com-
merce. This subsidy, for a 
maximum amount of 70,000 
91 euros for companies (unlimited for associative 
organisations) can cover up to 50% of the 
costs of services (technical or intellectual) or 
consultants which the business or association 
might need to make it more competitive. 
Eligible costs include all expenses incurred in 
the recruitment of a consultant or a service 
provider: training, technical assistance, restruc-
turing, ISO certification, commercial and/or 
marketing strategy, technology transfer, etc., 
and exclude all other expenditure: purchase of 
equipment, staff salaries, working capital, 
investment. 
"We insist that the results of EBAS action be 
measurable in the short term, which means that 
no intervention with hypothetical results can be 
eligible, be it feasibility studies or market 
research." As Laurence Guigou explains, "it is 
imperative that any business making an applica-
tion to us be in a position to contribute to the 
financing of its own project. EBAS will contribute 
up to 50% of the eligible costs. A firm can, of 
course, look to other sources of subsidy, but its 
own contribution must amount to at least 33% of 
the total eligible costs." 
The programme is a response to very specific 
needs and subsidises simple, practical projects 
which have a direct and immediate impact on the 
competitiveness of the recipient. However, it is 
important to remember that EBAS is part of a 
strategy coordinating a whole group of comm-
unity schemes initiated by COLEACP and the 
Trade Development Programme, all set up to 
encourage development of the private sector in 
ACP countries. Diagnos is a programme targeted 
at analysing the business environment to help 
governments take the necessary measures to 
improve the socio-economic and legal back-
ground to business. Prolnvest, scheduled to be 
operational by the end of 2000, will promote new 
business partnerships and assist the implemen-
tation of cooperation agreements. As for the 
Investment Facility, which is also scheduled to be 
operational in 2000 and is administered by the 
European Investment Bank, this line of credit will 
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make access to finance easier for businesses 
wishing to invest. 
Although there is no Regional Office in the 
Pacific, George Mills has every intention of pro-
moting and following up applications from the 
area. "The Brussels Project Management Unit 
(PMU) is also acting as the Regional Office for 
the Pacific. Missions are organised on a regular 
basis to promote the programme, and local infor-
mation relays will further the public awareness 
campaign and mediate between applicants and 
the PMU." 
Over to you, businesses! 
The team 
Project Management Unit 
Belgium 
110 Boulevard Reyers, 
B-1030 Brussels 
Fax 32.2.740.02.49 
ebas@ebas.org 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cote d'Ivoire 
22 BP 722 Abidjan 20 
Fax: +225.20.32.90.20 
ebas@aviso.ci 
Barbados 
PO Box 34B, Brittons Hill, 
St Michael, 
Fax: +1 246 436 99 99 
rdubrisingh@carib-export.com 
Sub-regional Offices: 
Dominican Republic 
Cale 6, No. 10, Ens. Paraíso, 
Santo Domingo, 
Fax: +1.809.685.22.28 
kdepool@hotmail.com 
Botswana 
Gaborone Plot 5196, Old 
Labotsé Road, PO Box 432 
Fax: +267.303.617 
mmartins.ebas.sa@info.bw 
Kenya 
Josem Trust Place, Bunyala 
Road, Ρ O Box 27578, 
Nairobi 
Fax: +254.2.719.360 
ebas@africaonline.co.ke 
92 Mining in Africa 
An example of why aid doesn't always work 
by John Hollaway* 
In 1988 I attended a United 
Nations conference in Ankara, 
a modest-sized one and so 
appropriate to its subject, which 
was to do with small mines. 
Here I was surprised to find that 
the definition of such a mine 
was a matter - an issue in the 
language of such gatherings -
which aroused such emotion 
that eventually the whole of the 
final two days were given over 
to heated arguments about it. 
These discussions to a min­
ing consultant from a mining 
country were incomprehensible. 
Definitions and distinctions 
In our mining law there was 
no distinction made by size, nor 
was there in successful mining 
countries like Australia, Canada 
or America. Everybody worked 
under the same system of peg­
ging claims, whether peasant or 
potentate. It was not practic­
able, anyway, to split up the 
industry into large and small. A 
mine that hoisted a thousand 
tons a day would be small by 
coal mine standards, but very 
big if it was a gold mine. 
The impracticalities did not 
end there; as soon as one 
starts trying to specify mine 
sizes a major semantic slough 
halts all progress. There were 
medium scale and small scale 
mines, which seemed to be 
simple enough, even if not 
definable. But then, what were 
small mines per se? And what 
were - a word I had first heard 
used only a few years before -
artisanal mines? 
My own contribution in 
Ankara was limited to suggest­
ing that any mine without a 
defined ore reserve was a small 
mine and asking why was this 
nonsense (I didn't say that) 
necessary? My interventions, to 
use the correct term again, 
were met with some bemuse-
ment. It was politely pointed out 
that of course definitions were 
necessary. Governments 
needed to know. 
I gave up, mystified. Why did 
they need to know? We were 
evidently on different 
wavelengths. 
Discovering mines 
The mystery was slow to 
clear, although over the years I 
managed to become something 
of an authority on small mines 
in developing countries in the 
eyes of the multilateral aid 
agencies. Not entirely accurate; 
I am actually an authority on 
why there aren't any to speak 
of except for one or two very 
important exceptions. 
What had happened was that 
when the gold price was freed 
up in 1971 and went rapidly 
upwards, thousands of barefoot 
prospectors in developing coun­
tries were spurred to discover 
new mines. 
This they did, in astonishing 
numbers. Starting from almost 
nothing in 1970, by 1994 Africa 
was estimated to be exporting 
(illegally) about 65 tons of arti­
sanal gold a year. At the pre­
vailing prices this gold would 
have been worth over 700 mil­
lion dollars. For diamonds the 
quantities are even less certain, 
but all in all well over a billion  Figure 1 
ZIMBABWE: THE NUMBER OF GOLD MLXES VERSUS THEIS SIZE 
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93 dollars of gold and gemstones 
leave Africa illegally every year. 
Faced with this growing situa-
tion numerous governments 
asked for assistance from the 
donor community. It was hardly 
an area in which most donors 
had direct experience, but it 
was depicted to them as a legal 
problem, and they had ample 
resources of lawyers. 
Consequently, numerous legal 
projects ensued, usually in 
conjunction with an overhaul of 
the mining law inherited from 
colonial times. 
The general conclusion of all 
this work in perhaps a score of 
countries was that artisanal 
mining and large scale mining 
were incompatible. The 
received wisdom arose that arti-
sanal mining was "a process 
set apart from the 20th century 
concept of mining." Such min-
ing (however defined) was, if 
not actually illegal, to be subject 
to detailed regulation. 
The enthusiasm with which 
these arrangements were 
received may not have been so 
much for a fine bit of legal draft-
ing as for the immense discre-
tionary powers they presented to 
the Minister and his officials. The 
more opportunities for decision 
making, the greater the scope 
for exacting a contribution from 
those needing a decision. 
Who gets title? 
The upshot of these well-
intentioned changes to third-
world mining laws was to seg-
regate the local miners from the 
foreign investors. Local people 
who made discoveries were not 
allowed title to what they found, 
and were forced to hand them 
over to foreigners, who were 
seen as better equipped to 
develop them. 
But why is this so important? 
After all mines - real, big mines 
- are found by geologists, work-
ing for big companies, are they 
not? Sometimes, yes, 
particularly with non-gold 
mines. But for gold mines in 
Africa, no, very seldom. In 1998 
Pierre Goossens of the Belgian 
BUGECO consultancy pointed 
out that the Morilla discovery in 
Mali by the Australian mining 
giant BHP was the only new 
mine in West Africa that had 
not been previously worked by 
artisanal miners. In Zimbabwe, 
out of 4,000 or so gold mines, 
only perhaps a score have 
been found by geological infer-
ence. Intriguingly, most of the 
rest date from discoveries in 
the days of the Empire of the 
94 Munhumutapa, 400 years ago. 
In 1994 the Zimbabwe 
Geological Survey published a 
major scholarly work entitled 
Structural Controls of Gold 
Mineralisation in the Zimbabwe 
Craton. This noted that when 
the cumulative number of 
mines were plotted on a log-
log scale against their cumula­
tive outputs, a straight line 
relationship emerged, as the 
graph on page 93 shows. The 
only point that falls off it is at 
the extreme right, for the very 
largest mines. The plot sug­
gests there should have been 
about five mines which pro­
duced over 100 tons; in fact 
there have been only two. 
Perhaps there are other ele­
phants lurking in Zimbabwe's 
geology. 
What has happened is that 
in Zimbabwe the size and 
numbers of the mines that 
have developed reflect the nat­
ural distribution of geological 
opportunities. This is because 
of the free-access, finders-
keepers, full-property-right type 
of mining law there, which 
allows the owner - a BHP Ltd 
or a barefoot prospector - to 
sell, option or tribute a discov­
ery without interference from 
the government. This leads to 
vigorous, nationwide prospect­
ing, together with an equally 
vigorous marketplace in 
claims. 
Countries that do not have 
this sort of law end up with 
either (as in Tanzania) almost 
no mines apart from small 
scale diggings, or (as in 
Ghana) nothing between 
the small-scale diggings 
and huge Ashanti-type 
operations. Here the graph 
looks something like Figure 
2. 
So there it is. 
Development assistance 
caused Africa's mining laws 
to be rewritten to be appro­
priate to "the 20th-century con­
cept of mining." The effect was 
to institutionalise corruption, to 
ensure a missing middle and to 
prevent the development of an 
indigenous formal mining 
industry. Impoverished Africans 
who had found valuable miner­
als were forced to exploit them 
with their own miniscule 
resources; they could not sell 
the title to their find. The result, 
improbable as it may seem, is 
that in the whole vast expanse 
of sub-Saharan Africa north of 
the Zambesi there are no more 
than about 40 formal gold 
mines, almost all of them large 
and foreign-owned. 
'John Hollaway is a Zimbabwean mining 
consultant whose work has taken him to 
18 countries in Africa. Small-scale mining 
is his special area and this article is taken 
from his book All Poor Together, to be 
published by Capricorn Books 
later this year 
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95 SME-SMI Projects: 
The name of the privatisation game 
by Ascanio Graziosi* 
The promotion, support, financing, and industries is the core business 
marketing and management of small of any privatisation programme, 
and medium-sized enterprises 
Since people started saying that small is 
beautiful and statistical analysis has shown that 
big business is no longer creating jobs, policy 
makers have been intensifying their efforts to 
boost smaller businesses because, among 
other things, their development can help 
unemployment. 
In a less-developed economy, by and large, the 
common denominator for interventions in favour 
of SME-SMI is taken from government policy to 
promote privatisation. 
Taking stock 
After almost a decade of intense SME-SMI pro-
gramming there is a need to take stock. Usually 
this begins with a post-evaluation analysis to 
show that a project is sustainable until a donor 
An SME-SMI project can be set 
up to implement an entire 
process, from disbursement to 
collection of money. Usually this 
happens in an environment 
without a well-developed 
economy. Intervention changes 
as an economy develops, until 
a situation arises 
where third parties 
can be approached to 
cooperate, and some tasks and 
responsibilities 
can be delegated to them 
has the goodwill to take over the supporting 
services. 
Field experience has made it clear that 
conclusions about the performance of a project 
are difficult to come by, and they don't tell us 
what we need to know. 
The activities of a project vary according to the 
environment: the more advanced the country, the 
more sophisticated the project needs to be. An 
SME-SMI project can be something which has 
been set up to implement an entire process, from 
disbursement to collection of money. Usually this 
happens in an environment without a well-devel-
oped economy. 
Intervention changes as an economy develops, 
until a situation arises where third parties can be 
approached to cooperate, and some tasks and 
responsibilities can be delegated to them. 
At the top of this pyramid we can have a situa-
tion where the local banks are entrusted with the 
management of the financial agreement between 
government and donor. There can also be a 
guarantee fund which shares tasks and responsi-
bilities with other financial providers. Between the 
top and the bottom of the pyramid the types of 
projects are as varied as the situations they have 
to deal with. 
How is a project implemented? 
Say we have a government programme which 
supports the private sector. Within this framework 
all the protagonists (government, donor, local 
financial providers, beneficiaries, management 
unit) agree on the rules for supporting SME-SMI. 
96 Each protagonist has their 
own interest to defend and 
consequently tries to get the 
maximum benefit from the 
available resources. A govern-
ment supports the private sec-
tor; the donor is concerned 
with the correct procedure for 
the allocation of resources and 
their management; the benefi-
ciaries wish to have easy 
access to the available 
resources in terms of money 
and services; the local financial 
providers ask for strict compli-
ance with the disbursement 
procedure; the Management 
Unit is asked to apply as accu-
rately as possible the rules in 
the financial agreement that 
everyone has signed and to 
set up an appropriate organi-
sation: with so many interrelat-
ed factors involved this is not 
easy. 
Cooperation among those 
involved is the conditio sine 
qua, and a firm agreement is 
necessary. There must be a 
very clear definition of the 
objectives and how to achieve 
them. In other words, the 
expected results of a project 
will vary in relation to the 
relative importance of the 
interests/positions stressed by 
the stakeholders. 
We must understand the role 
of each of these, within the 
existing socio-economic con-
text. This is usually set out in a 
framework paper, the source-
The expected results 
of a project will vary 
in relation to the 
relative importance 
of the 
interests/positions 
of the stakeholders. 
We must understand 
the role of each 
of these, within 
the existing 
socio-economic 
context 
document of a project. An 
SME-SMI project can have 
either a development objective 
or a trade objective, depending 
on how advanced the economy 
is. The two objectives can 
stand together by opening two 
credit windows because an 
economic environment that is 
not very developed is usually 
dominated by the so-called 
underground economy. Good 
management is vital. 
In this way one can say that 
the project doesn't mean the 
same to everyone involved. 
Indeed, each beneficiary can 
require a different strategy. A 
project must be able to cope 
with the demands of the bene-
ficiaries, and of the environ-
ment as well. 
Since the boundaries among 
the above variables are not 
easy to draw, the equation has 
to be adjusted to meet continu-
ously-changing demands. It is 
of vital importance to the sus-
tainability of a project how 
resources, tasks and responsi-
bility work together towards a 
common objective. 
Although we can see the 
equation is not balanced, it is 
not clear to which side it tips, 
and which player it favours. To 
see that, we have to examine 
their role and how far their 
interests have influenced the 
project as a whole. 
• If, therefore, we want to 
measure the performance of 
an SME-SMI project we need 
parameters, which are closed, 
related to each other, coherent 
and homogenous. A post-eval-
uation analysis which consid-
ers the behaviour of the pro-
tagonists could meet these 
requirements. The debate 
remains open. 
'Senior Banking Consultant 
CP 4058 Roma Appio 
00179 Roma Italia 
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97 Women: the 
"Beijing +5": on 5 June, in 
New York, UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, and 
Hillary Clinton opened the 
Special session of the United 
Nations General Assembly on 
women. Initial observations 
were depressing: the situation 
of women throughout the world 
has not improved substantially. 
Despite efforts to improve their 
situation, women nevertheless 
continue to suffer poverty and 
violence. From 5 to 9 June, 
representatives in the US capi-
tal reviewed such progress as 
has been made since the 
Beijing Conference, reaffirmed 
the undertakings made by 181 
countries and decided on the 
measures to be implemented 
in order to achieve improve-
ment. The meeting, entitled 
"Women 2000: Gender 
Equality, Development and 
Peace for the 21st Century," 
reviewed strategic goals and 
the list of actions which were 
to be implemented before 2000 
on the part of governments, 
world stagna 
the international community 
and the private sector with a 
view to combating sexual dis-
crimination. Twelve critical 
areas had been identified as 
constituting fundamental obsta-
cles to the promotion of 
women: poverty, education and 
training, health, violence, 
armed conflicts, the economy, 
empowerment and decision-
making, institutional mecha-
nisms, human rights, the 
media, the environment and 
female children. As regards 
poverty, this is becoming more 
female: 70% of poor people on 
the planet are women, and the 
gulf between men and women 
continues to grow. As for 
health, although progress has 
undoubtedly been achieved, 
statistics remain a cause for 
concern: taking the world as a 
whole, one woman dies every 
minute from complications 
linked to pregnancy or to deliv-
ery, and the number of women 
infected with HIV continues to 
tes 
increase. Violence within the 
family is still regarded as hav-
ing a more detrimental effect 
on women's life expectancy 
than breast and cervical can-
cers, and between 85 and 114 
million women and young girls 
have been the victims of geni-
tal mutilation. No improvement, 
either, in terms of conflicts: 
90% of victims are civilians, 
principally women and chil-
dren. Finally, the proportion of 
women in national and interna-
tional decision-making struc-
tures has not increased, 
remaining at 13% at world 
level. Nevertheless, there was 
a small degree of optimism 
concerning education, as the 
situation is evolving favourably, 
with illiteracy levels of those 
aged 15-25 years showing 
practically no difference 
between the sexes in several 
regions of the world, except for 
Africa. In the case of adults, 
however, illiteracy is still higher 
amongst women. 
Culture 
The objective: To set up an art market on the 
African continent. The sixth Biennial of 
Contemporary African Art, Dak'Art, was held in 
May in Senegal's capital. Inaugurated by the coun-
try's new president, Abdoulaye Wade, it included 
group and individual exhibitions by African and for-
eign artists selected by an international panel, a 
plastic arts market, a salon for young Senegalese 
exponents of the plastic arts and a salon for 
African design and textile creation. Dak'Art 
receives a grant of CFAF 250 million from the 
European Union. 
98 Health issues 
"Only $150 million for HIV prevention in 
Africa. One cannot expect miracles with such 
sums." This was the sad observation of Dr 
Peter Piot, Executive Director of the United 
Nations AIDS Programme (UNAIDS) at the 
meeting of OAU health ministers in 
Ouagadougou in May. AIDS is devastating 
Africa's health systems, reducing the 
chances of success of campaigns imple-
mented to combat the pandemic. Some 33.6 
million people are currently living with the 
virus, including 23.3 million in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In the majority of these countries, 
patients infected with HIV occupy 50 to 80% 
of hospital beds in the towns and cities, leav-
ing practically no room for other patients. Dr 
Piot called for an "international partnership," 
and his appeal appears not to have fallen on 
deaf ears, particularly in the US, where 
President Clinton has signed a decree aimed 
at making enforcement of laws protecting 
patents for AIDS medicines more flexible in 
connection with Africa, so that countries 
might be able to obtain such drugs more 
easily. This policy change had been 
announced at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle. The WTO enabled 
governments to authorise laboratories in their 
countries to produce medicines without 
licence in cases of medical emergency, 
although hitherto Washington had been ask-
ing its partners to apply these intellectual-
property-protection'agreements more strictly 
on a national basis. The European Union 
and the United States reiterated, during the 
EU/US Summit in Washington, their commit-
ment to combating HIV/AIDS and also malar-
ia and tuberculosis. They called for an inter-
national partnership, greater public aware-
ness, a stepping-up of research into a vac-
cine and easier access to medicines. 
Muzzling racism 
The offices of the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia opened in Vienna on 7 April 
2000. This independent European watchdog body is com-
posed of 18 persons appointed by the Member States, the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the Council of 
Europe. Their task is to study the evolution of racism, 
xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the EU and to analyse 
the causes and consequences of it. The Centre is also 
setting up a European information network on racism and 
xenophobia. For further information: EUMC, Rahlgasse 3, 
A-1060 Vienna, Austria. Fax: (+43 1) 580 30 99/ e-mail: 
office@eumc.at /website: www.eumc.at, not forgetting the 
Commission website: http://cc.cec:8082/comm/dg05/fun-
damri/eu racism/index en.htm 
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"Dirty" diamonds 
Within the UN Security 
Council, France and Great 
Britain are considering 
imposing an embargo on 
"illegal exports" of dia-
monds from Sierra Leone. 
France confirms having 
stressed very early on that 
the problem of Sierra 
Leone should be under-
stood in terms of rival 
claims for control and 
exploitation of the country's 
natural resources, particu-
larly its diamonds. Control 
of the diamond-producing 
areas is often put forward 
as the main objective of the 
Sierra Leonean rebels of 
the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and as one of 
the causes of the civil war 
which has ravaged the 
country for almost 10 
years. UK Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook 
appealed to the Security 
Council for an embargo 
on diamond imports from 
Sierra Leone to be set up 
in the next few weeks. An 
embargo would, however, 
allow export of diamonds 
from areas controlled by 
the legal Sierra Leonean 
government. Moreover, 
the European 
Commission has released 
urgent supplementary 
humanitarian aid for Sierra 
Leone amounting to €12 
million. After consulting 
Member States, the 
Commission set in motion 
the commitment procedure 
for this supplementary aid, 
which will be managed by 
the European Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) and will be 
aimed at resident popula-
tions inside Sierra Leone 
and at displaced persons. 
The Commission is to 
increase its aid to health 
and food services for the 
350,000 or so refugees liv-
ing in neighbouring coun-
tries (Guinea, Liberia). It 
will also finance specific 
programmes aimed at 
women and children affect-
ed by the conflict and at 
the disabled and injured 
(with AFP). 
Europe - an invitation 
to immigrants? 
Europe looks set to receive an additional 
160 million immigrant workers between now 
and 2025. This fact emerges from a report by 
the UN population division, the aim of the 
authors of the report being to demonstrate that 
greater attention should be given to the prob-
lem as soon as possible. The issue is not one 
of staving off the ageing of the population 
through immigration, but politicians ought to 
implement adequate measures. The problem 
of ageing and of maintaining retirement and 
pension systems is felt most keenly in the 
European Union. In 2025, it will have 5 million 
fewer inhabitants and this trend will continue 
after that. The ratio of those of working age to 
those of retirement age, which is currently 
between 4 and 5 workers for one pensioner, 
will be halved globally. In order to maintain its 
working population at its absolute 1995 level, 
Europe should therefore open its frontiers to 
24 million immigrants between now and 2025. 
Specialists stress that solutions will undoubt-
edly have to be sought elsewhere, either by 
raising the retirement age to 75 or by adopting 
an intermediate solution, accepting more immi-
grants whilst raising the retirement age. 
On the Agenda 
An African conference on penal reforms is to take place in the capital of Cameroon from 23 to 25 November 2000 on 
"The effects of globalisation on the penal reforms in Africa." Further information can be obtained from: 
www.geoclties.com/tmukete. Coordinator: Mukete Table Itoe. 
100 Europe fights 
against 
discrimination in 
its many forms 
In Luxembourg, EU 
Employment and Social 
Affairs Ministers have 
adopted a directive aimed 
at combating all types of 
discrimination based on 
race or ethnic origin. 
Europe thus has its first 
anti-racist legislation: the 
text adopted defines the 
notion of race, even 
though a number of 
Member States have long 
excluded the idea of race 
from their legislation. 
Based on the principle of 
equality of treatment, the 
directive extends the 
recommendations of the 
Amsterdam Treaty against 
discrimination. It covers all 
aspects of daily life, from 
the world of work to 
school, and includes trans-
port and social protection. 
EU Migrants Forum and 
the IOM enter into co-
operation "Improvement of 
working efficiency through 
greater cooperation:" such 
is the aim pursued by the 
directors of the EU 
Migrants' Forum and the 
Assistant Director General 
of the International 
Organisation for Migration. 
With this aim in view, the 
two institutions have 
signed a memorandum in 
Brussels. Setup in 1992 
after a lengthy campaign, 
"a voice for migrants and 
ethnic minorities across 
Europe,"the EU Migrants' 
Forum istoday acknowl-
edged by the various 
European institutions as 
the mouthpiece body on 
issues relating to migration 
and the rights of citizens 
from third countries. Its 
membership includes 190 
national migrant organisa-
tions and associations rep-
resenting over 2000 grass-
roots associations. 
Contacts: 23A rue Belliard, 
1040 Brussels, Belgium / 
Fax: + 32 2 230 22 70 / 
e-mail: 
forum.migrants.ue@skynet 
.be 
Signing of the Cotonou Agreement 
23 June 2000 - the 25
t
h anniversary of the 
Lomé Convention which links the 71 ACP 
states and the European Union - the new 
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement was signed 
in Cotonou, capital of Benin. 
This Agreement, regarded as innovative in 
adapting to a changed global environment, 
was concluded after 18 months of intense 
negotiation between the partners. It will link 
the ACP states - now numbering 77 - and 
the European Union for a period of 20 years. 
There are six new Pacific members of the 
ACP Group; the Cook Islands, the Republic 
of Nauru, the Republic of Palau, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, Niue, and 
the Federated States of Micronesia. 
The signing ceremony of the Partnership 
Agreement, informally called the "Cotonou 
Agreement", took place in the sports stadium 
" de L'Amitié" with all the solemnité required 
to inaugurate a new era of ACP-EU cooper-
ation. 
No funding for terrorists! 
The Council is recommending intensified cooperation in order to cut off finance from terrorist 
groups. EU Member States have agreed to exchange all available information from competent 
authorities concerning groups posing a specific threat. Source: Eur-Op News 
101 The journalism 
of resistance 
Média Résistance, a project 
implemented by the COTA 
(Appropriate Technology 
Exchange Collective), provides 
a forum for grass roots initia-
tives which use the media as 
vectors for democracy. This 
project was born of the desire 
to take full advantage of the 
expressiveness of men and 
women who, in writing, sound 
or image, refuse to submit or to 
re-transmit ready-formatted 
information. The stories told are 
eye-witness accounts of the dif-
ficulties of the journalism of 
resistance in the Balkans, the 
Middle East, Latin America 
and Africa. 
This work also includes a 
chapter on Medias en mouve-
ment [Media on the move] 
which gives 10 reference web-
sites and an alphabetical list of 
addresses and websites for 
various communication and 
information associations 
throughout the world. 
Média Résistance, Un écho pour les 
Média Résistance, Un écho pour les 
voix discordantes, by Serge Bailly and 
Didier Beaufort. 
www.media.resistance.org. 
Published by Editions Karthala; 22-24 
Boulevard Arago; 75013 Paris, pp. 324. 
ISBN: 2-84586-015-3 
On International Freedom 
of the Press Day, 3 May, 
Reporters Sans Frontières 
put on sale a book of photo-
graphs by Robert Doisneau, 
post-war photographer. The 
money they make from it will 
pay for activities supporting 
freedom of expression, and in 
particular, to help journalists 
and their families who have 
been put in prison. This 
money will also allow them to 
continue supporting media 
that has been censored, to 
put pressure on governments 
who prevent freedom of the 
press, and to alert public opi-
nion and international bodies 
in charge of defending human 
rights. 
Robert Doisneau, Pour la liberté de la 
Presse, Reporters Sans Frontières, 2000. 
Distributed by Les NMPP, Press Services -
38 FF/240 Bef/£4.50 -
ISBN 2-908830-49-3 
The media in 
Central Africa 
Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda, Chad: these nine 
countries, for the duration of the 
study, were the target for a sur-
vey conducted by the Panos 
Institute into the position of the 
media in Central Africa. What 
are these media? Within what 
legal context and what socio-
economic context have they 
evolved in the region? What 
are their problems, particularly 
in terms of professional organi-
sation? What are their strong 
points? And, in particular, how 
representative are they in a 
region in the grip of so many 
conflicts and power struggles? 
Afrique Centrale: Des médias pour la 
démocratie, Panos Institute Paris and 
Editions Karthala, Paris 2000. pp. 198. 
ISBN 2-84586-000-5. 
102 RWANDA 
ECRÏRE PAR 
DEVOIR DF 
MEMOIRE 
Nyamirambo 
A huge cemetery of mutilated bodies and souls. It was here that 
Man's most bestial instincts were made flesh and where humanity's 
shame was revealed for all eternity. 
It is precisely to awaken numbed consciences, to open eyes that 
refuse to see, that the author cries out. These are verses of blood 
which tell of the Rwandan nightmare; verses of fire to break humani-
ty's silent collusion; verses of hope that such events will never again 
come to pass. 
Nyamirambo! recueil de poésies, by Nocky 
Djedanoum. pp. 50. 
Murekatete 
Because of Murambi and its mounds of human bodies, a macabre 
consequence of Man's folly which swept through the tiny country of 
Rwanda, love struggled to gain a foothold. At Murambi and else-
where, terrible carnage left its imprint in hearts and on bodies. So, 
why is there hope for Muekatete and Venant's love? If there is not, 
how can such a memory of blood-letting ever be put out of the mind? 
The author has successfully depicted the drama of an entire people 
through that of a young couple, with a restraint and sensitivity which 
makes this novel so deeply moving. 
Murekatete, by Monique llboudo. Novel, pp. 75. 
The Tutsi genocide explained 
Rwanda will undoubtedly always be a shameful memory, the 
Rwandan genocide now standing alongside the Shoah. But, life in 
Rwanda must go on for all Rwandans, despite such memories. 
It is to confirm this need that the author has taken the lead, with passion, admittedly, but also with 
courage and lucidity, moved by a love for his country and his people. The text is in the form of an 
interview which attempts to portray the true nature of the Rwandan genocide. 
Le génocide des Tutsi expliqué à un étranger, by Jean-Marie V. 
Rurangwa. Essay, pp. 85. 
The above three works have been produced as part of the Rwanda: our 
duty to remember project initiated by the Fest'Africa Festival (African Arts 
and Media Association). They are published by Le Figuier, BP. E 2605 
Balako, Mali, and Fest'Africa, 9/2 Petite rue de l'Alma, 59800 Lille, France. 
ISBN 2-84258-067-2. 
Compiled by Anne Steger 
103 Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
(Territorial collectivities) 
Mayotte 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
(Overseas territories) 
New Caledonia and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
Territories 
Wallis and Futuna Islands 
Netherlands 
(Overseas countfies) 
Nethetlands Antilles 
¡Bonaire, Curacao, 
St Martin, 
Saba, St Eustache) 
Aruba 
Denmark 
(Country having special 
relations with Denmark) 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
(Overseas countries and 
tertitorics) 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
Brirish Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St Helena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
General Secretariat 
ot the ACP Group 
of States 
Avenue Georges Her 
1200 Brussels 
Belgium 
Tel.: 743 06 00 
This list docs not prejudice 
the status of these countries and territories 
now or in the future. 
The Courier uses maps from a variety 
of sources. Their use docs not imply 
recognition of any particular boundaries 
nor prejudice the status of any state 
or territory 
Angola 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Congo (ex-Zaire) 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Maurirania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
and the Grenadines 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Vanuatu 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe Income generation in Mali. 
A woman turns to basket weaving 